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BYU Prelaw Review Mission
Statement

T

he mission of d1e Brigham Young UniYersity Prelaw Review
is to pru,·ide opportunities for undergraduate studcms to:

1. Gain further knowledge about writing and publishing,
2. Prepare for writing in law school,
3. Become familiar with tbe Bluebook citation method,
4. Showcase their writing and editing abilities, and
5. Create bonds that help people work together more effectively.
Through these opportunities, the B\"U Prelaw Review strives to prepate students more fully for law school and bu.ild a solid reputation
for the journal as a recognized scholarly publication.

PuBLISHER's

NoTE

It is with great pleasure that 1 present to you the 21" volume of
rhe Bligham1 (umg Unit:mi!J·Prelaw Ret•ie1v. This year the B1 V Prelm1•Re!'if11
has truly reachctl new heights of professionalism thanks to the incredible
efforts of our student editors and authors. Specifically, there are three
things that ha,·e contributed to making this journal so impressive.
First, the organjzational structure bas been modified this year
to more accurately reflect the structure of a law school law re\'iew
and to allow more students to take on responsibilities and excel in
specific areas. In previous years, the only leadership positions
available were those of Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor, with
the rest of the positions being staff editor positions. Last year's
EIC and Managing Editor worked towards a more cffecti,·e model
by creating the positions of production editor, lead editors, assistant
lead editors, and assistant production editors. This year's EIC, Megan
Woodhouse, and ~Ianaging Editor, Jonathan Beutler, took this
model a step farther and created addi uonal positions of leadership
including the positions of lead design editor, lead citations editor, ::tnd
fundraising assistant. The result was that more students were able
to have leadership experiences and the overall work done was of a
hjgher quality as each student worked to excel in their specific role.
Second, whereas in years past the work on the journal has
taken place largely on an out-of-class volunteer basis, tlus year, through
d1e efforts of Megan Woodhouse, an actual university credit class was
created and held bi-weekly through the fall and winter semesters. ln
the class, editors received intcnsh·e training in both substantive editing
and technical editing, while authors received weekly critiques on their
articles and were given specific assignments to rewrite and refine their
pieces. As a result, both the writing and editing processes were much
more thorough and have produced thoughtful, substantive articles.
Third, the efforts of the students involved in the journal this
year have been outstanding. Megan Woodhouse is a unique individual
with a passion for the tasks she desires to accomplish who has
consistently gone above and beyond what was required of her. Jonathan
1

I'll

Beutler has been an admirable support to her and has contributed in
so many ways, often going unnoticed for his efforts. Additionally, the
work of rhe indi,·idunJ editors and ~utho rs has been truly impres1>ive.
l n conclusion, because of the elements described above, l
truly believe this to be the best edition of the journal eYer published.
1 hope that as you read the journal you will concur that the work
presented is of an unusually high quality for undergraduate students.
\\'hat a pleasure it has been, and continues to be, to work with such
fine individuals on a daily basis here at Brigham Young University.
Carherine Bramble, J.D.
Prelmv Adz,isot; B) 'U
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EDITOR-IN-CHIEF's

NoTE

The 2007 edition of the 8111 PrelaJJJ Ru~e1v showcases the
successful fuJfillment of the journal's new mission statement. The
fifth point in the mission statement, "creating bonds that help
people work together more effectiYely," has played an integral role
in the success of this year's edition. Efforts to build unity among
the editorial staff and authors have resulted in unprecedented
enthusiasm, which has helped the journal achieve its newly defined
mission. E.B. \"Xt11ite closes his famous children's book, Charlotte~ Web,
with the line, "It is not often that someone comes along who is a
true friend and a good writer." Not only have many good writers
been trained dus year, but true friendships have been fostered.
Several successful aspects of the 2006 edition have been
continued this year. Sincere thanks is extended to Robert Snyder
and Catherine Bramble for the changes they implemented last year,
particularly broadening the range of article topics, creating positions for
lead editors, and instituting the use of the Bluebook citation method.
The Pre/em' Retie1J' has continued to find the use of lead editors to be
invaluable, and we thank Jan Dawson, Jeff Harris, and Chris Bates for
their significant contribution to the editing of the journal. ln addition
to having lead editors, two new production positions were created.
Sara Sn1ith spent several hours working as the Lead Citations Editor
and effectively organized a team of production edimrs to complete the
necessary source checking for the journal with very lin1ited Bluebook
training. Taylor Profita enthusiastically approached the new position
of Lead Design EditOr by creating a new template for the journal and
training the entire journal staff in Adobe lnDesign. His signficant
contributions greatly aided in the prodcution of the journal this year.
Building on the success of last year's journal has allowed this
year's leadership to create a more organized and efficient editing schedule
and process. You may notice that the 2007 edition is being printed
much earlier in the year than previous editions of the journal. The
planning and writing for this year's journal began a full year ago in April
ix

2006. Adherence to ueadlines and an increased level of participation
on the parr of our auLhors have made this earl)' production possible.
There are se,·eral people whose support and guidance have aided
in publishing d1e 8) 1 l PrelaJJJ Rez:iew. I wouJd like to thank Catherine
Bnunble for her guidance and trust in our student editors and authors.
Linda Bunter Adams and Mel Thorne have been excellent resources
for editing instruction. Their years of experience working with student
publications and their willingness to offer assisrance provided the
stability needed for a journal relying on amateur undergraduate editors
and authors. I would also like to thank Professor Steve Averett of rhe
BYU Law School for offering tours of the I loward \~ Hunter Law
Library and research and citations aid to our staff. Lastly, this work
couJd not have been accomplished without the unwavering dedkation
of Jonathan Beut.ler and his willing attitude to work together on
any project requiring our attention. It is with great pleasure that ]
present this edition of the BY1J Pre/au' Revieu; to you for your reading.
Megan \XIoodhouse
Editor-i11-Chiif
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E DITOR's
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This eclition of the B) "L- Pre/ant Rniell' represents the exhaustiYe
efforts of a cohesive team of dedicated and skilled undergraduate
students with whom I have been privileged to work this year. I
first worked with the Pre/an• Rtl'im• in 2002 as a ~taff eclitor. Since
rhen, l ha,~e ";rnesscd firsthand the significant progress that we
have made. The quality of our journal's content and production
bas improved as we stri\'e to deli\'er a reputable publication. As I
graduate this rear from BYU, I reflecr on the wonderful lessons
I have learned through my association ,.,·ith the PrelaJJ' R.etim•.
The Pre/an• Rtrim/r primary mission is to produce an excellent
academic journal, but just as important is our objecti,·e to prepare
undergraduate students for future educational and career pursuits in
law. As u ndergraduate writers. and eclitors at Brigham Young University,
we are seeking to p t·epare for leadership roles in the legal world and
contribute to society in a meaningful way. The extensive technical
training that students ha\·e receh·ed by way of the Prela11• Rnim•has been
\'Cry important. .\!embers of our eclitorial board ha\'e been rrainedin the
Bluebook system of legal citations, an excellent asset in their preparation
for law school. H aving worked ·with the Pre/au' Revim• has been a
particularly useful met hod to prepare for our entrance to the legal world.
T he articles in this journal ha\'e been chosen because of
the diverse issues they address. This eclition's articles cover a
broad spectrum of timely issues, including campaign finance
reform and age discrimination. The acclaimed political journalist,
llelen T homas, declared that, "l don't think a tough question
is clisrespectful," and we apply this same principle to the work
in which we ha\'C participated. ~'e ha\'e sought to analyze legal
problems and issues '' hile asking questions and seeking solutions.
\X'e on the editorial board haYe stood on the shoulders of giants,
who must be recognized . l\legan Woodhouse deserves p rofound
thanks for her exemplary leadership and commitment to the mission of
the PrelaJJ' Ret'ieJJ'. 1 commend Megan for such deYoted work to make
this journal a respectable and accurate collection of legal scholarship.
xi

Also, thanks to Catherine Bramble at the BYU Prelaw Advisement
Center, for her unwavering support and constant willingness to
assist in our ecliting endeavors. Because of such leadership, the
Br'U Prelmt' Rez•iell/ is a leader among undergraduate legal journals.
As you continue reading, I invite you to Jearn
about the "'ide array of topics addressed in this journal. I
gladly present to you this edition of the B1V Pre/au' Rel'it:JJ-'.
Jonathan McCarthy Beutler

Managing Editor
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l.

l NTRODUCTJON

n the late 1990s, entertainment industry groups like the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recorrung
Industry Association of America (RIAA) faced a major threat
to their business model: digital media. Although the ability to
make copies of analog media, such as by dubbing a cassette tape
or recording a televjsion broadcast, had been around for many
years, digital merna offered the ability to make perfect copies.
While the quality of analog copies declines with each generation,
digital media alJow for infinite wpies with no reduction in quality. 2
The advent of new ways ro copy and use digital media, paired
with the instant dispersion capabilities of the lmernet, brought
justified fears that piracy of copyrighted content would increase. 3
As part of its crusade to protect digital content, the
entertainment industry resorted to Digital Rights Management (DRI\1),
the term for a technological system that restricts access tO digital
media. For example, a digital sound file downloaded from Apple's
popular iTunes store has restrictions that prevent a comumer from
playing it on an MP3 player produced by another manufacturer, and
a DVD movie has digital protection that prevent users from copying
the movie onto a computer's hard drive. The entertainment industry
sought, and obtained, legal protection against the circumvention

I

Gary Tyler Hilton is a junior at Brigham Young UniYersity majoring in
Spanish Translation and Linguistics. I Ie plans to attend law school beginning in the
fall of 2009. Tyler is from Cedar Hills, Ut:th.
2
Eric Schlacter, T he lntcllcctual Property Renaissance in C)'berspacc: Why
Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKF.LI;:Y T 1.CI I L. J., 15,
19-20 (1997).
3
Ser Editorial, Protecting Digital Copyrights, ~.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1998, at
A20.
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of DRM systems in the form of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, or DMCA, which President Clinton signed into law in 1998:~.
Section 1201 of the DMCA made it illegal to circumvent or
distribute tools for the purpose of circumventing DIUv1 systems.5
\'\'hile the goal of the DMCA was to stop piracy on the 1nternet
and elsewhere, it has not proven effective in doing so. Section 1201 has
introduced many unimended consequences that have injured legitimate
consumers and competitors, who now find legally backed restrictions
to otherwise lawful uses of digital content. Congressman Rick Boucher
has introduced an amendment to the DMCA, called the Digital1\Ieclia
Consumers' Rights Act (DJ\fCRA), that remedies rnany of the DMCA's
unintended conseqllences. Congress should pass this amendment
because the DMCA currently puts copyright legislation into the hands
of copyright holders, criminalizes legitimate fair use of digital mectia
by the public, and stifles market competition, all the while failing in its
goal to prevent Internet piracy and protect creators of original works.

II.

P L \CING LEGISLATION IN THE H ANUS OF CoPYRJGI:JT H o LDERS

\X'hen Congress passed the DMCA, it effectiYely transferred
many areas of copyrightlegislation into the hands of copyright holders. 6
Though giving \i.rtuallawmaking power to g roups who are the primary
beneficiaries of the mles they create is very dangerous, the DMCA
does just that. In a sense, DAAl systems are comparable to fences.
While property owners may use fences to protect their property, it
would be unwise to pass a law banning the crossing of fences, because
sometimes there is a legitimate reason for doing so, such as to retrieve
a piece of personal property. In addition, a law that prohibits the
4
See ge1uroi!J U.S. CcwYRlGHT 0FFTCI3, SUl\l?IL\RY: THI:i DlGITc\L l\1u.LENNIU~l
C1 li'YRlGIIT AcT 01· 1998 (1998), http:/ / www.copyri.ght.gov / legislation/ dmca.pdf
(discussing background and purposes of the DMCA).

5

6

17 u.s.c.s. § 120 l (2003).
See Eu.crno"c FR E.LDOM FROI'.TILR, U~I~TEl\.'DLD CoNM· QU&'<CI-'~~= SE\'EN

DJ\.1C1\ 9 (2006), http:/ /www.eff.org/lP/DMCr\/DMCA_
unintended_,·4.pdf.

YEARS UNDER THL

2

Unfair Use

crossing of fences is unnecessary to protect private property, because
private property is already protected w1der trespassing and other laws.7
Similarly, DRM srstems act as fences against efforts to gain access
to copyrighted material. I n many cases, the end result of actions to
circumvent DRl\ti systems falls under the doctrine of "fair use," which
allows exemptions to copyright law "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching .. . scholarship, or research."<~
Pair use is an intentionally vague and evolving area of copyright law
that leaves many questions up to the courts.9 When ruling on fair use
issues, courts consider the purpose of the use of the work (such as
whether it is commercial o r noncommercial), the nature of the work,
the amount of the work being used, and the effect of that use on the
work's market value. w Many of these questions remain undecided,
but Section 1201 prevents the courts from ruling on the issue at all
by making the initial circumvention illegal. In other words, since
the DMCA makes it illegal to cross the fence in the first place, it is
impossible to determine the legality of the purpose behind the crossing.
Because the D MCA criminalizes the initial circumvention of
D RM systems, the law gives copyright holders the chance to decide
what constitutes fair use of their content, and copyright holders
have routinely ru led in their own favo r by restricting uses that would
otherwise be legal. The opinion of copyright holders and the opinions
of the courts, however, do not always coincide. For example, in the
1984 Supreme Court case Sot!)' Corp. z: U11iversa/ Cit;• St11dios, Inc., 11
copyright holders fought to ban the newly invented VCR because
7

Su T1~tOTHY B. LEE, C.\TO h

STITL-JE, CiRCL'~f\·E:-.IIl':G CmiPETITil>'-: THE

P ER\'ERSE CoNSEQllE.I\ICF.s o F THE DJGIT\L ~IILLE."-"Nitr~r CoPYRIGHT Acr 2

(2006),
http:/ /www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa.564.pdf (comparing anti-circumvention laws w
fences).
8
17 u.s.c.s. § 107 (2003).
9
Sff U.S. Copyright Office - Fair Use, http:/ / www.copyright.gm"/As/ fl102.
html Qast ~'isited Dec. 12, 2006) (discussing the difference between fair use and
infringement).
10
U.S. Copyright Office- Fair Use, http: / /www.copyright.gov/As/A 102.
html Qast visited Dec. 12, 2006).
11
464U.S.4 17 (1984).
3
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of its capability to record copyrighted tele\1sion broadcasts for later
viewing. NeYertheless, the Court found these acts of "rime-shifting"
to be a fair use by consumers. More recently, the music industry inhially
argued in Metro-Gold~ryn-Mq_>•er Studios lttc. t~ Groksterl 2 that copying a
CD's tracks onto a computer and then tmnsferring those tracks to
Apple's iPod in 1\fP3 format \t;•as "perfectly legal." 13 Later io a brief
to the U.S. Coprrigbt Office, industry groups contradicted themselves
by proclaiming the action not to be a fair use. 1+ D espite copyright
holders' inconsistency and self-interest, Section 1201 allows them to
set their own rules by writing DRM restrictions on whatever they do
not deem co be a fair use of their content, and then have full legal
backing against efforts to bypass those restrictions. Because there are
no limits as to which types of DRM systems are permitted (only that
the system ''effectively controls access to a work" 15), copyright holders
have the potential to effectively rewrite copyright law as it pertains to
their content because the conditions they set are backed by the DMCA.
The DMCA gives copyright holders this power despite tbe
fact that DRi\1 systems can potentially harm consumers, as the recent
Sony Bl\IG Music Entertainment "rootkit" settlement demonstrates.
In the case, consumers filed complaints against Sony BMG because
of certain D R.r\1. software Sony HMG had 1mplanted in its CDs. 16 The
complillms alleged that the software limited the number of copies of
the CDs that could be made and also forced consumers to use Sony
or J\licrosoft software to play rhe CDs on a personal computer. The
12
125 S. Cr. 2764 (2005).
13
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, l\IG~I , .. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005), available at http:/ /wW\\:Supremecourt:us.gm'/oral_argurnems/ :lrb"llment_
transcriptS/04-480.pcl£
14
Joim Replr Comments of Association of ,\mcricnn Publishers et al., In
re E....emption to Prohibition on Circum,·ention of Copyright Protection Systems
for Access Control Technologies, No. RM 2005-11, a1 22-23 (U.S. Copyright Office
Feb. 2, 2006), available at http:/ /www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11mctalitz_
AAP.pdf.
15
17 U.S.C.S. § 1201 (a)(3) (2003).
16
In 1'1' Sony BMG CD Technologies Litigauon, No. 05-CV-09575-NRB
(S.D.~. Y. 2005).

Unfair Uo;c

DRM software also prohibited users from transferring songs to Apple's
iPoJ portable music player. ,- Each of these actions are considered fair
uses. Even worse, however, were the risks that this software posed to
consumers by the CO\'ert way in which it operated. Upon inserting the
CD into the computer, an End l T ~cr License Agreement confronted
the user. The complaint~ alleged th:n this agreement tlid not disclose
the limits placed on the audio files.' ri The software then proceeded
to install a "rootkit", a soft\,·are tool used to hide programs, inside
the system. 19 This rootkit was also capable of hiding other programs,
meaning that it could also cloak v iruses and other malicious soft\vare.
Morco,·er, the rootkit essentially disabled security measures like
firewalls and anti-spyware programs, exposing the computer to attack.~'
Thomas Hesse, president of Sony BMG's Glo bal Digital Business,
ga,·e one example of his industry's attitude towards consumers when
he said, "M ost people, I think, don't even know what a rootkit is, so
why should they care about it?"21 lt was impossible to uninstall the
rootkit until Sony, in response to complaints, later created software
for that purpose.2.' EYentuaUy, the case was settled and Sony B~IG
compensated consumers for the crippled CD s.2J The complaints
against Sony BMG illustrate why it is unwise to allow companies to
haYe legally backed free reign ro impose DR.t\1 systems on consumers.

17
ln 1'r Sony BMG CD Technolo~es Litigation, No. 05-CV-09575- Rl3
(S.D.N.Y 2005), at 5.
18
ld. at 6.
19
Jd. at 7.
20
!d. at 7-8.
21
Sony Music CDs Under Fire from Prh-:tc\' Ad,·oc:ucs (NPR radio
broadcast, ).forrung f:.dttion, No,·. 4, 2005), :t\-ailable at http:/ h ..-wv.·.npr.org/
templates/ story/ story.php?story 1d - 4989260.
22
In ''r, uny B~lG CD Technologies Litigation at 8, No. 05-CV-09575
(NRB) (S.D.~.\ . 2005).
23
So:>~\ / B~IG, SntM \RY l"1rrtCT (2006), http:// www.
!l<>nybmgcdtech~ettlemt'nL.com/pdfs/SummaryNotice.pdf.
'i
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III.

CRThHNALIZATION OF FAIR

UsE

Section 1201 of the DMCA also criminalizes legitimate fair use
rights of consumers. Violators of Section 1201 can face up to $500,000
in fines and five years in prison for the first offense.24 The S01!J case
showed that despite the protests of copyright holders, noncommercial
"time-shifting" of copyrighted television programs constitutes a fair
use. There are other examples of efforts by copyright holders to
restrict fair use rights. Today, the personal computer is probably the
most frequently used tool for making digital copies. The Audio Home
RecordingAct (AHRA) of 1992 prohibits copyright holders from suing
consumers who use digital audio recording deYices to make digital
copies for noncommercial use/5 in exchange for royalty payments on
recording materials 26 and the requirement that companies implement
copying controls on recording devices. 27 The personal computer
is not considered to be a "digital audio recording device" and thus
does not receive immunity under the act, but there are indications its
use also falls under fair use. In R1AA 11. Diamond .Nltdtimedia 5_ystems,
lnc. 28 , the RIAA sued Diamond, an electronics company, in order to
halt Diamond's production and sale of the Rio, one of the first of
today's popular portable 11P3 players. The RIAA alleged that the
Rio was not subject to the AHRA and did not employ the copying
controls.29 The court determined that while tl1e Rio was not considered
a "digital audio recording device" under the Act, the procedure of
"space-shifting", in which an audio file is transferred from a CD to a
computer as a very large audio file and then compressed into a much
smaller MP3 fi le, was a "paradigmatic noncommercial personal use
entirely consistent with ilie purposes of the Act." 30 ln doing so, the
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

17 u.s.c. § 1204 (2003).
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2003).
17 u.s. c. § 1003 (2003).
17 u.s. c. § 1002 (2003).
180 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
Jd. at 1075.
ld. at 1079.
6
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courts quoted a Senate report from the time of the AHRA showing
that the purpose of the act was to "ensure d1e right of consumers
to make analog or digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for
their private, noncommercial use." 31 The Dl\ICA currently restricts
many of ilie rights Congress established in passing the Af IRA.
Consumers have more rights than copyright holders will concede
iliern, and the Di\ICA unfairly criminalizes the exercise of those rights.
One finds examples of how copyright holders have criminalized
frur use in lhe current market for music downloads. Today, every legal
music download service in cl1e United States offering a large amount
of content from major record labels embeds DRM systems into ilieir
auclio files. This prevents a file purchased at Apple's iTunes store from
being played on an 1fP3 player manufactured by any other company,
and also prohibits a file purchased from Napster or the \XIalmart Music
Store from playing on Apple's iPod. Although it would seem that based
on Diamond and the AHRA converting a legitimately purchased music
file from one format to another would constitute a fair use, Section
1201 prohibits circumventing the DRM systems embedded in the files
in order to transfer formats. Tbjs means that if a person who purchases
cl1eir digital music collection from Apple ever wants to switch from
ilie iPod to a different brand of MP3 player or vice versa, he o r she
has to repurchase their entire collection in order to avoid prosecution.
One sees another example of using Section 1201 to crimlnalize
potential fair uses in 321 St11dios v. Afetro GoldJJ!)Il Mr!Jer Studios, Inc. 32
321 Studios created the programs DVD X-COPY and DVD Copy
Plus, both of ~which allow users to decrypt the Contents Scrambler
System (CSS), a DRl'\I system embedded in DVD moYie releases to
prevent copying of ilie content. D ecrypting ilie CSS permitted users
to create an archkal backup copy of DVDs they had purchased.33
i\IGM sued 321 Studios, alleging iliat 321 's software violated ilie terms
of Section 1201 due to its capability to circumvent the CSS system.
The defendants argued that making an archival backup copy of a DVD
31
32
33

S. Rep. No. 102-294, at 86 (1992).
307 F.Supp.2d I 085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
ltl. at I091.
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is an expressly autho rized fair use under copyright laws, 34 and the court
agreed. HoweYer, the court also stared that" ... rhe downstream uses
of the software hy the customers of 321, whether legal or illegal, are
not relevant to determining whether 321 itself is violating the sratutc."35
Thus, 321 Studios lost the case because their software "picked the
lock" on the DR.i\l to make that copying possible. Jn other v.·ords,
because 321 's software allowed consumers to cross a fence, the court
could not consider consumers' reason for doing so when determining
the software's legality. Tbc court also argued that fair use rights are not
limjted under the DJ\lCA because the act only prohibits the trafficking
of circum,~ention de' iet:s, not the act of circum,·ention itself Trus is
largely irrelevant to consumers, howe,er, since most consumers Lack the
technical knowledge required to circumvent DRM systems and must
therefore rely on tools produced by others. Section 1201 can thus be used
to criminalize the avct·age consumer's fair usc of copyrighted materials.

IV LIMIT!

c., 1L-\RKET Co\JPETJTJO~

Section 1201 also stifles legitimate competition in the
markerplace. 36 Because it is illegal to circum\'cnt access controls on
digital media, competitors are potentially prohibited from offering
alternative digital media players that rely on circumvention to
function. One example is RealNetworks' attempt to use its Harmony
software to permit files purchased from its online store to play on
Apple's iPod. Apple has threatened legal action under the DMCA
against ReaiNetworks for these efforts.'" ReaiNetworks' stated in
its Securities and Exchange Commission report: ''Although we
bdieye our Harmony technology is legal, Lhcrc is no assurance that
34
35
36

SHpm note 32, :u I1197.
/d.
Tl~luTm B. 1.1:.1, C.\TO

IMTJTUTE, CIRct lMYI·NTIM.. CollfPE'JTllON: Tu~:.

ACT I (2006),
htlp:/ /www.cato.org/pubs/pal'/pa564.pdf.
37
Matt I lines, 'Stunned' Apple Rails against Real's iPod
Move, C~LT NI:.\XS.C()~l,Jul. 29, 2004, http:/ / ne,,.·s.cum.cum/
'Srunncd'+ Applc+rails+ag:unst- Rt.-al's...-iPod+mon:/2 111{1-I04 1_3-5288378.htmL
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a court would agree w1th our position.""' Rather than imprO\;ng
on their produces to compete in the market, the DJ\1CA encourages
companies to usc legal threats to stifle their competition. These
threats entail the potential for high litigation costs and severe
penalties that discourage innoYation on the part of other companies.
Another example of how thL Di\ICA can stiflt! competition is
the case of 11."\'llltlrk 1~ \"lt~ticColllmlCo111pounJis."' Lexmark sold "prebate"
primer cartridges protected by special software as part of an agrecmem
jn which the customer agreed ro return used cartridges to Lexmark to
be refilled. Static Control Components circumYcnted the software's
authentication process in order to allow competitors to refill the
cartridges, causing Lexmark to sue Static Control Components under
Section 1201.'"1 Static Control Components won the case, but the legal
battle forced the company to keep its product off the market for 19
months.4'
The real loser in these battles is the consumer, who loses
the benefits of market competition when making choices to purchase
copyrighted marcrial-;. These benefits include lower costs and newer
ways to use digital content. Wblle copyright laws Iike the D l\ICA should
prevent piracy, they should not do so at the expense of legitimate
market compericion.

v. O PPOSI~G VIE\\"S
Prevention of piracy is one of the main arguments copyright
holders use in favor of Section 1201.42 Copyright holders fear
that without legal backing, their DRM systems can serYe no useful
38
Reah,ctworks Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at32 (\lay 6, 2005),
a"'ilable at http:// clocs.real.com/docs/im·estors/ Y08--8.pdf.
39
387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
40
ld.
41
Eu:c-rn.O"JI( foRE'F.Oml rrmNTIF.R, UNrNTF.NOr.D CoNSFQIIF.NrES: SE.\"F.N
Yr \RS l':-'DFR THL D~ICA 9 (2006), http:/ /www.eff.org/lPI 01\[C;\/Di\ICA_
unintended_Y4.pdf.
RIAt\ Coprright Laws, http:/ /www.riaa.com/issucs'Vo5Ccopy.right'Vo5Cb
42
ws.asp#millen last \lsncd Dec. 9, 2006).
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purpose in stOpping pirates. As Jack Valenti, bead of the MPAA
said about amending the DMCA, " lt legalizes haclcing. lt allows
you to make a copy or many copies. And the 1OOOth copr of a
DVD . .. is as pure and pristine as the originaL You strip away aU
d1e protective clothing of that DVD and leave it naked and alone."n
Yet, this "protecti,•e clothing" does not stOp piracy.44 With
copy protection schemes, the t}uestion is not if they will be broken,
but: when. 45 Indeed, peer-to-peer file sharing networks still teem
with copyrighted content. DRM systems originally protected much
of this content, but computer users cracked these systems shortly
after the content's release. Additionally, because of the Internet,
once one copy has been unlocked, infinite copies can be made and
distributed globally. The circumvention of the DRl\1 may have taken
place in a country without DMCA-like laws, which when paired with
the degree of anonymity tl1e Internet offers makes prosecution of
actual pirates under the DMCA extremely difficult. The Napster
phenomenon, which initiated ·widespread file-sharing of music and
other media through peer-co-peer networks on the Internet, occurred
after Congress passed the DMCA. A&M Records sued Napster4 ~
and won, but not because of the DMCA. In fact, Napster used a
different section of the DMCA (not Section 1201), one that g rants
immunity to Internet sen·ice providers for copyright infringement
by their clients under certain conditio ns;*' as a defense against
allegations o f contributory copyright infringement.48 That the DMCA
43
D eclan ~lcCullagh, Congress Mulls ReYisions to D~I CA, CNE:c1 NE\\S.
May 12,2004, http:/ /news.com.com/Congress+mulls+redsions+w+DMCA
/2100- 1025_3-521 1674.html?rag=nl.
44
TL~IOTHY 13. LE£, CATo INSTITUTE, CtRCOM \ 'ENTJNG CoMPETJTION:TI U:::
P HR\'ERSE Cot-:SEQL E-\1CES oF THE DIGITAl. M .I.LLI:.NNil'•'' CoP\ RJGHT tkT 20 (2006),
http:/ /w\\'\\:cato.org/pubs/pas/pa564.pdf.
45
BRLII 1=. SCH'-Elll, THI:. N.m.. R.-\1.. L.\\\:. <If OIGJT.-u. CoNn-"r 8 (2001),
hrtp:/(\V\\'\"ima.umn.edu/ talks/w<Jrkshops/2-12-16.2001/ schneicr/Digita!Rights.
pdf.
46
A&M Records, Inc. ''· Napster, lac., 239 E3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
47
17 L'.S.C.S. § 512 (2(Hl3).
48
A&~l Records, Inc.''· • apster, lnc., 239 E3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001).
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gave Napster cover for enabling copyright infringement is highly
ironic considering the DMCA's intended purpose to prevent piracy.
A second argument against amending Section 1201 is that
Section 1201 protects artists who create original works. 4CJ In this
sense, Valenti called the DMCA "a viable and critical law that
protects copyright holders from unauthorized abuse of their works
in the digital arena."51' However, at least with music, many artists
object to the record companies' use of DRM restrictions on their
works, which often occurs against their ·will. In Canada, popular
recording artists and groups such as Barenaked Ladies, Avril Lavinge,
and Sum 41 have formed the Canadian Music Creators Coalition
(C:l\ICC), one of whose goals is to preYent Canada's government
from passing legislation like the D:t-.I CA. In an open letter, the
coalition expressed its alarm at record companies' usage of CMCC
members' names to further the companies' own interests, and said
this about technological restrictions on the coa]jtion members' music:
Artists do not support using digital locks to
increase the labels' control over the distribution,
use and enjoyment of music or laws that prohibit
circumvention of such technological measures. T he
government should not blindly implement decadeold treaties designed to give control to major labels
and take choices away from artists and consumers.
Laws should protect artists and consumers, not
restrictive technologies. Consumers should be able

49
~lPAA's Valenti Applauds 1 ew York Second Circuit Coun of Appeals
Decision to Uphold Lower Court D ecision in "Motion Picture Industry DeCSS
Case, http:/ /www.mpaa.org/2002_05_1 7a.asp (last \"isited Dec. 8, 2006). See also
I lilary Rosen Testimony at DCi\'IA I learin~, http:/ /www.riaa.com/news%5Cnewsl
etter'Vo5Cpressl999%5C102899_2.asp Qast visited D ec. 8, 2006).
50
.:\lPAA's Valenti Applauds New York Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Decision to Uphold Lower Court Decision in :'\fotion Picture Industry DeCSS
Case, http:/ /w\vw.mpaa.org/2002_ 05_ 17a.asp Qast \"isited Dec. 8, 2006).
II
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to transfer the music they buy to other formats under
a right of fair use, wid10ut having to pay twice. 51
Often, it appears, the middlemen (the record companies
in this case), not the producers or consumers, reap the most
benefit from Dfuvi restrictions because they can hold both
sides hostage, especially when backed by leg]slation such as the
DMCA. This hinders the distribution of artists' material because
content crippled by DR.l\I systems is less attractive to consumers.
Although restrictive copyright laws like the DMCA may benefit
creators of original works in the short term, the law's overall effect is
negative. Digital copyright restrictions have the potential to prevent
worksfromeverreachiogthepublicdomain.52 Creativeworksarenotborn
from nothing, but draw from the work of previous creators. 53 A limited
public domain ultimately limits the pool from which creators of works
can draw and thus hinders their ability to build upon the works of others.

VI. PROPOSED A.\m

Di\IE:-.:T TO S ECTION

1201

To address the DMCA's problems, in 2005 Congressman
Rick Boucher introduced the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act
(DMCRA). The DMCRA, among other things, amends Section 1201
by adding the following: "[A)nd it is not a violation of dus section
to circumvent a technological measure in order to obtain access to
the work for purposes of making noninfringing use of the work." 54
This amendment restores fair use rights to legitimate consumers
and competitors while still allowing for penalties against those who
51
Letter from Ste,·en Page, et al., Canadian Music Creators Coalition, to
Maxime Bernier, i\fi ruster of Industry and Bev Oda, :Minister of Canadian Heritage
(2006) anilable ar http:/ /www.musiccreators.ca/docs/Open_Letter_to_Ministers.
pdf.
52
\X'illiam
Fisher m, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.K~'<T L. Rt-.\'. 1203, 1233 (1998).
53
RobertS. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?, N.i: Tl~fFS ~L\G., Jan. 25,
2004, at 40, 42.
54
fl.R. 1201 § S(b)(t) (2005).
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circumvent a technological measure in order to infringe a copyright. 55
The amendment also includes other provisions favorable to the
consumer, namely codifying the So'!J' Supreme Court decision that
hardware or software products capable of noninfringing uses do not
\iolate the copyright law,56 allowing exceptions to Section 1201 f0r
purposes of scientificresearch,S7 and requiring companies who sell copyprotected CDs to label those CDs as such.58 Putting the Sot!)' decision
into law would be particularly beneficial as it would allow companies
to create products that circumvent DRM restrictions for legitimate
consumers,59 who generally lack the technical knowledge to do so.
Supporters of the D111CRA include lhe American
Association of Law JJbraries, the American Library Association,
the Association of American Universities, and various technology
and consumer advocacy groups.60 These groups recognize the
importance of granting digital media consumers the rights that
have been guaranteed for many years by the fair use doctrine.

VU.

CoNCLUSION

The DJ\1CRA resrores to consumers the fair use rights that
copyright law has granted them for many years. lt is somewhat
disheartening to purchase a legal copy of a work, only to find oneself
unable to use it according to fair use rights, especially when so much
unprotected content is readily available via the Internet and other
sources. \Vhen consumers are able to use digital media according to
55
Congressman Rich Boucher- Boucher's Statement before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the lnternet, http:/ /www:boucher.
house.g0\·/index.php?option=com_content&task= ,•iew&id= 24&Itemid= (last
\'isitcd Dec. 8, 2006) (regarding II.R. 107, an earlier instance of the bill).
56
Digital ~Iedia Consumers' Rights Act, H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. § S(b)(2).
57
H.R.I 201 at§S(a).
58
H.R. 1201 at§ 3.
59
Boucher, s11pra note 55.
60
Congressman Rich Boucher- Supporter List, http:/; ,,.·ww.boucher.house.
go,·/index.php?option=com_content&:task=,·iew&id=25&Itemid- (last dsitecl
Dec. 8, 2006).
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fair use, they have an attractive alternative to illegal downloading and
other infringing activities. This benefits both copyright holders, by
encouraging consumers to purchase their content, and consumers,
by permitting them to use their digital media with more freedom.
If Congress were to pass the DMCRA, companies would
once again be allowed to observe and improve upon competitors'
products without the threat of legal action, in turn benefiting the
marketplace through heightened innovation and competition. Indeed,
such innovation and competition led to the VCR, the MP3 player, and
many other digital technologies. Though copyright holders have often
fought these new devices in the courts, these devices have proven
to benefit both copyright holders and consumers by broadening the
options for producing and consuming creative works. The filmmalcing
industry, for example, has benefited greatly from the sale and rental
of videos, something it did not foresee at the advent of the VCR.
The proper way copyright holders should cope with the capabilities
of digital media is to find new business models which can capitalize
on those capabilities, not hinder those capabilities through legislation.
The DMCRA would also rake copyright legislation out
of the hands of copyright holders and place it back in the courts
and lawmaking bodies where it belongs. These measures would
provide a better context for la\.vmakers to use as the}' draft new
legislation to complement existing copyright laws in the digital age.
For these reasons, Congress should remedy the DMCA's
unintended consequences by passing the D MCRA. The DMCRA
will enable fair use rights to continue to evolve and will create an
opportunity to develop solutions that fairly manage the rights of all.

Cnrnpaign Finance Refonn

THE BENEFITS OF C /\J\lPAJGN

FINANCE REFOR.\1

BY ScoT BAYLLS

1.

1::\TR< >DL'CTIC >:-\

n d1e world of politics, many measures arc taken to assure Y1ctorr
and apprmal. Oftentimes, politicians are inAuenced not only
by the majority, but also by small interest groups. As such, '\\;th
each year, politicians become more and mote refined in their ability to
appease interest groups rather than improYe the economy or address the
needs of their constituents. In campaigning for power, the candidates
\vith the most funds are able to improve their chances of winning.
HoweYer, due to the misuses of campaign financing, campaign finance
reform is needed to bring integrity back to politics. To understand
how campaign finance reform can positively affect politics, one needs
to explore the problems occurring in campaigns, the measures used to
reform campaign financing, and rhe ' ·iews concerning these measures.

I

11. C.\.\IP\IGt--.

p,, \1'\CF

Campaign financing is becoming increasingly complex as
politicians fight for apprO\·al and interest groups yearn for attencion.
In the ideal world, politicians would do that which is best for society as
a ,,·hole; however, as politiciam seek power and approval, they often do
whate,·er is best for themseh·es. Pri\'ate groups understand this principle
and so they realize that, by supporting politicians, their indiYidual
motives will be met. ln fact, critics say that donors such as "wealthy
individuals, companies, labor unions, [and] interest groups" belie,·e
that they can influence public officials, and therefore public policy.2
Actually, because d1ese donors, both Large and small, can have a greater
Scot Bayles is a junior at Brigham \oung Uni,·crsity majoring in English.
He plans lOgo tO law school after graduating. Scot is from La Crescenta,
California.
2
Campai!o(n Finance Re form: The Issue, lmp://www.opensecrets.org/
news/ campaignfinancc/indcx.asp (last 'isited Jan. II, 2007).
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inAuence on politics than YOters themselves, this is a concern for many
citizens. Donors help politicians because it serves the donors' personal
agendas. Some critics believe that donors see their contributions as
an investment that will hopefully benefit them in the future. 3 The
contributions of private groups are referred to as "soft money."

A. SoFT 1\'fo::-.mY
Soft money is traditionally defined as "contributions made to
the national parties for 'party-building' activities that were exempt from
the limits and restrictions of normal contributions."4 As soft money is
given to politicians by pri,·ate groups and inc.lividuals, hard money is the
money that is aiJocated to the parties by the government. 5 While hard
money has restrictions, soft money does not. For decades, soft money
has been used by politicians but not to d1e same extent that politicians usc
it today. Because these contributions are unlimited, politicians use the
money they receive in a number of ways. Examples of the contributions'
use include "get-out-the-vote drives, bumper stickers, yard signs, and
generic TV ads that say 'Vote Democratic' or 'Vote Republican'."6
Though at first these activities seem harmless and reasonable,
campaign contributions in the form of soft money have soared over
the last decade (Figure 1).- The rise in the amount of soft money that
politicians receive not only causes the rise in "parry-building" activities
but also it accounts for the rise in measures that politicians have passed
to accommodate their respective comributors. In addition, Figure 2
shows the dramatic increase in soft money contributions by both parties
in reladon to hard money." The rise in hard money allocations by
the go,·ernment is proportional to inflation and nor changes in policy.
3
Campaign Finance Reform: The fssue, mJmz note 2.
4
Larry Makinson, The Old Money Ain't \'\"hat lt Used to Be. Capital Eye,
\\'inter 2001, http:// w·ww.opensccrets.org/ newsletter/ ce7 4/softmoney.asp.
5
ld.
6
!d.
7
Id.
8
ld.
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Figure 1
As a result, the problems of campaign financing can be seen
throughout politics and not necessarily within any single political parry.
Nonetheless, the fact that the Republican Party utilized more private
contributions than the Democratic Party can proYide support for the
triumph of the Republican Party in the 2000 Presidential election.
Possible correlations include the facr that Republicans received
more funds to help them with their campaigning, so they were able
to influence the voter better than D emocrats. ln addition, these
added contributions imply that Republicans receiYed more support
from larger and more influential private groups than did Democrats.
However, not all soft money contributions have to go directly
to the party. "Do-It-Yourself" soft money allows private groups to
support a parry without the party being held accountable. For example,
a company can run a commercial that supports a politician's platform
without directly endorsing the politician. Because it is too
difficult to monitor the prh·ate group that is promoting the
party, d1e candidate indirectly benefits from tl1e group's
contribution.9 Consequently, contributors of soft money provide
9

Makinson, .rHpm note 4.
p
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the core problem for regulating campaign financing as they influence
elections wirhour being held responsible.

B.

PRESENT- DAY APPLICATIOI'\

Economic principles help to support how politicians are
influenced by interest groups both large and small. ln the world
of economics, self-interest is an important principle. One apparent
example of the economic influence of self-interest is seen in Iowa corn
farmers. Throughout the years, gasoline made with the corn-derived
ethanol \Vas "taxed 5.4 cents less per gallon d1an pure gasoline ... because
it lowers [U.S.] dependence on foreign oil." 10 A 1997 srutly showed,
however, that ethanol was just as harmful as traditional gasoline to the
nation's environment and economy. Neverd1eless, a 7.1 billion dollar
subsidy for oil by the U.S. Government enabled Iowa corn growers to
charge 30 cents more on the price of every bushel of corn sold. 11 As
a result, to maintain support from the farmers, politicians during the
2000 presidential elections assured Iowa corn growers that they would
not repeal the tax. In doing so, politicians were more concerned about
receiYing votes from Iowa corn farmers than they were about eliminating
an unnecessary 7.1 billion dollar tax subsidy on ethanol. While seeking
after their own sdf-interest, both the farmers and the politicians did
that ·which would best benefit themselves, but not necessarily the
nation. The reason the U.S. population as a whole was not upset about
this situation is that they did not recognize the impact. Though the
subsidy gready benefited the farmers, the tax increase for the millions
of Americans who had to pay for the subsidy was so small that d1ey
clid not realize what was occurring. 12 Only Senator John McCain of
Arizona opposed the ethanol subsidy. Although Senator McCain did
not win the presidential elections, the foUowing shows that he and
other poljticians haYe made many efforts to reform campaign financing.
10
Ctt \RLES \'\11tt::EL.\1'\ ,
139 (2002).
11

ld.
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Measures to reform campaign financing date as far back as
the Theodore Roosevelt Administration in the early 1900s. President
Roosevelt recognized the need for reform in campaign contributions
and so a number of policies were enacted. \X.irh time these policies
evoh·ed until the Federal Election Campai!,tn Act (ff:.CA) was enacted
in 1971. The act limited the influence of "wealrhy indi,,iduals and
special interest groups on the outcome of federal elections," and it
forced the regulation and publication of finances used by candidates. 13
Such reform was necessary because politicians were being inAuenced
more by special interest groups than by their constituents. ln
addition to these restrictions, the FECA made a number of grants
available to candidates. for example, the General Elections Grant
states that the "RepuhJjcan am] Democratic candidates who win
their parties' nominations for President are each eligible to receh·e a
grant to cover all rhc expense of their general election campaigns." 14
I Iowever, these grants state that nominees who "accept the funds
must agree not to raise private contributions." 15 As candidates were
not allowed to receive pri,·ate contributions, they were enco uraged
to seek the interests of the country and not the interests of prh'ate
agendas. Although these provisions were steps in the right direction
to help reform campaign llnandng, these measures receiYed
opposition and were ultimately reformed by the Supreme Court.
Despite the Fl ~(',.A's efforts, the act received much opposition. In
197 5, SenatorJames L. Buckley of New York and Presidential Candidate
Eugene McCarthy disagreed wirh the FECNs regulations of campaign
fmancing. lcCarthy opposed the country's current campaign finance
laws and felt that the regulations of the FECA were unconstitutional.
Consequentlr, the Supreme Court case Buckley Y. Valeo 16 resulted
13
The FEC and the Fedcrnl Campaign Finance Law Brochure, http://www.
fec.gov/pages/brochure~/ fccfeca.sh tml (last vi Riled .Jan. I I, 2007).
14
ld.
15
ld.
16
Buckler'· Va(('o, 42.4 U.S. 1 (11)76), :wail.tble at http:/ /www.fec.gm·/law/
litigation_CCA_B.shtml#bucklcy.
19
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\\'hen these representath·es filed suit agrunst Francis R. VaJeo, the
FECA representative of the U.S. Federal government. Although the
court follnd some pro,,isions of the FECA unconstitutional such as
the "limitations on expcndinJrcs," it upheld the constitutionality of
most of the provisions." The provisions that were upheld included
the "limitations on contributions to candidates for federal office," the
"recordkeeping provisions of the FECi\'' and the "public financing of
Presidential elections." 1g While people opposed the FECA, campaign
finance reform gained momentum as more pro\isions and amendments
were passed to further the hope of more honest and fair elections.
ln 2002, Senator Feingold and the previously mentioned
Senator McCrun proposed a bill to enforce more specific regulations
on campaign finance. The McCrun-Feingold biU called for a ban on
soft money and placed restrictions on "outside groups airing so-called
'issue ads' that tout or criticize a candidate's position on an issue,
but refrain from explicitlr telling Y:iewers to vote for or against that
candidate." 19 These measures are very important because they help
citizens make necessary changes to their communities rather than
allowing companies and inrerest groups to dominate the political arena.

IV VIE\\'S Co

CERJ'\Ii'G CAMP,\JGN Ft:-~A~CE REFOR.\1

As campaign finance reform has become a \'ery important
topic in today-'s politics, it has received much criticism. The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recognizes a need for campaign finance
reform, butit opposes the measures taken co enforce such a reform. The
ACLU does not support the McCain-Feingold legislation for a number
of reasons. In a statement released soon after the McCain-Feingold bill
was enacted in 2002, the ACLU stated, "We will continue to advocate
reform of the current system - such as our longstanding support for
full public financing- but in doing so we will stress the fidelity to the
principles protected by the FirstAmendmentwiLh the goal of expanding,
17
18
19

/d.
/d.
Campaign f-inance Reform: The Issue, Jtpra nmc 2.
20
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not limiting, political speech."211 The ACLU contends that the new
measures infdnge upon the rights of Americans to exercise their First
Amendment rights and share their public views. The ACLU's claim is
,,alid because it discusses ho"• companies and individuals are unable to
voice their concerns under these restrictions. For example, the ACLU
statement also asserts how the McCain-Feingold bill does not aUow
interest groups such as the NAACP and the NRA to express their
opposition to bills that adversely affect a large number of Americans. 21
The American federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-ClO) has also expressed its opposition
to the McCain-Peingold bill. In a statement released in April of
2002, President John]. Sweeney of the AFL-ClO stated that "this
law also unfairly and severely interferes with the ability of unions to
communicate with the public and to advance working family interests
in the U.S. Congress."22 With campaign finance reform, the group
contends that it will not be able to endorse measures that strengthen
the position of the labor unions. Though the organization recognizes
the need to limit soft money, it feels that the current legislation is
inadequate. 23 While these claims are valid, the present measures to
combat campaign finance reform protect more Americans from the
interest groups that would harm their economic and moral views.
Despite criticism from groups such as the ACLU, other groups
such as CommonCause and Public Citizen have teamed together to
support these reforms. A group devoted to campaign finance reform,
CommonCause has released the following statement: "[Campaign
finance reform] is a proven \Yay to give \'Oters more control OYer
government, make politicians accountable to their voters rather than
their campaign contributors, and level the playing field by giving all
20
ACU I Statement on Campaign Finance Reform, http://w\V\,:aclu.org/
free1;peech/ cfr/ 11403prs2001 030 l .html (last ,·isited Jan.l1, 2007).
21
ld.
22
i\FL-ClO Lawsuit Challenges SeYeral Aspects of New Campaign
Pinance Statue, http:/ /www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/pr04222002a.cfm (last
\'isited Jan. 11, 2007).
23
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cidzens a fair shot at getting elected."24 The group Public Cilli!en also
recognizes the importance of campait,rn finance reform. The group
states that it is imperative to replace private money with pubbc funding
in order to "limit the influence of wealthy special interests."z.; In doing
so, these groups express how the measures enacted by the McCainFeingold bill and others have allowed Americans to become more
inYolved in the political process and to improve the state of the Union.

V Co.

cws1o~

Campaign finance reform is a key factor in assuring that
politicians' actions are motivated by the interests of the country
as a whole and not the interests of private groups. As politicians
continue to misuse campaign finances, their personal agendas ·will
have negative effects on the economy. The las t decade has shown how
campaign contributors have gained too much power m·er elections
and politicians. In order to ensure that politicians regain the trust
of their constituents and work to improve society, campaign finance
reform must be a major priority. By assuring that political campaigns
are not influenced by interest g roups, society will be able to achieYe
its worthy objectives and politicians, in wrn, will regain their integrjt)'.

24
Public Enancing, http:/ /www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK
L\fQiwG&b=202895 0ast visited Jan. 11, 2007).
25
Campaign fo'inanc<.: Reform, http:/ /W'Nw.citizen.org/ wngress/ campaign/
index.cfm (last visiteJ Jan. II, 2007).
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AMATEUR SLAVES:

AN

ETHICAL AND L EGAL ANALYSIS

OF THE T REATMENT OF COLLEGE ATHLETES
BY NATHAN

R. CL'RTIS 1

l.

l NTRODL'CTJO~

n April 2006, Reggie Bush, arguably the most high-profile college
athlete of the decade, faced allegations of accepting payments and
improper benefits while still an "amateur" at the University of
Southern California. These widely publicized allegations have brought
the college sports world once again under heavy scrutiny.2 Athletes in
the revenue-producing sports, specifically men's football and basketball,
provide the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA),
universities, coaches, advertisers, television stations, and many more
with hundreds of millions of dollars in profit; yet these same ath letes
are prohibited from so much as accepting a free ride home from
practice. Although the NCAA and most major universities claim that
college athletics have a principally educational purpose, a closer look
at the system reveals just the opposite to be true-it is a multi-billion
dollar industry dependent on the labor of ill-compensated slaves. It
is time to rethink this system as it Yiolates ethical anu legal doctrines.
In this paper I will debunk some of the prevalent myths concerning
college athletics: the NCAA's claim of amateurism, the university
as an educational institution, and the athlete primarily as a student;
analyze two legal challenges facing the CAA-labor and antitrust
issues; and look at the distinct advantages of a pay-for-play system.

I

Nathan R. Curtis is a junior at Brigham Young l.Jni,·ersity majoring in
Physics with a dnuble minor in Spanish and Mathematics. rlc plans to go to law
school and concentrate on iJHcllectual property law. Nathan is from
Cedar llills, Utah.
2
Charles Robinson & Jason Cole, Cash and Carry, Y \HOO! SPORTS, Sept.
14, 2006, http: / I spons.yahoo.com/ ncaaf/ news?slug=ys-bushprobc&proy=yhoo&t
rpe=lgns.
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U. Tlll·. NCAA AND

A~L\Tl.:.l RISM

The NCAA purports as one of its major principles: ''Studentathletes shall be amateurs ... and their participation should be motivated
primarily by education and by the physkal, mental and social benefits to
be derived ... [S]tudent-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enrerprises."3 lronically, it is precisely the
professional and commercial exploitation of coUege athletes of which
the NCAA is guilty. In the eyes of many the NCAA is the head of a
well-disguised labor cartel that contains its costs by severely limiting
payments to players while standing to make immense profits off their
contributions.4 A thJetes are limited to scholarships - including onfy
tuition and room and board- worth no more than about $30,000 a year
e\·en at d1e most prestigious universities. D espite the NCAA being a
non-profit organization, the executive director brings in over $600,000
a year and other high officials bring in similar amounts. 5 The CAA
irself markets its product and logo,6 and the major conferences market
their games, logos, and even p ermission to use the players, likenesses
and life stories to for-profit televjsion stations for millions of dollars,
thereby promoting the commercial exploitation of student-ath letes.
ln order to preserve its power the r CAA flaunts d1e
amateurism fa<;ade - the idea chat college athletics exist primarily for
talented athletes to further their education and to receive physical
and social benefi ts. The NCAA publishes a three-volume, 1,268
page manual full of restrictions for players and universities to help
maintain amateur status.~ For example, athletes cannot sign with
an agent if they want to maintain eligibility, they must sit out a year
if they transfer from one college to another, and ther cannot earn
3
2006-2007 NCAA Dt\'JSIO'\J I M .-\J\IU.\L 5 (2006), aYailablc at http:/ /w-..vv.~
ncaa.org/library /membership/ division_i_manual/2006-07_d l_manual.pd f.

4

1\KDRE\\' Ztl\IBA.LI:iT, Ll~P.\ID P ROI·ESSlO"'AJ.s: CoMMERCl \1 T~.\1 AND

CONFLICT tN BIG-TIME CoU.EGE SPoRTS

5
6
7

20 (191)9). See tJLro id. at 18.

/d. at 52.
Srt' id. at

4.

ld. at 5.
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more d1an $2,000 from outside employment during the season.~ The
most notable of all regulations is that all college athletes are expressly
prohibited from any sort of pay-for-play, meaning universities cannot
directly pay athletes and, at the same time, athletes cannot use their
sports talent to earn any money above the uni\·ersity scholarship.
Such rules produce some puzzling contradictions. \'\'hy can schools
"pay" players duough scholarships but not through other means?
Does compensation through scholarship not technically negate one's
amateur status? Furthermore, tradttional coUcbre students are not
forbidden from profiting off their talents. A music student can publish
a song and an English student can pro6 t from a book. \'\'hy are athletes
treated differently? The logical response is greed - the NCAA desires
to control its laborers.9 Former Executh'e D irector of the 1 CAA
\\'alter Byers put it best when he said, ..Collegiate amateurism is not a
moral issue. I t is an economic camoufl age for monopoly practice." 111

Ill THE U.

J\'ERSI1'Y AS ,\N EouCATroNAL l NSTITUnoN

Publicly, universities agree \\;th the CAA principle that college
athletics is "motivated primarily by education," but does that explain the
unh ersity's obsession with sports? \X'hy do unh-er<;ities spend millions of
dollars on recruiting, traveling, builtling bigger and better stadiums, etc.?
What is the root of this obsession with sports?T he ans,ver is <.Juite simple.
College sports, namely men•s football and basketball, are big business.
The money generated by these two sports in the last tweh·e
years has increased 300'%, with universities as the primary benefactors.' '
Universities are not the purely etlucational institutions d1ey claim to
be. At the expense of poorly compensated athletes, uniYersities, the
NCAA, major conferences, advertisers, coaches, and te)e, ision stations
8
Zimbalist, s11pm note 4 at 18.
9
Cnug T. Greenle~ CoUege \thJctes Dc:scn·c Some Equity, BL\CI\. bwcs
IN ll!ca-LER Hr>l'CAllnN, Apr. 27, 2000, at62, a\'ailablc at http:/ /w,vw.findarticles.
com/p/articles/mt_mODXK/is_S_I 7 /ai_62297 183/pg_ l.
10
ZI~IB.\LISI, mpra not<.: 4, at 19.
II
Greg Skidmore, Payment for College Football Players in • ebraska, 41
II \R\'. j. 0:-l LEGIS. 319 (2004).
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bring in over $4 billion in revenue each year. 12 Universities, through
participation in bowl games alone, can bring in almost $250 million
every December and January. 13 [n 1999, CBS purchased the rights to
broadcast !\{arch Madness, the men's college basketball tOurnament,
for more than $6.2 billion, which trkkles down to d1e universities that
participate. 14 Interestingly, one court of law even noted more than fifty
years ago that "higher education in thjs day is a business and a big one." 15
Critics of college athletic programs point out that only about
40 Di,-ision I-A institutions operate in the black on a yearly basis. 16
They believe that student-athletes are not exploited because colleges
rarely make any profit off of d1eir play. WhjJe it is true that many
universities' books show losses in the area of sports, this could not be
any further from the truth. The first reason is that it is general practice
that revenue from men's football and basketball be used to subsidize
other collegiate sports that do not bring in enough revenue. 17 Based
on data provided by d1e Office of Postsecondary Education, in 2005
Division 1-A men's football and basketball programs brought in total
revenue of more than $2.1 billion, while expenses were only about
$1.3 billion. On d1e other hand, the revenue gained by all other sports
combined was a mere $294 million, about $577 million less than their

12
Letter from ~CAA President Myles Brand to the Honorable William
Thomas, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means (NoY. 13, 2006),
a\railable at http:// www.ncna.org/ portal/ me<.lia_and_e,•cnts/ pn:ss_room/2006/
no,·ember/ 2006111 S_ response_to_housecommitteeonwaysandmcans.pdf.
13
Thomas O'Toole, $lThi BCS Payouts Sound Great, But ... , USA TODAY,
Dec. 6, 2006, at C I, axailablc at http:// \\'\V\V.usatoda}.com/ sporrs/ college/
football/ 2006-12-06-bowl-payouts_x.htm (calculated by summing the per team
payouts in the Bowl Payout Breakdown chart included in the article).
14
GREEl"lU ie, supm note 9, at I.
IS
Unh: of Dem~er v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 425-426 (Colo. 1953) .
16
Kellr \X'hi1eside, College Athletes Want Cut of Action, liSA Ton.w, Aug.
31,2004, at C.03, m·ailable at http:/ /www.usatoday.com/sports/2004-08-31-toptcn-number-7_x.htm.
17
RJCK TF.t.,.\NDER, Til l! HuNDRED YAno LIE: T11E CoRRPPTION or CoLLEGI:.
FoowuJ ,\ N D \X'lli\T WE C.\N Do To STOP lr 60-61 {1989).
26

Amateur Stoves

total e:-..penses. 18 -ro()/ n of football ant..! basketball programs themsekes
bring in a profit of more than S1 million a year. In fact, during rhe
Unh·ersity of Texas' national championship run from 2005-2006, the
university reported O\'er$42 million in profit off the football team alone.
Other schools reported more than $30 million in profit the same year. 19
Secondly, uni,·ersity accounting .is not an exact and complete
scJence and is not equipped to account for all of the possible ways
d1at uniYersities profit off athletics. An economic study by Urian
Goff, a Distinguished University Professor of Economics at \'\'estern
Kentucky University, came to some interesting conclusions. Goff
concluded empirically that any sort of achievement in athletics brings
a significant increase (sometimes millions of dollars) in general
university contributions, not just in athletics. H e even found that a
major ach.ie,•ement in athlet.icc;, such as a bowl game or an appearance
in March l\Iadness, sparks interest fmm prospective students,
increasing a school's average SAT score. 21 ' After the "Cinderella" run
by George .Mason University to the Final Four, almost 400 more
qualified freshmen enrolled at dte university, forcing the urU\'"ersity to
house some in a hoteJ.2 1 Simply put, athletic programs bring national
exposure, and exposure brings more money and better students.
A similar study cut right to d1e heart of the exploitation issue. A
pair of economists initiared an econometric study to determine exactly
what a successful athlete pro,~ides his uni,·ersity-\vhatis referred to as the
marginal re' enue product. By using regression techniques on extensive
re' enuc data from almost all public and private un.iversi ties, the 199 5
study estimated that a successful football player (one who goes on to
play in the FJ .) brings in more than $500,000 per year in additional
18
Office of Postseconda~ Education, Equny in \thletic..c;, http: / / www.opc.
ed.govI athletics/m~in.asp Qast ,·isitcd Jan. 17, 2007).
19
Rod Gilmore, Colle~c FootbaiJ Players Desenc Pay for Play,ESPN.cmt,
Jan. 17, 2007 http:/ / sport.<>.espn.go.com/ espn/pnnt?id -2.,3362·~type =story.
20
Bnan Goff, Efft:cts of l 1nivcrsity Athletics on the Unh·ersity, in
Er o"o~nc.s or Co111 c;F SrnR1~ 65, R2 (John Fizd & Rodne~ Fort eds., 20114).
21
Andy Kat,., George ~lason's Campus Still Buning o,·er Hoops,
ESPN.coM, Nov. 2, 2006, http:/ /pro"]".cspn.go.com/ncb/columns/
stury?columnist=k:u;candy&id=2647166.
2~
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annual revenue for his university. A "premium" college basketball
player generates more than $1,000,000.22 These figures show just what
universities gain from the labor of uncompensated athletes-the study
clicl not even look at theN CAA or any commercial enterprises and what
they gain from the same labor. Such an unfair system bas been described
as having a "neoplantation mentalit:y"23- it's a modern form of slaYery. 24

IV THb ATHLETE PRL\IARlLY 1\$ A

STCDE~T

Opponents of a pay-for-play system recite two arguments
supporting the status quo: first, student-atbletes already receive
enough "payment" for their participation in sports-a free education25and second, student-athletes are recruited primarily to be students. A
closer look reveals the truth to be that "stutlent"-athletes are required
to put their emphasis on the field, and not in the classroom. Although
critics may have been correct when the NCAA was established
96 years ago, the arena of college sports has changed dramatically.
Though universities say that they git•e scholarships to
athletes, it'smorecorrectthatathletesearnscholarships from the university.
Due to NCAA rule changes a little more than a decade ago, players can
no longer receive a four-year scholarship. Universities are restricted to
granting one-year schoJar!>hips which, to the detriment of the athlete
as a studenr myth, are renewed by performance on the football field or
basketbaU court, not by performance in the classroom.26 The NCAA
does require that modest academic requirements be met by athletes,
but universities have fountl inventive ways around them. Critics also do
22
Robert\'\: Brown & R. Todd Jewell, Measuring ~larginal Revenue
Product in College Athletics: Updated Estimates, in EcoNOMICS Ol· CoU.El;E SPORTS
153, 154 Oohn rizel & Rodney Fort eds., 2004).
23
Steve \X'ulf, Tore that Ball, Lifi that Revenue, T!~ii.l\L\<;.~7.L'IE, Oct. 21,
1996, at 94.
24
Su Z L\IMUST, SlfjJra note 4, at 20.
25
Van Horn': Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal.Rpu:. 169, 172 (1963). Set
aLro TEL\.'-DER, tl(pra n ote 17, at 66.
26
Sten: l\lurp!1)" &Jonathan Pace, A Plan for Compensat.U1g StudentAthletes, BYU Eouc. & L. J., Apr. 1994, at 167, 170.
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not recognize the tremendous number of hours that athletes dedicate
w their sport, leav ing few for academic endeavors. NC,'\A bylaws limit
a student to four hours a day and twenty hours a week of "athleticaUyrelated acthities." Needless to say, universities have found a way aroun<..l
this rule, primarily through the implementation of "optional sessions"
and captain-led practices- which players are obligated to attend in
order to retain their scholarshipY It is actually estimated that athletes
devote anywhere between thirty to si'<t) hours per week to their sport.211
Furthermore, the "free-ride" scholarship packages athletes
receive are never sufficient to cover all of the typical expenses
a college student incurs. By NCAA regulation, scholarships can
include tuition, room, books, board, and nothing else (like spending
money, laundry money, movie money, etc.).29 Coupled with the
fact that many come from disadvantaged backgrounds·"• and are
forb idden to accept money from anyone upon whom they are not
legally dependent, it is clear why athletes complain that they are not
students in that they cannot afford to participate in common collegiate
practices, like going on a date or buying a pizza:11 Most do not even
have the option of supplementing their scholarship through outside
employment. Even though the NCAA does allow players to have
outside employment, they are limited to earning no more than 32,000
during the season. Moreover, most college athletes do not work
because their potential working hours have already been spoken for. 32
The NCAA also limits the number of scholarships a uruversit)r
may grant. Athletes without a scholarship, commonly referred to as
walk-on athletes, practice, train, and play just like scholarship athletes
but receive no compensation whatsoever. AJthough walk-ons are
traditionally not the "stars," they play an integral role in the success
27
28
29

30
31

SKim loRE, supra note 11 , at 325.
Zr~m \1 1ST, supra note 4, at 37.
T EI-·WOER, mpra note 17, at 72. Stt also id. at 69.
WL'LF, s11pro note 23, at 94.

I larry Bruinius, College Players Still Amateurs ... But Barely, CHRISTI \N
MoNnnR, ,\pr. 3, 2000, at 1, available at http:/ /wW\\~csmonitor.
com/2000/0403/p Is4.html. See also T EU...;DFR, mpm note 17, at 69-72.
32
G R£F.Nl..EE, supra note 9, at 1.
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of a team. A recent lawsuit complained that the CAA permits
universities to grant only 85 football scholarships.33 \X'ith an average of
about 117 players on a Division I-A football roster, this leaves 25% of
the athletes participating without a!!)' form of material compensation.
To answer critics it also helps to look at the academic success
of these athletes. Men's football and basketball players, on average,
have lower GPAs and SAT scores than all other college athletes, and
they are significantly inferior to the averages of their respective student
bodjes.J~ Graduation rates are also much lower than national averages.
The Knight Commission II in 2001 reported the graduation rate of
men's football players at 48% and that of men's basketball players at
an appalling 34%. The rates have dropped even more in recent years.35
This would not be the case if universities actually valued education
more than athletic success. Even more damaging to the university's
image are the reports of rampant cheating on the behalf of athletes,
the purpose being to sidestep the modest NCAA mandated academic
requirements in order to help them maintain etigibility.36 One woman
admitted to doing more than 400 pieces of coursework for athletes at her
school. Many athletes receive preferential treatment from professorsearning C's eyen though they never eyen show up for class.r Although
they are rarely caught and sanctioned for such action, "Presidents,
boards of trustees, faculty, conferences, athletic departments, and
coaches have a!J played a role in subverting the educational mission.''3 ~

33
NCAA Sued (h·er Football Sd1olarship Limit of 85, USATuD.W.CO\J,
Mar 20, 2004, http:/ /www.usa roday.coml sportslcoUegelfootbali/2004-05-20scholarship-suit_x.hun.
34
ZJ)Ul\Lll)'T, supra note 4, at 39.
35
Paul D. Staudohar & Barry Zepcl, The lmpacr on Tligher-Education of
Corruption in Big-Time College Sports, in EcuJ'.;muc.'i OF CoLLLGE SroRTS 35, 45
Qohn Fizel & Rodney Fort cds., 2004).
36
See ZlM~.\Ll~T, .mpm note 4, at 4.
37
Gary D'Amato, Academic cheating occurs all the time, professor says,
MILWAUKEE J. SENliNEL, Mar. 14, 1999, at 18, available at Imp:/ /www.findarciclcs.
com/pIarticlesI mi_q n4 196I is_l9990314I ai_n10483813.
38
STAt 001-1 \R & ZLPhL, .Iffpm note 35, at 38.
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V L\BoR IssL t.s
The issue of rhe treatment of revenut:-protlucing college
athletes is not just an ethical one- it is also a serious legal one. For
years athletes h.we been crusading to be recognized as employees
of a university, ant! not just students. The benefits of such legal
recognition are two-fold: li rst, athletes woultl be able to receive
adequate compensation, thus eliminating exploitation issues, and
second, adlletes woukl be eli!:,>ible for workers' compensation in case
of serious injury in the course of play. One of the major legal Aa\\'S of
rhe current system is the lack of cm·erage for student-athletes; if an
athlete with recognized professional potential incurs a career-ending
injury in the course of play or practice, he is entitled to very little, if
any, money from the university. E'·en though he put his time, future,
and livelihood on Lhe line for a university, he receives nothing in return.
Remembering the fact that the majority of successful athletes underperform in the academic arena, this injured athlete has practically
no future prospects. It is precisely for this reason that athletes ha'e
battled universities ant! the CAA in court for bener co,·erage.
Players ha,·e won two major court banles during the past
fifty years, the first in the case of University of Dmrer t! Nemeth. The
court held that a foCJtbalJ player injured during practice was an
employee of the university and was therefore entitled to benefits
under applicable workers' compensation statutes. l t was resolved on
the fact that Nemeth was employed in maintenance at the campus
tennis center contingent on his success in playing football for the
universit:y.39 Nemeth was even told that "it would be decided on
the footbaU field who recej\'es the meals and the jobs." The coun
was "willing to look beyond the 'fictional' records of a student
employed to maintain a tennis court to the reality of the relationship
between the employment and the student's athletic participation."~ 0
39
Ju Uni,·. of Oenn:r , .. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
40
Linda]. Carpcmcr, \'{rockers' Compensation and the Scholarship Athlete,
53 j. HIGHFR Eott. 448, 452 (1982).
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Proponents of pay-for-play gained an even bigger victory in
T(m Horn tt Ind11sttial Accidmt Co111mission. Edward Gary Van Horn
was on scholarship to play football for a university and held no other
employment. He was killed in an airplane crash returning from a regularly
scheduled college football game. His wife and children sued for benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and was initia1ly denied by the
California Industrial Accident Commission, but a California Appeals
Court overturned that decision. The court wrote, "There is authori ty
for the proposition that one who participates for compensation
as a member of an athletic team may be an employee within the
statutory scheme of the \X'orkmen's Compensation Act." The form of
remuneration-the fact that Van Horn was compensated in the fo rm of
a scholarship- was "immaterial." It •vas also held that "one may have
the dual capacity of student and employee in respect to an activity." 41
This precedent was not followed for long. More recent
decisions in other states have held just the opposite. I n both Rensing t!
Indiana State Board q( Tmstees and Cole!IJnfl v. lf/'estern iHichigan Unit•ersity,
it was determined that athletes on scholarship were not employees of
their respective universities. The first court based its decision on "the
weight with which the NCAA regards amateurism ... and the broader
educational-based priority the CAA routs as its chief concern for
student-athletes."·42 The second court refused to find that "the 'work
performed' (playing football), was an integral part of defendant's
'business' (education)."43 These claims have already been addressed;
NCAA players arc disguised as amateurs, the education-as-a-priority
ideal is untrue, and football and basketball prm·ide a fundamental
part of improving a university's image and pocketbook. As the scope of
college sports continues to becomemore commercial,courtsmayverpveU
return to the original idea of players as employees, thereby proportioning
a means for athletes to receive wages and workers' compensation benefits.
41
Van HornY. lndus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cai.Rptr. 169, 173 (Cal. 1964).
42
Christopher\'\~ Haden, Foul! The Exploitation of the Srudent-Athlete, 30
J.L & Em c. 673, 677 (2001) .
43
Coleman v. W J\lich l 1ni,·., 125 .Mich. App. 35,40 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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\' L. A \:TITRl"ST ls."il ' I.S
A second major legal issue facing college sports relates to the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which expressly prohibits "[e]\ery conrract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint or trade or commerce." ~ The
NCAA amateurism rules, specifically the no-compensation rule, in many
ways represent an unreasonable restraint uf trade, and by the "rule of
reason" should be deemed illegal by the courts. NCAA rules ha,·e twice
been challenged unsuccessfuiJy in the courts, but the growing business
aspects of college athletics may alter the court's decisions in the future.
lt was originally assumed that the NCAA was not subject to
antitrust scrutiny because of its non-profit nature, but the Supreme
Court ended such speculation with its ruling in NCAA n Board of Rt!!,ents.
Although the case did not concern amateurism ruJes specifically, rl1e
Supreme Court maintained that the NCAA's current television p lan had
a "significant potential for anticomperitive effects," thus opening the
r CAA up to antitrust litigation on other froncs. 4; ln both McComlflrk 1:
NCAA and Bank.s t: NCAA it was held that the NCAA was not guilty
of antitrust violations in regards to its enforcement of its amateurism
rules. The courts supposed that CAl\ bylaws were not unreasonable
restraints of trade on the grounds that they promote competition,
encourage educational pursujts, prevent commercialism, and preserve
rl1e amateur nature of college athletics.-16 More specifically, the courts
determined rl1at NCAA rules and actions ought to be analyzed under
the ''rule of reason," which requires a determination on an action's
"impact on competition." This paper has already addressed the issues of
commercialism, amateurism, and education in college athletics. The only
remaining argument is the notion that NCAA bylaws foster competition
and are necessary to maintain the character of college sports.
As stated previously:, a number of economists dew the NCAA
as a successful labor cartel. One of the purposes of a cartel is to control
the market by controlling input prices-a violation of the Sherman
4

44

45
46

I L\OE:-;, slfpra note 42, at 673.
P.wr C. \\'HtrR. & G \RY R. RnBERTh, SPoR.TS
ld. at 611.
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Antitrust Act. Specifically, the NCAA, by requiring each institution to
offer recruits the same compensation package, limits competition in the
input market, thereby violating antitrust laws. 4 ~ Moreover, the NCAA,
in cooperation with all member institutions, maintains a monopoly
over amateur athletics; there is no alternative to participating in college
sports. Both the NFL and the NBA do not permit athletes to enter
their leagues straight from high school. A young athlete is forced to
develop his talents in an amateur league where compensation is strictly
forbidden, ''restraining [his] ability to market his services to competing
instirutions."48Justice White, although dissenting to the Board of Regen ts
decision, agreed, "[T]he NCAA imposes numerous controls ... many
of which 'are similar to those whkh are summarily condemned when
undertaken in a more traditional business setting."'49 AJso detrimental
to the NCAA's posicion is a study done by Craig A. Depken and D ennis
P. Wilson that shows that the enforcement of NCAA rules many times
unintentionally leads to a reduction in competiti,·e balance between
teams. 50 Another study demonstrated that many NCAA institutional
changes, many having to do ,\;th the preserYation of amateurism,
most likely have a "rent-seeking explanacion"-they reduce competitive
balance and seem to have a financial motivation above aU else.51
On the issue that the no-compensation rule is necessary
to maintain the character of college sports, what dle courts failed
to realize was that even as the system is now, many universities
47
Brad R. J lumphreys & Jane E. Ruscki, Monitor Cartel Beha,i.or and
Stability: 12\i.dence from NCAA Football, cr:... . TE;R FOR Eco 10MK RESEARCIJ c\ND
GR.\DU.\'f£ Eot:C.\TlON OF CH.\RLES u . . J\'ERSITY, Jan. 200 I' http:/ 1\\"-\'W.cerge-ei.cz/
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(1996).
49
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468 U.S. 85, 122-23 ( 1984) (\X'hite, J., d issenting).
50
Craig A. Depken 11 & Dennis P. \X'il~on, The Impact of Cartel
Enforcement in NCAA Dh·ision 1-A Football, in Eco:smucs or Cot.LJ:.C.b SPORTS
225, 241 Qohn Fi~d & Rodney Fort eds., 2004).
51
Set Craig A. Depken II & D ennis P. \X'ilson, lnsrirutional Change in
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frequently violate or find convenient w~ys around the rule. Over the
period of one decade it was found that at leaM 5711 'n of all NCAA
Di\'ision I-A football teams violated compensation rules. Players are
not amateurs and the public knows this, yet consumer demand foe
college sports continues to flourish like never bcfore. 5 ~ In some ca.ses,
teams sanctioned by the NCAA received even more support for their
programs than before being sanctioned.53 The anticompetitivc nature
of the NCAA rules has brought the orgttnization under fire before; it is
up to future courts to dig beneath the NCAA's claims of amateurism,
education. and competition and declare its actions ancicornpeLit.iYe.

VII. BENEFITS OF .\

P ,\Y- FOR-PLAY SYSTEM

"t\lany experts have attempted to design a pay-for-play srstem
thar's both fair to all involved (athletes, universities, and the NCA.i\)
and that maintains the unique qualiLies of college athletics that make
it so immensely popular. The proposed sysrems Yary widely, with
ingredients such as salary caps, trust funds for athletes, revenue sharing,
and much more. It IS noc the intent of this paper to propose a ne"\\system; rather, it is to show the specific benefits inherent in any payfor-play srstem, thus furthering rhe argument against amateurism rules.
One strong argumem in fa,·or of a new sysrem rests on the
premise that if an athlete already recci\·ed compensation above a
traditional scholarship and had adequate medical cm•erage in case of
severe injury, there would be less motivation ro lea,·e college early ro
play professional sports, chereb) better fulfilling the CAA's primary
ideal of education. More than half of all student-athletes in revenue
producing sports do not graduate54- many because they leave school
early for an opportunity to pia}' on tl1e professional level. Some succeed
but many do n<>t, leaving them young, unemployed, and uneducated.
The National Football League Players Association reports that the
52
Sherman .\ct lm-alidarion of the 1\CA.\ Rules, 105 Jl \R\". L. Rh\. 1299,
1312- 13 (191J2).
53
Jd. ;\( 1313.
54
STA!IDOH.\R & Zr::.PEl., mpm note 25, at 45.
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average length of an NFL career is only three and a half seasons. 55
Exacerbating the problem is the fact that most young players do not
plan for the future. Aftcr taxes of about 30% and extravagant spending,
which is all too common for young athletes, many athletes are left with
small income and large debt. 51• In order to survi,·e financially, athletes
must either invest their money well or have plans for another career
when they can no longer play professionally.5' FewwoulJ Joubt that the
best contingency plan would be ro remain in college until graduation.
lt should also be noted that the abolition of amareurisn1 rules
would allow student-athletes to accept outside endorsements, possibly
making the earnings of the most talented athletes attractive enough
to remain in school. While universities would only be required to pay
moderate hourly wages, national companies affiliated with college
sports and even local companies looking to advertise could provide
more .lucrative compensation to athletes according to market demand. 58
In fact, it would be mutually beneficial for these athletes to
remain in school because universities haYe much to gain from these
talented young men. By economk estimates, universities themselves
lose between $400,000 and $1.2 million a year when talented stars
declare for the draft early.5" Moreover, the underclassmen who
lea\'e school early are more often than not the most talented - the
Reggie Bushes of the world - and bring the excitement to college
sports d1at fans attend games to see. It is not a stretch to say that
the sports of college football and basketball would be gready
improved if the high-profile athletes participated for all four years
of eligibility. This would most likely lead to higher viewership, and
therefore more revenue for advertisers, TV stations, and the NCAA.
Only this time it wouldn't be at the expense of university slaves.
55
NFL Players Association - FAQs- NFr, Hopefuls Faq, http://www.
nflpa.org/ faCJS/ FL_ Hopefulsfaq.aspx (last ,·isited Jan. 15, 2007).
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VIII.

CoNCUJSLON

\'<'hen asked about the accusations made against Reggie Bush,
Joe Horn, a new teammate of Bush's, made an interesting comment,
"1 don't think Reggie did that, but if he did, I would have done it
too."6" Regardless of the veracity of the claims made against Bush,
the question remains: Can you really blame Reggie Bush, or any other
student-athlete for that matter, for accepting improper benefits? Does
the system really seem fair? Over the course of ninety years, the NCAA
has created a system that flourishes on uncompensated student labor.
And over the past twenty-five years, the majority of these students
have been low-income minorities. Although all have an opportunity
at the incomparable benefit of a uni,•ersit:y education, the majority
of athletes overlook academks and instead focus on the prospect of
playing their sport at a professional level. Sadly, the NCAA, universities,
and commercial enterprises thrive on such "student-athleres." The
Wall Street Journal commented almost a half century ago that in many
cases universities "have come to see-and treat- athletes less as students
than as tools to be manipulated for profit."61 Whether changes to the
present system will be initiated by the courts, the CAA, or member
institutions themselves is yet to be seen, but it seems fairly certain that
sibrnificant changes arc in order so that future athletes and their families
can trust the NCAA, and so that fans can continue to enjoy college
sports in all of the tradition and excitement that have existed for years.

60
Bush 'not worried' about ille~al benefit alle~ations, F~'il':-J.C0,\1 , Scp. 16,
2006, http:// WW\\:sports.espn.go. com/ ncf/ news/story?id=2588347.
61
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TAX TRJ~i\TIES: TRANSFERRJNG TAXES IN A GLOBAL
ECOi'OMY
BY RY.\N \'\'000 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

n the 1990s, Congress passed legislation that currently affects
transactions between a parent company and its foreign subsidiary,
also known as a transfer pricing transaction. This legislation
prevented international companies from illegally circumventing U.S.
laws and evading income taxes rightfully owed to the U.S. government.
Concurrently, the world economy enjoyed success and companies'
financial statements proved it. Despite staggering profits, many
multinational companies wanting even more income found a subtle
break in the tax code which allows d1em to pay very little in federal
income taxes. For example, in 1998, General l\Iotors Corporation
reported a staggering $4.61 billion in pretax income; however, the auto
maker owed just $36 million or just 0.8 percent of its global pre-tax
income, and of that $36 million, General Motors paid only 13 percent
or $4.68 million to the United States tax collectors.2 According
to section 11 of the I nternal Revenue Code, if a corporation's
taxable income is greater than $10,000,000 the minimum income
tax percentage is at least 35 percent.3 If the 35 percent burden rate
was applied to General Motors's pretax income, then it should have
paid the U.S. government $1.6 billion in taxes instead of just $4.68
million. Similarly, 1\lotorola I ncorporated is in the middle of transfer
pricing tax disputes with the Internal Revenue Service (lRS) for a sum
of $800 miJJjon in back taxes due to same misuse of transfer pricing

I
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aJso practiced br GLnual Motors.4 ThesL companies employed an
income tax scheme calk·J transfer pricing among their multinational
subsidiaries that was not only dynamic, but legal to a certain extent.
An explanation of transfer pricing and its loopholes prior
to the reYisions in thl! United States tax code will be presented.
Fnrthermore, tax code revisions from the 1990s will be explored
including their benefits as well as their deliciency in establishing
equality for global commerce. Critics asscn that rhc current state
of international tax treaties is sufficient 10 alJe, iating multinational
corporations from double ta.xation and in securing corporate income
taxes for the appropriate gO\·ernmenL On rhe other hand, opponentS
of big business argue that loopholes in the current tax code still exist
and further regulations should be instituted. \X 'hile multinational
corporations must be fairly taxed for all business transactions with
their foreign subsidhtrics, they must not be suppressed through
exorbitant doublc..: taxes in both the United States and abroad. This
equilibrium is best attained through the utilization of further crossborder transfer price recognition, or tax treaties, among countries.

II. TR. \l'~FrR PRICI!'\G

LooPIIOI.I ;s

Transfer pricing "occurs when a pan::nt company sells a product
below or above the market prices to its affiliate to reduce ta.'{es or strip
profits from one company to another." 5Julian I leslop, the chief financial
officer of the British Pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline, called
"transfer-pricing disputes among the toughest issues for corporations
to resoh-e with ta.x authorirics."6 Since there is no market price "ithin
a company it is difficult to establish a reasonable price threshold.- One
4
Robert Gur ~latthews &Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo to St:tde Tax Disputes
\X'irh IRS 0\'er UNlTEO STATF.S Unit for $3.4 Billion, Wall St.]., Sept. 12, 2006,
at i\19.

5
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Matthews & \\ halcn, 111pru note 4 at A3.
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advantage to the parent company is that implementing the strategy "can
reduce its reported U.S. income - and increase its subsidiary's profit."H
In essence, transfer pricing is a creative way of disbursing costs and
profits among scattered business subsidiaries within a multinational
company. Since the amount of income tax that a corporation pays
is proportional to the amount of taxable income it earns, increasing
transfer prices from a subsidiary and to its parent will result in a
lower amount of taxable income, and consequently, a lower amount
of taxes owed by the subsidiary.'' By strategically attributing costs and
profits to the appropriate business segment through transfer pricing,
multinational businesses are able to generate substantial tax savings.
Before adopting new transfer pricing legislation, companies'
profits were unjusdr inflated through exploitation of loopholes in
the United States tax code. For example, Symantec Corporation
owns Veritas Software Corporation in Ireland and began paying
large Licensing fees in 2005 to its Irish subsidiary where the corporate
income tax rate is significantly lower than in the United States. During
the course of operations, Symantec's financial officers realized that if
they could pay large licensing fees, they could increase "the income
of the subsidiary in Ireland - a lower-tax country - at the expense
of income in the United States, lowering the company's overall
tax biU." 10 By using this ingenious tax-planning scheme, Symantec
Corporation was able to display a healthy profit by its Irish subsidiary
and reduce its income tax liability in the United States parent company.
Transfer pricing merits investigation because understanding
how companies exploit it as a tax loophole will preclude multinational
companies from evading federal income taxes and from deceiving
potential investors. In 1999, Heiko Thieme, a columnist for the IVai/
Street Jot~mal, dealt with reducing the tax burden on foreign companies
that own subsidiary business segments here in the United States. When
considering national tax reform, Thieme said "to stimulate and not
to discourage should be the philosophy toward corporations and
8
9
10
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indi,·idual investors alike." 11 Since investors use financial statements
of multinational companies to make investment decisions, transfer
pricing should not unjustly inflated companies' financial statements. As
a case in point, a 1998 tax study showed a $35.6 billion loss in federal
revenue in that fiscal year. "Through anonymous customs records, the
researchers found $18,000 dot-matrix printers being imported from
Japan and $2,600 radial tires corning from Indonesia.''12 In addition, they
discovered someone "exporting $12,000 helicopters to ltaly and $135
howitzers to South Africa." 13 These previous figures represent blatant
transfer pricing exaggeration between multinatio nal companies and
their foreign subsidiaries. The eYidence against multinational companies
necessi tated new pragmatic tax laws in order to ptevent multinational
companies from evading taxes owed to d1e federal government.
Before 1990, the tax code required companies that used
transfer pricing for products and services to provide only a calculation
of how the transfer price was determined. This left the burden of
actualizing calculations w the IRS. 14 In addition, the IRS used a
tangible asset transfer price threshold between SO percent less than
and 200 percent more than the market price. 15 E rrors in adjustment
that exceed $5,000 are subject w investigation. 16 In a case between
Yukos Oil Securities, a Russian oil company, and the United States
District Court of Southern New York, the Russian Tax Office gave
a summary of previous litigation, including an accusation of transfer
pricing inflation. According to Russian tax law, a transfer price is too
large if it is outside the threshold of 20 percent rhe market price
for the tangible asset. The defendant's tax strategy did not violate
Russian Federal Tax Code. P I n the United States, this transfer price
issue would have been irrelevant due to d1e freedom that the U.S. tax
11
Heiko J L Thieme, CEOs oo the Summit: Taxing Foreign Firms Won't
\'\'ork, \"{'all St.]., Dec. 14, 1992, at A10.
12
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code accorded to multinational corporations at that time; the old tax
code was too lax on corporations that embellished transfer prices and
their taxable income to countries with lower corporate taxes. The
IRS had the power to levy fines, but these fines were not sufficient
enough to deter multinational companies from abusing transfer
pricing. roreign subsidiaries and their u.s. parent companies ha"e
taken advantage of the inherent enigmatic nature of prc\·ious tax la\\~

Ill. TAX CODE R EVISIONS
Throughout the 1990s changes in transfer pricing regulation
assigned and tightened corporate cost-sharing arrangements; the
government forces companies to evaluate intangible assets as if the
parent company had sold them to an unrelated company, ensuring
that both the buyer and the seller remain free to pu t·sue their own
interests. 18 In his book, Tra11sjer Pticing Under US L:mJ--The Ne1v Regime,
John l\lcDerrmot outlines the evolution of section 482 of the tax code
with respect to transfer pricing. In 1986, Congress commissioned the
IRS to analyze Section 482 of the U.S. tax code and make appropriate
recommendations in order to close tax loopholes found therein.
Subsquently, in 1992, Congress incorporated the TRS's incomebased method for determining the transfer price of "high-profit"
intangible assets into the U.S. tax code. In the new income-based
approach, the value of tangible and intangible assets is proportional
tO the amount of income the asset generates. Later in 1993, the
proposed final regulations took precedence over the majority of
previous regulations, taking effect in October 1994. The regulations
focus on the following alternative price methods: income, comparable
uncontrolled transactions, and other factors. This 1994 addition is
classified as the "best method" rule. Its aim is to produce the most
reliable measure of an arm's length result or market-place value. 19
18
Rob Wells, Moving the Market: IRS Plans Cost-Sharing RLtlcs, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 25, 2005, at C3.
19
John E. McDermott JL, Transfer Pricin~ Under US Law -The New
Regime: 1994 Final Regulations- 3 (IBC Financial Publishing LTD 1995).
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As pn.:' iously discussed, the Cn.ited States re\'oluuonized ics
corporate cost-sharing arrangements and thus Jed the way toward a new
me )del of dispute resolution for transferpricingamong foreign countries.
This stream of legislation during the 1990s led to the creation of the
AdYanced Pnce Agreement or APA program. The AP,\ process is an
alternari,·e co the standard ra_xpayer path of completing-transactions,
filing a rerum, facing audit (some Je,·el of auclit is more likelr with
Jarger taxpayers), and possible appeal with settlement or litigation. The
general requirements of an APA comprise the following: an indication
of the currency used for transactions, starutory proYisions, tax treaties,
court decisions, regulations, and reYenue rulings o r procedures. 211 The
taxpayer initimes the APA process by approaching the IRS (and rypicaJiy
lhe corresponding tax authorities in the other relevant jurisdictions)
before engaging in the related party transactions potentially at issue.
At this point, lhe taxpayer voluntarily provides detailed information to
the governments regarding its business activities, plans, competitors,
market conditions, and prior tax circumstances. The critical piece of
this presentation is the taxpayer's explanation of his o r her planned
pricing method. FoUowing discussion and negotiation, tl1e parries
hopefulJ) reach agreement on how the taxpayer should handle the
pricing of these anticipated related party transactions. Furthermore,
the IRS may nm,· le"y a penahy from 20 to 40 percent of the transfer
price, in addition co back taxes commensurate with the infringement,
when the infraction results in a "gross yaJuation misstatement" in
order to discourage further exploitation of transfer pricing laws.11 Yer,
if companies can show they made a good-faith effort to fo rmulate
a reasonable transfer price, the lRS will avoid attributing a penalry.21
Although these new regulations to the tax CCidc effectively
inhibit companies from e\'ading taxes they owe on tangible assets, it
is still dirficult co regulate tl1e transfer price a company assigns to its
intangible assets. The new tax code addresses abuses in the valuation
20
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of intangible assets such as brand names, patents, and research and
development costs that a company assigns to its products. For example,
the value of a French research team would be considered a pre-existing
intangible asset; others who purchase the drug that the research team
developed, including a subsidiary company, would have to buy the
asset at a price that includes the cost of the french research team:B
Some may argue the new transfer pricing rules are more effecti\'e than
those preceding them; however, it is still impossible to assign a value
to intangible assets that are im·olved in transactions between foreign
subsidiaries and their parent companies. Assigning a price to a new
and reYolutionary product can be clifficult. Nevertheless, the new
code includes spedfic valuation methods permitting a more accurate
transfer ptice assignment to innm·ative intangible assets. For example,
prior to the new transfer pricing regulations U.S.-based multinationals
recurrently developed a patent for a valuable drug in the United States.
After they concluded that the drug would be a worldwide winner,
they would confer the patent to an offshore affiliate. 24 The new code
requires a comparison of the patent's transfer price to a similar patent's
transfer price. In order for the intangible asset to be comparable, one
of the following conditions must be met so that the intangible asset is
comparable: both must be in rhe same general industry, both must haYe a
similar profit margin, or both must be used in the same general process.-~ 5
Even if the company takes a somewhat liberal approach to
determine the transfer price for a revolutionary intangible asset for
which no comparable products exist, the lRS will avoid levying a
penalty if the company has documented research used in calcuL'lting
the transfer price.26 The IRS's new valuation method is not only
dynamic but progressive because it allows companies to estimate
when creating a transfer price for an intangible asset that may have
23
\Xle!ls, mp1"a note 18.
24
Guy Russell, Regs would change the landscape for intangibles, Acct.
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25
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never before existed. Opponents of this type of valuation system
might argue it accords too much liberty to multinational companies
when determining a transfer price. HoweYer, the transfer pricing
study that the lRS requires measures an intangible asset, which is
often unique in purpose, and therefore any efforts made to determine
its price are better than none at all. 1f this new law on intangible
asset valuation were not in place, multinational corporations in the
United States would still be exploiting loopholes in the tax code and
grossly understating their taxable income. Although they are more
difficult to valuate because of the new tax code, a corporation's
intangible assets are subjected to more scrutiny than in the past.

IV

us TA."< PROGRESS

The rRS is fighting the battle against multinational
corporations who have misused transfer pricing in the past, evidenced
by their recent out-of-court settlement with GlaxoSmithKline PLC,
a pharmaceutical company based in the United Kingdom, and its
United States subsidiary. Glaxo v. Commissioner was originally filed
in 1992 when "the Commissioner began an examination of Glaxo's
tax returns for 1989 and 1990,"27 and the parties settled out of court
in February 2006 in light of the new ameliorations in the U.S. tax
code concerning intangible assets being traded at "arm's length"
between parent companies and their subsidiaries. The case was the
largest transfer price tax case in U.S. history and highlighted the IRS's
new-found resolve to crack down on transfer pricing offenders by
proving that Glaxo's United States subsidiary had grossly overpaid
its British parent for drugs, significantly reducing its rax bill The
settlement constitutes $3.4 billion including back taxes owed and
also a 40 percent penalty based on the total amount of back taxes.
1\Iany contest that the performance of the IRS's prosecuting
attorneys was negligible despite tl1eir utilization of the new tax laws.
Philip R. West, a tax partner at \'\'ashington law firm Steptoe & Johnson
27 GlaxoSmithKline lloldings (Am.) Inc. v. Comm'r, 117 T.C. l, 2 (2001).
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stated "over the past ten to twenty years, the government has brought
a good number of transfer-pricing cases and come away ,,·ith clear
victories in very few of them." 28 Leon Harris a tax expert from Ernst
& Young Multinational pointed out that transfer price cases litigated
against Asian corporations in the 1980s did not succeed.2'> 1r is important
to note the majority of transfer price cases settle out of court anJ
therefore are not prone to have a clear·cutvictory for either side. In spite
of all this, the IRS is confident that with the new tax code it can win Lhe
majority of transfer price cases it will litigate against major corporations
in the future. With respect to the Glaxo case, IRS Commissioner Mark
Everson said, "The settlement of this case sends a strong message of
our resolve to continue to deal with this issue." 30 Clearly, the lRS has
begun to be victorious in litigating and reaching favorable settlements
against multinational corporations who have exploited transfer
pricing loopholes because of the tax code's re·vision during the 1990s.

v F UTURE P ROGRESS NEEDED
The U.S. ta..-x code must continue its strict regulation of
multinational companies' transfer prices, without suffocating them
tluough excessive double-taxes in both the United States and in the
subsicliary's country. Some believe it would be more beneficial for the
United States to isolate itself from foreign competition by levying
high taxes on foreign multinational companies which employ transfer
pricing. \'\'hile this belief is con\'incing, it is not entirely based on
facts. When the IRS issued its new regulations requiring subsidiaries'
transactions to be at "arm's length," many multinational companies
started shifting their inter-company transfer p rices in favo r of the
United States at the expense of tl1e treasur.ies from their native
countries. This was harmful to fo reign economies because foreign
subsidiaries shifted an unequal portion of their profits toward their
28
29
at 18.
30
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parent companies in the Uruted States.31 Consequently, most first
world countries have deYeloped their own transfer pricing regulations
in order to prevent their respective multinational companies from
unjustly reducing their taxable income, whkh reduces the amount of
income tax the company will pay to its respective government.32 These
circumstances create a bothersome situation fo r subsidiaries and
their parent company in ali countries, called double-taxation, which
exposes multinational companies to taxes in both the subsidiary's
counu·y and the parent's country. This is especially detrimental to
the U.S. economy because it has traditionally possessed a 35 percent
corporate income tax rate which impedes growth in multinational
companies, and therefore creates a serious incentiYe for multinational
corporations to leave d1e country with the highest tax burden.33
1n the United States, when the 1RS adopted its 1990 tax code
revisions it also proliferated the international transfer price doubl.etaxation cliJemma. Fortunately, the U nited Stares has addressed this
problem with other coumries by initiating cross-border transfer
price recogrlition, also called "tax treaties." Tax treaties are conceived
for the following two reasons: to avoid double taxation by the two
treaty countries of the income of a resident of either country, and
to prevent the fiscal evasion of either company to its respective
country.3* In addition, tax treaties "also serve a third purpose, the
reciprocal reduction of tax impedin1ents co cross border investment
and trade." 35 In her article published in the New York Uruversity
Law Review, Dr. Ruth i\lason stated that tax treaties help combat tax
avoidance through exchange of information among multinadonals
31
H:H"ris, supra note 2<).
32
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33
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34
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35
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and their respective countries. In order to promote these causes, tax
treaties stipulate that if the parent company's country to which the
asset is sold recognizes the tax already paid by the subsidiary to its
respective country, then the parent company avoids double taxation. Y>
Tax treaties "include provisions intended to ensure that cross-border
investors do not suffer discrimination in the application of the tax laws
of the other country."37 Ta.-x treaties benefit both countries that use
them because they determine where transfer price penalties are paid
if an infraction does occur, with respect to both countries' tax laws.
AJthough many tax treaties exist with a large number of foreign
countries, the United States must endeavor to establish tax treaties
with groups of associated foreign countries and unions in order to
maximize economic gains by foreign governments and their businesses.
In a case study published in the Brookb'11 f...aJJJ Ret'iell', Professor Allison
Christians, who does not endorse tax treaties, states that the Unjted
States has not yet enacted tax treaties with every foreign country:
Not all countries have tax treaties, and no country
has tax treaties with all the other countries of the
world. The average individual tax treaty network
comprises just 17 treaty partners, and over half of all
countries have tax treaty networks of five or fewer
treaty partners. Jn addition, the benefits of treaties are
typically limited to activities conducted between the
two signatory countries. As a result, there would haYe
to be over 32,000 bilateral tax treaties to coYer every
possible cross-border transaction. The U.S. would

36
Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Potier and the European Court of Justice,
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37
Tax Treaties: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th
Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Patricia Brown, Deputy lmernational Ta.".:. Counsel,
Department of the Treasury).
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have to enter into new treaties \vjth ove1· 160 countries
to ensure that its co,·erage spanned the globe.38
The United States could attempt to establish tax treaties with
each and every remaining country, a time-consuming task, or the United
States could develop tax treaties with groups of associated countries.
Indeed, this method would conserve time and promote world trade
among the United States and the foreign countries with which it already
does business. Although tax treaties exist between the United States
and most member countries of the European Union, the utility of
cross border transfer price recognition treaties with European Union
members is suspect. For example, the European Court of Justice ruled
that the French goyernment was not required to grant a cross-border
trans fer price cred.it to one of its citizens who earned income in Germany;
therefore, Germany and France both taxed the citizen's transaction. 39
"Following such an adverse ruling... the ~Iember States presumably
would pressure the Urured States to remove the offending provisions
from their tax treaties." 40 Unless the United States accommodates
the European Union and its members by establishing multilateral
tax treaties covering the European Uruun as a whole, transfer pricing
penalties in absence of such treaties will suppress global economic
prosperity. Although a multilateral tax treaty with the European Union
was discussed, this is merely one type of tax treaty the U.S. Government
must strive to establish with foreign unions and individual countries
in order to ensure that multinational corporations are taxed fairly.

VI.

CoNCLUSION

Transfer pricing in today's global economy is a controversial
subject that continues to be a source of litigation in the United States tax
38
Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for lswcstment and Aid to SubSaharan Africa: A CASE STUDY, 71 13rook.lyn I,. Re" 639, 659 (2005) (fax
Treaties yet to be established).
Mason, slfpra note 36, at 93.
39

40

ld. at I04.
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court. No'v multinational companies have little hope of circumventing
the transfer pricing tax code, whereas before the L990s ta..x reform,
multinational companies utilized transfer pricing schemes in order to
transfer taxable income to countries where the corporate income tax
rate was much lower, and complicated topics in the domain of tax law
due to its enigmatic nature. Before d1e 1990s tax reform, legislation
allowed multinational companies to calculate their own transfer prices
for transactions bet\veen paren t comp~lnies and foreign subsidiaries.
But "\\'ith the advent of progressive tax laws, muJtjnational companies
must now assign a reasonable estimate to all transferred assets.
Furthermore, transfer prices for intangible assets must be derived
from a number of valuation metl1ods: both assets must be in the same
industry, both must haYe a similar profit margin, or both must be used
in the same general process. Because of this evolution in the tax code,
the IRS is fighting anJ winnjng many transfer pricing cases as these
multinational companies continue to stretch the tax code to its limits.
The IRS's most recent ta..x case against Glaxo Smith Kline
highlights the pragmatic nature of the United States' tax code
against multinational companies that infringe transfer pricing ta..x
law. Yet even as it punishes tax-deYiams, tax legislation must deal
with multinational companies fairly and a,·oid submitting them to
double-taxation by neglecting to form tax treaties. By coordinating
with foreign governments to establish in which country, and under
what conilitions, a multinational ·will pay back taxes and penalties
for transfer pricing infringements. The United States must continue
to form tax treaties witl1 countries individually or in groups in order
to regulate transfer prices and all the while eliminating doubletaxation. As tax evasion strategies of multinational companies in
the United States evoke, the tax code must adapt with transfer
pricing legislation to establish equality for global commerce
among multinational companies and their respectiYe governments.
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FLAws AND REPERcussto s or Et\CEL F .
13Y DALLIN LE\XlS

T/ITALE

1

J.

1:--:TRODl'C.TIOi'-.

n 1962, the First Amendment came under increased judicial
scrutiny as the Supreme Court examined the legality of prayer
in public schools. The Union Free School D istrict in New Il yde
Park, New York, requested that principals invite srudents to recite
a specific prayer every morning before class: ''AJmighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." This ritual
was part of a state-recommended program for the students' moral
training. While participation was voluntar)~ the parents of ten pupils
sued to stop principals from using the prayer, claiming the school
district had overstepped the boundaries of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. ln the resulting case, E11gel v.
Vitale, lower courts ruled consistently in fa,ror of the school district
until the issue reached the Supreme Court. Here, in a 6-1 decision,
the justices O\'erturned the lower courts' rulings and declared that
the Union Free School District's prayer was unconstitutional. 2
The Court, in its opinion written by Justice Hugo Black,
concluded that dus prayer "was composed by governmental officials
as a part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs"3
and that such actions were impermissible under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The Court's opinion asserts that the
First Amendment "must at least mean that in this country it is no
part of the business of government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American peopJe to recite as a part of a religious

I
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program carried on by the government." 1 To justify this interpretation,
the Court leaned heavily on historical evidence to understand
the Founder's original intent in composing the Uill of Rights.
However, an im·estigation of the writings of men like James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson-as well as an analysis of the actual
text of the Constitution-shows that the Court faik:cl to consider
substantial evidence that undermined its interpretation of the Founders'
original intent. Likewise, the Court overlooked contemporary churchstare precedent that suggested gm·ernment and religion were nor
mutually exclusive, and it also failed to recognize that certain religious
practices that had preYiously been deemed acceptable were at that time
taking place within the federal government. Unfortunately, the Court's
flawed ruling in E'~e/bas become a faulty basis for later decisions that
have deviated even further from the First Amendment's original intent.
To remedy tills situation, the Supreme Court needs to reevaluate the
Founders' position on church-state issues, recognize the gap between the
Pounders'positionandirsownimerpreration,andovenurnE1~e/v. Vitale.

II.

0RIG~ALTSM

In explaining irs decision in Engel, the Supreme Court draws
heavily from historical sources rather tban relying on legal precedent.
ln fact, the Court's opinion cites only one other Supreme Court case
directly, which it uses solely to establish the court's reason for granting
certiorari. 5 I nstead, Justice Black focuses primarily on the Founding
period's religious hisrory and the words of one of the Constitution's
key framers, James Madison. Black also says that the Court agrees with
the petitioners that the Union Free School District's prayer breached
the "wall of separation between church and state,"6 a phrase first used
by Thomas Jeffcrson. 7 This approach, interpreting the Constitution
by looking to the initial intent of its framers, is called "originalisrn."
4
5
6
7

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,422-24 (1%2).
ld.
ld.
Reynolds\'. U.S., 98 U.S. '145-64 (1878).
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According tO Professor Rodney K. Smith, "those who hold to the ...
originalist viewpoint maintain that in exercising juclicial review; judges
must refer to the text of the Constitution and to the intent of the
framers and ratifiers of the pro,·ision or provisioners at issue on a given
case."ll In other words, when using originatism, the Supreme Court looks
directly at the Founders' intent, not precedent. lf the Court wishes to
take an originalist approach on a case, it must provide solid, compelEng
evidence that its ruling is exactly how the Founders would have
interpreted the same case. An investigation of 1\Iadison's and Jefferson's
own writings and actions, however, reveals a substantial amount
of evidence that undermines the Court's original.ist interpretation.

Ill. HISTORICAL ANALYsrs OF Tw'o Fou DL'IG FATrmRs' PoslTro:-.~s
In defending the Court's ruling, Justice Black relies heavily on
the words of James Madison. Black rebuts any notion that the Regents'
prayer is too brief tO be considered "a danger to religious freedom" by
quoting Maclison's J.Hemotial and Remonstrance against Religious AssesstJJmt.

[I] tis proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties.... \Vho does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular
sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That
thesameauthorit:ywh.ich can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of
any one establishment, may force him to conform
to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever? 9
This excerpt of 1\[adison's serves as Justice Black's
main defense as to why a prayer that is both short and nondenominational is nonetheless unconstitutional. The slightest
8
9

K. S\rrrH, PuBLIC PR.m::.R AND 111E Co;.;s-nn'Tto~ 2 (1987).
Engel\', Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436 (1962).

Rool-. tY

55

BYU Prelaw Review, Volume 21, 2007

"experiment" on religious liberties, the quote suggests, can lead
down a dangerously slippery slope towards an established church.
However, an inYestigation into the intent of the Constitutional
Framers must also consider the events and time period in ·which they
lived. To judge their words by conremporary situations alone can
lead to misinterpretations because of differences in situations and
definitions between then and now. Understanding historical context
is particularly important in church-state issues because the religious
landscape is much different today than it was in the 18"' century
Trying to understand the context in which James J\ladison lived and
wrote sheds g reater light on his comments on church-state issues.
James Madison lived in a time when it was a real possibility that
a denomination would become the established religion of the land.
He saw certain individuals call for establishing the Anglican Church
as the official church of Virginia. w He watched a Baptist preacher in
Culpeper, Virginia discourse to his congregation behind jail cell bars. 11
He understood that unless religious freedom was assured in the new
country, a majority religion, like the Anglican Church, might gain control
and establish itself above all other denominations, in which case "slavery
and subjection might and would have been gradually insinuated among
[all Americans]." 12 Theseinstances of harsh religious intolerance sharply
contrast with the prayer at issue in Engelt\ ~ 7ita/e, a prayer completely
voluntary and devoid of any reference to Christianity or any other
specific religion. America during Madison's era was not concerned
with whether government could promote religion in general, but with
whether government could promote one religion as superior to another.
Madison's actions as a politician also contradict Black's
notion that Madison sought a strict division between d1e secular and
religious parts of society. For instance, Madison was a member on
d1e congressional committee that recommended the appointment

10

GARRET W'.~RD SHELDOK, THl:.

Pounc.\L PHILCJ:>oi'JJY m

27 (2001).
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Id.at27.
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of the first congressionaJ chaplain. 13 Madison, during his Presidency,
declared several national days of prayer and fasting, proclaiming that
[a day] be set apart for the devout purposes of
rendering the sovereign of the Universe ... the public
homage due to His holy attributes and especially
offering fervent supplications ... that He would inspire
all nations with a love of justice ... with a reverence for
the unerring precept of our holy religion ro do others
as they would require that others should do to them. 1 ~
H ere is another example of Madison emphasizing the
importance of God in American society. Dedicating a day to pay
"public homage" to a Supreme Being promotes religion without
advancing one religion over another. This was, essentiaJly, what the
Union Free School District :tttempted to do with its prayer. The
assertion that Madison would disapprove of the school district's
practice seems to conflict with his calls for national days of prayer.
Madison would certainly not set aside a national day for citizens
to voluntarily gather together in prayer and then deny school
children the option to voluntarily p~rticipate in a school prayer.
Additionally, when Madison bad the opportunity to push
for greater separation of church and state, he refrained from doing
so. As an elected delegate for the Revolutionary Convention, he
was directly involved in the drafting and refining of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights.15 One such right was the freedom of worship,
which G eorge Mason originally proposed in the following manner:
That as Religion . .. can be governed only by Reason and
Conviction, not by Force or Violence; and therefore
that all Men shou'd enjoy the fullest Toleration in the
I3
(1985).
14

15
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L~xercis e of Religion ... unpunished and unrestrained

by

the l\lagistrate, unless ... any Man clisturb the Peace ...
It is the mutual Dutv of all, to practice Christian
l·orbearance, Lm e and Charity towards each othcr. 111
\\:'hen the phrase "Christian Forbearance, Love and Charity" was
omitted in one draft, .l\laclison reinserted it in a later one. 1" llad
.t\ladison truJr sought to totally divorce the secular from the religious,
as the Supreme Court claims he clid, he would certainly not ha' e
reinstated the language concerning a citizen's duty to practice
certain Christian \'irtues. Maclison was concerned about a particular
denomination becoming established is the official church of the
land, not with whether government promoted religion in general.
But the Founders' intent cannot be deduced based on just one
man's writings and actions. To learn more about rhe Framer's intent,
anOLher famous Pounder should be considered: Thomas Jefferson,
who is quoted in a number of religion and state cases, including
lvy11olds 1: U11ited States, Everson t! Board of Education, and McCollum
I! Bomrl of Ed11rtrtio11. Though Justice Black does nor specifically
cite Jefferson, be docs reference Jefferson's oft-quoted phrase, "a
wall of separation between church and srate" 111 when explains the
Court's decision for overturning the previous ruling. Because Black
uses Jefferson's "wall" phrase in his opinion co support the court's
decision, Jefferson's ,-ie\\· on the church-state issues, which has long
been defined by dte "wall" phrase, thus needs to be addressed.
i\lany conclude that Jefferson's "wall" quote prm·es that
.Jefferson advocated a strict division between church and state.Jefferson's
actions and other writings, howeYer, show that he Sa\\ a strong need
for religious and moral education in public schools. Jefferson explained
his view of education in the following words: "Can the liberties of
a nation be thought secure when we have remm·ed their only firm
basis-a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberucs
16

17
It!

1\llcy, mpm 1/0tc 13, at 51.
/d. !It 52.
Reynold~''· United States, 98 U.S. 145, (1878) .
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are .. .the gift of God?" 1 ~ ln a letter to another Founder, John Adams,
Jefferson remarked that religion "is more than an inner conviction of
the existence of the Creator; true religion is morality." 20 Jefferson also
believed that one of the key aims of religious education was "to make
men moral."21 Jefferson recognized that morality was imperative for
maintaining a liberal society and that morality stemmed from religious
education. Because Jefferson considered religion to play an important
part in moral education, he would ha,-e approved of initiati,·es like
the school clistrict's prayer that promote religion in education . Also,
during his presidency, Jefferson signed a treaty with the Kaskakia
Indians in which he gave monetary support to the Roman Catholic
church and the priest who was presiding within that tribe. 22 Once
again, Jefferson demonstrated that he did not envision a complete and
total separation between government and religion. Instead, he belieYed
that religion could be useful in promoting morality among America's
citizens, which is what the Regents' prayer was designed to do.

IV

TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

An analysis of the textual history of the First Amendment
itself reveals that the Pounders' original intent was to ensure
that there was never a government denomination, not that the
government could not promote religion generally. The First
Amendment, as it is known today, reads: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." 1\ilichael Malbin, a professor of Political Science
at State University of New York, says this about the amendment:
Had d1e Framers prohibited 'th e establishment of
religion,' which would ha,·e emphasized dte generic
word 'religion,' there might have been some reason
19
20
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21
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for thinking they wanted to prohibit aJl official
preferences of religion over irreligion. But by choosing
'an csrablishmem' over 'the establishment,' they were
sho\\ ing that therwamed to prohibit only those official
actl' iues that tended to promote the interests of one
or another particular sect. Thus, through the choice
of 'an' O\'cr 'the,' conferees indicated their inrem. 23
In defining tl1e Bill of llights, the Continental Congress went
through multiple drafts of the first Amendment. \X'hile each included
the notion of religious freedom, the exact wording was written ami
rewritten time and time again. 24 One such draft said that "Congress
shall make no Ia\\' establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise
thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience," while another declared
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." b·idently,
the final language of the Establishment Clause was not accidental,
but a meticulous choice that followed much deliberation. Thus, as
Malbin's analysis shows, if the Founders indeed sought to create a
complete di\'ision between church and state, one that would prohibit
the recitation of non-denominational prayers, the First Amendment's
language would have denounced the establishment of "religion," not
"a religion," as it does today. This distinction reemphasizes that the
Founders were nm concerned about encouraging religion generally,
but rather feared that a particular religion or denomination would
become dominant m·er others. A non-denominational prayer certainly
does promote religion generally, but promoting religion does not run
contrary in and of itself to the currentwordingof the First Amendment.

23
~h< 11 \W J. ,\l\1.81,, RrUGio' .>u-.:n PoLrnu.,
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24
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V. j UDIClAL VIEW'S OF TilE TIME
At the time when Engel ~~ Vitale was decided, precedent on
church-state issues, while new and inconclusive, did not provide
significant support for Justice Black's decision. Around the time of
Engel, the Supreme Court had just barely begun to rule on state cases
invohring the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Thus, there
were no clear precedents before the Supreme Court on the legality
of school prayer.25 Nonetheless, previous rulings in state Supreme
Courts concerning prayer in public schools did not support the
Court's decision in EngeL Prof. Chester James Antieau and others
at Georgetown University note that a significant number of state
Supreme Courts, like those in Colorado, Florida, Texas, Ohio, New York,
and 10 others, had ruled prior to Engel that Bible-reading or in-school
prayer at public schools was permissible. On the other hand, only a
few-Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, and \'\'isconsin- had declared that
school prayer or Bible-reading was unacceptable. 26 Additionally, some
of the Supreme Court's own decisions towards the First Amendment
and the Establishment Clause around this time asserted that religion
does have a place in the public sector. ''\"\'e are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Be.ing," Justice Douglas wrote in
Zorach tt Cla11son, which permitted public schools to offer a release-time
program to their students so they could attend religious instruction
and services off-campus.27 \X'hile some decisions did indeed support
a stricter separation uf church and state at the state and federal level,
there was certainly enough juxisprudence contrary to the Court's ruling
in Engel to question the strength of the Black's opinion. This may well
have been why the Court cited no other Supreme Court cases in its

25
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supra note 8, at 133-4.

BtlRKE, RF.JJGIOT'\ Ul\'DER THE STATE (OI"STITUTIONS 53

(1965). See also \'('JLLIMI
G£ORGE T O RPF.Y, JL DICl \1 Dcx.JRJ!';ES o F THE REu moes RIG I IT~ l'l A.\IERK \ 244249 (1948); $~LITH, J/lpra note 8, at 17 1.
27
Zorach ': Claufion, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
Gl

BY U Prelaw Review. Volume 21, 2007

opinion, except ro defend its decision to grant certiorari. Either way,
t.he Court did not have clear precedent for its decision in Engel n Vitale.

VI.

REuG1ous PRACTICES 1~ G oVER.'\l~lE:-rr

One of Engel's implications is that the government cannot
sponsor any type of prayer in its public buildings or during governmentled events. Nonetheless, this implication stands in conflict with current
federal government practices. Prayer is a mainstay in government
meetings and has been for many years. For instance, the Supreme
Court begins each one of its sessions with the Court Crier exclaiming:
"God save the United States and this Honorable Court."28 This is a
plea for protection to a deistic figure and is very similar to the Regents'
prayer, which acknowledges God and pleads for blessings from his
hand. Likewise, the United States Congress begins each of its sessions
with a paid chaplain giving a commencement prayer.29 Thus, on the
one hand, federal public servants offer a prayer to begin their meetings,
but on the other, students in public schools cannot join in a public
prayer to begin their day. This double standard sends an inconsistent
and confusing message about government-sponsored prayer. It is
unfair to limit public school students' First Amendment rights while
congressmen and Supreme Court justices freely enjoy those same rights.

VIl. MlSLEt\DING

PRECEDENT

Unfortunately, not only did the Court misinterpret the Framers'
intent of drafting the First Amendment in Engel v. Vitale, it also
established a precedent that has misled the judicial system in later churchstatecases. Engel's stanceon church-stateissues has become tbefoundation
upon which the Supreme Court has decided many church-state cases.
This stance has, over time, slowly become ever more slanted towards a
strict, uncompromising separation between government and religion.
28
Engel v. Vitale, 370 C. S. 421 (1962), (Douglas,]., concurring).
29
Chaplin o f the I louse of Hcpresentatives, http:/ I chaplain.housc.gov/
histinfo.html (last \'i~ited Mar. 6, 2007).
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In ~Wallace t: Jaffree, d1e Supreme Court, relying on En,P,el as
precedent, struck down an Alabama statute that prescribed a oneminute moment of silence in schools for meditation and voluntary
prayer.30 I n Engel, the Supreme Court found fault with government
prescribed prayer, stating that the Establi shment Clause must" ... at least
mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite..." 31 HoweYer, under the Alabama statue, the goYernment
clid not compose any specific prayers for students to recite; rather,
it is merely allocated time to do so if students wish. In li/al/ace, the
Court said that Engel "prohibits a State from authorizing prayer in
public schools." 32 lt also cited Engrl directly as saying that "The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated
by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or
not.'>33 But setting aside a o ne-minute period for students to pray on
their own accor<.l neither authorizes a prayer nor establishes an official
religion. Since the time period is free for students to pray or not pray
as they wish, the government in no way establishes an official religion
or "lcomposesl official prayers."34 In IPallace} then, while using Engel as
precedent, the Court strayed even further from Engels original holding.
Likewise, in Lee v. Ul'eisman, which also cited Engel as a
precedent, the Supreme Court barred a prayer that was not composed
by government officials. In this case, the Court ruled that allowing
principals to invite clergyman to give graduation commencement
prayers is unconstitutionaJ.35 In its opinion, the Court looked to Justice
Black's words in Engel that "it is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
30
31
?2
33

34
35
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recite as a part of a religious program carried on by gm·ernment."36 Yet
the government does not compose prayers when it invites a man of faith
co speak at a school celebracion.ln fact, this situation is almost identical
to having a chaplain open a congressional session with a prayer. In both
cases, a prayer-one not officially composed by the government-is
offered freely at a government event by a person of faith. The prayer
given is not the established creed of the gO\·ernment, but instead the
prarer of a clergyman. If there is no implication that the congressional
chaplain by offering a prayer at the start of each session of Congress is
establishjng a religion, then no such implication should be inferred when
a clergyman offers a prayer at a high school graduation. In Lee, as well as
in lf7allace, the Supreme Court misconstrued Engelto set an overly strict
definition for improper legal involvement between church and state.

VIIL

CONCLUSION

In its ruling in Engel n Vitale, the Supreme Court banned
school prayer on the basis of the Court's interpretation of the
Framers' original intent in drafting the Constitution. Yet, strong
evidence that the Founders would have ruled differently on this issue
undermines the Court's decision. Since this ruling, however, the new
precedent Engel created has been further misconstrued as the Court
has deviated furth er and further not only from the Founders' original
intent, but from Engel itself Supreme Court cases citing Engel have
moved towards an increasingly stringent division between religion
and government, as shown in Tr4/lace t: Jaffree and Lee v. lfl'eisman.
Before the Court wanders even fartl1er from the original
intent of the First Amt!ndment, it needs to revise and overturn its
ruling in Engel. Since Engel has established precedent based on false
presumptions, it is not enough for the Supreme Court to try and realign
its rulings \\ith the Founders' intent by looking to recent cases.lnstead,
the Court needs to return to its originalist approach in Engel, this time
focusing on what the Framer's true intentwasin declaringthat"Congress
36
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shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.".r Indeed, the conclusion should be clear:
America's Framers did not intend for a complete and total separation of
church and state, as seems to be the prevailing norm in today's society.
James Madison and others worried that a single denomination would
become the established religion of the U.S. goyernment. Their intention
in the Establishment Clause was to prevent any one denomination
from becoming the official state religion, not prohibit public schools
from leading ten-second prayers. The Supreme Court thus needs to
carefully re-examine the First Amendment, paying particularly close
attention to the final clause: "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

37
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Hunger Strikes

HuNGER STRIKES:
LEGAL R IGHTS OF G UANTJ\ AMO D ETAINEES
Bv: JoN Scorr 1
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slowlr dying in this solitary prison ceU," Omar Deghaycs
told media representatives. " I have no rights, no hope. So
why not take my destiny into my own hands, and die for
a principle?"2 Many of the hundreds of detainees held by the U.S.
government at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba feel similarly towards thei r
detainment. On 11 September 2004, 13'1 detainees went on hunger
strike to protest their incarceration. By October 2005 however, the
U.S. government gladly informed visiting media that the number of
participants had decreased to 25. The government responded by
force feeding 22 of the remaining fasters by .inserting nasogasu·ic
tubes into the detainees' stomachs. 3 The government's current forcefeeding practices violate the detainees' common law right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment by seelcing justification from state
interests that have failed to carry the burden of proof necessary
w supersede the detainees' established rights to hunger strike.
The following assessment of applicable legal principles will
reveal that detainees may claim the right to hunger strike. First, a
recent court r uling shows that the Guantanamo detainees do possess
some substantive constitutional rights, inducting due process of law,
which provides the common law basis for the right to refu se unwanted
medical treatment. Second, the state may potentially apply a few
specific interests to provide the legal basis to force-feed a faster,
1
Jon Scott is a junior at B righam Young UniYersity majoring in Political
Science with a minor in Middle East Studies. He plans on attending law school
and hopes to continue his studies of I Jebrew and J\lidclle East politics. Jon is from
Liberty, ~lissouri.
2
CliYe S. Smith, Git111o's Hungtr Slrikffr, TJ IE JATIO r, at 8, 8 (2005).
3
Susan Okic, Glimpses of Guantanan1o- ~Icdical Ethics and the W'ar on
Terror, 353 NE\X,' ENG. J. MED. 2529, 2530 (2005).
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inclu<.ling: the preservation of life, prevention of suicide, avoiding
manipulation of the justice system, and protecting the integrity of
medical ethics.4 Third, several courts have ruled against the detainees'
ability to hunger strike without even addressing the basis for their
common law rights, allowing the government to negatively portray
the hunger strikers' possible motivations. Fourth, a clear disclosure
of the facts and legal precedent demonstrates that applicable state
interests fail to carry the burden of proof necessary to prevail
against the detainees' right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.

II.

EsTABLiSHED D t::TAINEE RJGHTS

The recent ruling of In 111 Gttantanamo Detainee Cases
has provided the framework under which the constitutional and
historical right to refuse unwanted medical treatment may apply to
the Guantanamo detainees. In the case, the court interpreted Rasul
t! B11sh to declare that the Guantanamo detainees maintain some
constitutional rights concerning their detention and the conditions
of their detention, including the fundamental right to due process
of law under the Fifth Amendment.~ Specifically, the court stated
that the "Supreme Court held that habeas jurisdiction did in fact
exist'' in regards to Guantanamo l:hy and that the "existence of
habeas jurisdiction and substantive constitutional rights were 'directly
tied."'6 This ruling's reference to habeas jurisdiction signified that the
Guamanamo Bay detainees do not exist in a legal void outside the
protection of the United States Constitution, bur rather they do enjoy
some degree of legal standing that includes substantive constitutional
tights. This idea of substantive constitutional rights under due process
4
John Williams, Hunger-Strikes: A Prisoner's Right or a 'Wicked Folly'?
40(3) THE J tOWARD JOUR. 285, 294-2Y5 (2001).
5
Jay ~f. Zitter, Annotation, Rights of Alien Detainees J leld Outside the
United States as to their Treatment and Conditions of D etainment, 6 A.L.R. Fed.
2d 185, 195 (2005).
6
In re Gwlnt;mamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 461 (D.C. Cir.

2005).
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becomes significant because substantive due process, as tlistinct
from procedural due process, guarantees many protections upon the
legal foundation of common law. 7 lt is common law that lays the
basis for the detainees' right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
Legal scholars have broadly defined common law as guarantees
of "life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of
the general rules which govern society."8 These general rules center
around ideals of fairness that have evolved from "history, reason, the
past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the
democratic faith."'~ Substantive due process refers to fundamental
guarantees beyond mere procedural legal processes to a description
of life that lies beyond the in\'asion of others, including force-feeding
practices. Legal scholars instruct, "The right to refuse medical treatment
or to withhold consent to medical treatment may be protected by the
common law:"10 Therefore, tletainees may exercise their common
Jaw right to hunger strike due to the substantive due process that
the Constitution has permitted them within its habeas jurisdiction.
I .ega! precedent further estabJjshes the constitutional and
historical right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, thus strengthening
the detainees' case concerning their fundamental common law rights.
The Supreme Court in Cruzat7 t! Director, MissotJri Department q( Health
stated, "The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may
be inferred from our prior decisions." 11 The same court began its
opinion on Cruzan by quoting a 1891 Supreme Court case that stated,
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
7

Donald T. Kramer, Annotatio"' Constinttional Law, 168 A~r JUR 2d 1,

468 (1998).
8
ld. aL478.
9
ld. at 475.
lO
11

T..:tura Dietz, et. al., Annotation, Death, 22A A..\lJUR 2d 101, 476 (2003).
l\£ara Sih•er, Testing Cnt7.an: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question

of Self-Starvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631,640 (2005).
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others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law:" 12 This
century-old ruling not only establishes the historical right tO refuse
unwanted medical treatment, but it also shows a strong correlation
between autonomy over one's body and the highest form of libert)~ If
substanth·e due process can claim to protect any liberty under common
law, then surely the Pifth Amendment protects the most sacred of
liberties. In 11'/ashington v. G!ttcksberg, the Supreme Court likewise drew
upon common Jaw precedent to maintain the distinction between
"right ro die" jurisprudence and the state's ban on assisted suicide. The
Court explained, "Given the common-law rule that forced medkation
was a battery, and the long legal tradition p rotecting the decision
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, ou r assumption was entirely
consistent with this nation's history and constitutional traditions." 13
Such common law liberties extend even to a more local level.
The Supreme Court of l owa in Polk Cotmf.Y Shet?ff v. Iou1a District Court
for Polk CotmtJ• similarly "recognized that the [fourteenth] Amendment
gave a competent person a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment." 14 Thus guaranteed freedoms
under substanti'e due process remain consistent at both the federal and
the state levels. All this evidence reveals the depth thatcommonlawrights
have penetrated American society, b()[h temporally and institutionally.
However, the Supreme Court of Iowa also cautioned that such liberty
interests need "to be balanced against countervailing State interests." 15

IT I.

APPUCAI3LE STATE I NTERESTS

When assessing an individual's right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, justice officials and scholars commonly weigh the influence
of four applicable state interests: the preservation of life, prevention
of suicide, potencial disruption of prison discipline, and protection of
12
13
14

15

Silver, Stlj>m note 11.
ld.
\X'illiams, s11pra note 4, at 290.
ld.
7()
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the medical profession's imegrit:y. 16 HoweYer, under the assumption
that medical professionals have determined the hunger strikers to be
competent, the preYention of suicide does not apply sufficiently to
permit the state to suspend the detainees' common law rights. The law
bas confined the prevention of suicide to "the prevention of irrational
self-destruction, and although the state will act to prevent suicide, merely
declining medical care, e\'en essential treatment, is not considered a
suicidal act or an indication of incompetence."'- Here the law identifies
an important distinction between the right of a rational individual to
refuse life-sustaining treatment and the prohibition on an irrational
individual to terminate their own life. One scholar succinctly correlated
this distinction specifically to hunger strikers by stating" ... tl1e public
policy in pre\·encing suicide is to pre\'ent the irrational loss of life; tl1e
decision of a competent hunger-striking prisoner is not irrationaJ." 18
The Guantanamo Bay detainees provide an excellent example
of how society may deem a competent hunger strike a rational decision.
Israel \~laismei-Manor, a scholar from the University of Haifa, states
that officials should not view a hunger strike as "the act of a crazy
individual, but a rational path that follows some deliberation and is
based on indi,':iduals' socialization and the political action alternatives
open to them." 19 ~ - aismel-Manor provides some possible criteria
that medical professionals may use to determine hunger strikers'
rationality, namely: signs of deliberation, a patient's socialization, and
few available political alternatives. First, the nature of the hunger
strike allows a participant to seriously deliberate the consequences
of their actions because a hunger strike is slow and includes multiple
opportunities to choose whether to improve one's condition by eating
or to continue to refuse offered food. Hunger strike fatalities do not
occur instantly because of one rash choice. Second, the detainees'
Islamic socialization has already incorporated ilie principle of fasting
16
17
18
19
the USA

Williams, supra note 4, at 294-295.
Dietz, supra note 10, at 482-483.
\'\'iUiams, supra note 4, at 291.
Israel \'<'aismel-l\fanor, Striking Differences: Hunger Strikes in Israel and
4 SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDIES 281, 282 (2005).
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into their lives as an acceptable form of behavior. As an ord1opraxy,
Islam motivates Muslims to show their faith by action, which frequently
includes fasting. Therefore, the dt!tainees may easily resort tO such
behavior as they seek divine intervention in their rughly restrictive
environment. Thjrd, the government has left the detainees with very
few options as a possible response to such a restrictive environment,
prompting the detainees ro make decisions with higher risks. As stated
earlier, Omar Deghayes believed iliat he had no rights and no hope.
Judge Green in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases explains that by
claiming the right to incarcerate the detainees for the duration of an
ambiguous, potentially multigenerational conflict, the U.S. Executive
Branch has basically sentenced ilie detainees to life imprisonment,
which is the ultimate deprivation of liberty short of the death penalty. 20
The government's actions have extensively undermined the
' 'ery ideal that the common law finds fundamental to our humanity:
liberty. The detainees' current punishment may almost be perceived
as worse than the death penalty because the detainees must li\-e a
life with little or no meaning. The government has not named their
crimes, and therefore, the detainees' punishments have not been fixed
that they might be fulfilled. The government has left the detainees
witl1 very few options beyond the decision of whether or not to
endure a life devoid of incentives to live. Their restrictive detention
provides these t\Iuslim detainees with the reasons to rationally attempt
a hunger strike, and medical doctors already bold the procedures
to determine the competency of a hunger striker. Therefore, only
three of the four possible state interests apply specifically to the
derajnees' common law right to refuse unwanted medical treatment;
though, no argument can completely avoid the prevention of
suicide interest since "generally, the state's interest in preventing
suicide is a natural corollary to its interest in preserving life." 21
Concerning state interests that could apply, military officials at
Guantanamo Bay have sought to reference the preservation of life as
20
In re Guamanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 4-13, 465-466 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
21
Dietz, Slf/Jra note 10, at, 482.
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a justification for force-feeding many of the detainees, emphasi7.ing
a weak commitment to starvation amongst hunger strikers as an
unuttered plea for such preservation. Major General Jay W. Hood,
commander of the Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, has told dsiting
meclia that "consistent with the D epartment of Defense policy the
JTF will prevent unnecessary loss of life by detainees through standard
medical intervention, including involuntary medical intervention
when necessary to overcome a detainee's desire to commit suicide."22
The government feels that such procedures are consistent with
federal prisons' policies in the United States, which "authorize the
involuntary treatment of hunger strikers when there is a dtreat to
an inmate's life or health." 23 Government officials also justify such
responsive action by concluding that the hunger strikers do not
truly desire to terminate their own lives. The government '~ews the
detainees' hunger strikes more as protests than actual attempts to
commit suicide, and d1Us officials assume the responsibiliry to sustain
the detainees' true desires for life. Captain John S. Edmondson, an
emergency physician and the commander over the detainees' medical
care, referring to the camp's hunger strikers stated, "In none of these
[cases] have 1 ever gotten the impression that these guys want to die."24
In regards to another state interest, several courts have ruled
against hunger strikers to avoid possible manipulation of the prison or
justice system by detainees making radical threats of self-destruction.
Scholars be)jeve that prisoners may hunger strike for a variety of ulterior
motives, including frustration, the desire to gain attention for specific
po)jtical beliefs, or the intention to use their health as a bargaining tool
to change their circumstances.25 Justice Lavorato stated the following
concerning inmate hunger strikers: "In most of these cases, the
inmate's main aim was to gain attention from correction officials and
22
El-Banna Y. Bush, 394 F. Supp. 2d 76, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
23
Tim Golden, Guantanamo Hunger Strikers are Force-fed- 'Restraint
Chairs' with Straps, Tubes used to Feed Inmates, N.Y. Tll\fES, February
9, 2006, http:/ I \V\""'sfgate.coml cgibin/ article.cgi?f= / cl ai20U6I02I09 I.
!\.fNGR8HSHLU l.DTL&hw=Guantanamo+ bunger+ strikers&sn=OO l&sc= I000.
24
Okie, mpra note 2, at530.
25
\X'illiams, supra note 4, at 287.
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sometimes from the public to manipulate the penal system. ln \'irtually
all of these cases, the court allowed force-feeding as a reasonable
response to a threatening disruption of discipline and order in the
penal institution. The common fear was that other inmates might do
the same thing for manipulaLi,·e purposes."~ 1' ComnJonwealth 1: Ka/li11gtr
supporrcc.l this theory and stated that "allowing a prisoner to starve
to death while in state cuscody would have an unpredictable negative
effect on the security and order within the prison system."1- Those
that fear manipulation of rhe penal system seem to hold the belief
that any apparent success by one hunger striker would begin a chain
reaction of hunger strikes, where prisoners would unitedly attempt to
undermme the Yery sentences that seek to enact justice upon them.
Other go...-ernmenr officials justify the force-feeding of hunger
strikers by upholding the inregrity of medical ethics under Hippocratic
principles. ln ConliJJOI11JJectlth v. Kallingp~ a prison psychiatric director
testified that "it would be de\'astating to the staff and rhe staff morale
if they had to allow someone to cease liYing, \ irrually by their own hand,
while under !prison] care."211 The specialist seemed to belie,-e chat health
officials' training has so ingrained the prcsen·ation of Life within their
consciousnesses that any actions against such training would threaten
the health care providers' emotional stability. A nephrologist, in
Commissiomr of Correctionu ,\f)ters, Likewise testified that "metlical ethics
demanded that everything possible be done to ltreat) the defendant 'up
to the point we cannot technically manage it."'2'1 Supporters of such a
position seem ro express a moral imperative that health workers seek
to satisfy to avoid the possible compromising of personnel specifically
trained to save lives. r lowever, these specialists fail to define the
limit of health o fficials' obligations by failing to account for patients'
consent, but medical ethics will assess those limitations momentarily.

26
/d. at 290.
27
~ lam Sill-er, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners ami the Constitutional Question
of Sclf-Stamllion, 58 STA•. L. REV. 631,648 (20US).
28
Siln:r, 111pra note 27, at 652.
29
/d.
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l v.

CORRESPONDJNG STKfE ACTIONS

SeveraJ courts and governmental policy have supported these
state interests in their ruJings and statements against the detainees,
especially favoring the preservation of life and the protection of the
justice system from any manipulation respectively. Judge Bates ruled
in O.K t! Bush that the plaintiffs, referring to the Guantanamo hunger
strikers who sought a stop to being force-fed, carry the burden of
persuasion to "demonstrate a likelihood of injury in the imminent
future in order to secure an injunction."311 Judge Bates later added that
that burden "takes on added importance in a case where the Court is
asked to reguJate the conduct of the Executive in the theater of war." 31
In conclusion Judge Bates declared that "absent a persuasive claim that
the conditions of confinement at Guantanamo are so severe that they
presentanimminentthreatto petitioner's health, the CourtwiJJ notinsert
itself into the day-to-day operations of Guantanamo."32 Interestingly
enough, this judge seems to feel it necessary that the detainees p rove
that the government seeks their harm when the controversy actuaUy
lies with the government's unwillingness to allow detainees to naturally
harm themselves. Later in El-Banna u Bflsh, Judge Louis Oberdorfer
likewise ruJed that "the movants here, like the movant in the O.K. case,
have failed to demonstrate an imminent threat to their health." 33 Such
non-interference into the conduct o f the Executive has allowed the
go,·ernment to term the det..'l.inees' actions as attempts to manipulate
the terms of their detainment. Navy Commander Robert D urand,
a G uantanamo Bay spokesman, recen tly stated, "The hunger strike
technique is consistent with AI-Qaida practice and reflects detainee
attempts to elicit media attention to bring international pressure
on the United States to release them back to the batclefield."34
30
31
32
33
34

EI-Banna '~Bush, 394 F. Supp. 2d 76, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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V.

STr\TE l~TERESTI>

Vs. D

ETAl EE R EALITIES AND RiGHTS

A comparison of the realities and rights of the Guantanamo
detainees to the mentioned state interests reveals a situation far more
degrading and oppressive to the hunger strikers than government
officials have described. Concerning the state's interest to preserve
life, first consider that inherent in every individual is a uniqueness that
only freedom of expression can articulate. Such uniqueness prompts
the state to see life as valuable and worth preserving. However, it is
possible that the state may actually diminish the virtue of that life by
seeking to save it. The :Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated,
"The constitutional right to privacy .. .is an expression of the sanctity of
i11dividual choke and self-determination as fundamental constituents
of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision
to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human
being the right of choice."35 Other legal scholars agree almost verbatim
stating, ''A competent person's common-law and constitutional rights
to forgo life-sustaining treatment do not depend on d1e quality or value
of his or her life and the value of life is lessened not by a decision to
refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being
the right of choice."36 Everything worth preserving in life demands
iliat officials respect the rational decisions of individuals. Freedoms,
like the freedom to refuse unwanted medical treatment, lose all meaning
if individuals mar not exercise such freedoms in reality. Humanity's
freedom capabilities separate it from all other creatures, but suppression
may easily allow individuals to lose that "'·hich makes them human.
Instead, government officials have marginalized detainees'
humanity by questioning their resolve to exercise their fundamental
common law rights while simultaneously incarcerating these
individuals in a condition that the previously mentioned court rulings

35
George J. t\nnas, Law and the rife Sciences: Prison Hunger Strikes: W'hy
the Morive Matters 12 THE I IASTINGS CENTER REPORT 21, 22 (1982).
Dietz, strpra note 10, at 532.
36
76

Hunger Strikes

have termed "the ultimate deprivation of liberty."l7 Surely realizing
their hopeless position, some detainees have e,·en resorted to possible
irrational behavior, which provides a contradicting response to
Captain Edmondson's prc\'ious statement concerning the detainees'
desire to stay alive. The military ad mits that there have been thirtysix suicide attempts by twenty-two Guantanamo detainees as of
November 1, 2005.31.1 One derainee,Jumah Dossari, attempted suicide
by gouging his right arm until it bled and then hanging himself from a
makeshift noose in his cell. f lowever, D ossari's lawyer, who had been
meeting with his client until a few minutes before the suicide attempt,
happened to enter Dossari's ceU in enough time to discover D ossari's
dangerous circumstances and stop his client from losing his life. 39
Then on June 10, 2006, Mani Shaman Turki ai-Habardi AI-Utaybi,
Yassar Tala) Al-Zahrani, and Ali Abdullah Ahmed hung themselves
in their cells and succeeded in taking their own lives.4 Clearly some
of the detainees feel so hopeless about their current situation that
several woukllike to end their suffering. Such evidence also describes
an environment where rational actors may choose to hunger strike,
exercising one of the few political alternatives left to the detainees.
Concerning the undermining of the penal system, Mara Silver,
a graduate from Stanford Law School, finds the state's rulings on
the hunger strikers' ulterior manipulative motives as very ambiguous
and asserts that the law requires states to carry the hea\'iest burdens
of persuasion "before fundamental rights may be restricted."41
Silver finds it interesting that the "Kallinger court jrself admits
that the effect of a faster's death \Vould be, at best, 'unpredictably
negative'."42 Clearly, unpredictable consequences do not provjde the
strong e·..-idence necessary to suppress a common law right. Silver

°

37
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goes on to cite Singletary L~ Costello, in which the Florida District
Court of Appeal ruled that state interest<; could not stop Costello's
hunger strike "given thtre was no e\·idc:nce of actions undermining
security, safety, or welfare within the prison. Rather, 'arguments
concerning the effect of Costello's conduct [werel nothing more than
speculation and conjecrure.'"43 The district court judge then went on
to challenge the theory that a successful hunger strike would start a
chain reaction of multiple coercive fastcrs. He stated, "lt is hard to
imae,~ne that if lCostello] dies as a res\.llt of his actions, that inmates
"''ill be rushing to imitate him."~4 Competent indi,'iduals will surely
back down from permanent consequences if weakly committed to an
action because they still believe that their lives have hope for meaning.
Government officials would also be wise to not minimize
individual rights even in a prison setting, lest society animalizes those
humans who ru:e incarcerated. The Supreme Court has already stated
in T11mer L~ Sa.fo.J• that a prisoner "retains those [constitutional] rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system."45 The
Court then later clarified in Johnson l( California that "while 'certain
privileges and rights must necessarily be limited in the prison context,'
rights that need not necessarily be compromised for proper prison
administration are 'not susceptible to the logic of Turner,'" which had
provided a very lax standard for prison regulations. 46 The judge in
Costello understood that a hunger striking prisoner does not disrupt
proper prison administration. An indiYidual that weakens himself
from lack of nourishment cannot easily lead a revolt against prison
security. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in If: r..!ff v. ll1cDonnell,
"denied the existence of an 'iron curtain' between the Constitution and
the prisons." 47 Legal scholars summarize these principles succinctly

43
44
45
46
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by stating, "An inmate's constitutional right to refuse nonconsensual
medical treatment is not vitiated by fact that he or she is incarcerated."~8
Finally, concerning protection of the medical community,
the World Medical Association, an international authority on medical
ethics, has declared that doctors must Jearn to balance the values of
preserving life and being respectful of their patients' autonomy when
presented with a hunger striker as a patient.49 In Singletary l'. Costello,
the court ruled that "patient autonomy and medical ethics are not
reciprocaJs; one does not come at the expense of the other."50 \'<'hen
a patient proves himself or herself competent, then medical ethics
state that the patient holds the power to refuse unwanted medical
treatment. A doctor's obligation to use all available means to presen'e
a patient's life ends where and when a competent patient desires. The
World Medical Association, which includes the American Medical
Association, declared that doctors that agree to attend to a hunger
striker accept all of the "responsibilities inherent in the doctor/patient
relationship, including consent and confidentiality." 51 Then applying
more specifically to the detainees, d1e W.l\LA. has stated, 'Where a
prisoner refuses nourishment and is considered by the physician as
capable of forming an unimpaired and rational judgment concerning
the consequences of such a voluntary refusal of nourishment, he or she
shall not be fed artificially."52 These statements continue to sttengthen
the argument that common law rights may not be easily discarded,
even in extreme circumstances. Just as incarceration cannot instantly
dissolve all fundamental rights, hunger strikes do not operate under
a new framework oudining the doctor-patient relationship. Further
showing the endurance of these basic rights, the W.M.A. has also
48
Dietz, 111pra note 10, at 485-486.
49
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50
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51
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52
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Assembly Tokro, Oct. llJ75.
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announced that "medical ethics in times of armed conflict is identical
to medical ethics in times of peace."53 The \'\~M.A. would seem to
argue that the war on terrorism has not relinquished the detainees'
right to refuse unwanted merucaJ treatment through hunger striking.

V1.

CONCLUSION

The goYernment's current actions and policies clearly violate
the detainees' right to refuse unwanted meclical treatment by seeking
justification from state interests that have failed to carry the burden
of proof necessary to supersede the detainees' fundamental common
law rights. The United States justice system has plainly ruled that the
detainees hold substanth·econstitutional rights, including the due process
of law which builds irs foundation upon common la\\~ Furthermore,
common Jaw protects those personal liberties that define the humanity
within an individual, like autonomy over one's person, the most sacred
liberty of all. The government has offered justifications for their forcefeeding practices, but each excuse lacks merit. The government cannot
preserve life by keeping an individual breathing to only oppress the
essence of that individual's humanity later. Life requires freedom of
expression to have meaning. The government cannot claim possible
exploitation of the penal system when hunger strikes do not hinder
t.he proper administration of the prison facility and detainees maintain
their common law rights in prison. Finally the government cannot
raise the banner of medical ethics to heroic proportions where medical
personnel must save lives at all costs when the power of consent gives
the patient the ability to place limitations on medical intervention. lf
the government wishes to continue acting in such an authoritarian
manner toward the Guantanamo prisoners, then it should provide
evidence that gives them that authority. ln the meantime, the detainees
shouJd maintain their common Jaw right to decide their own destiny.
Nonetheless governmen t officials and some courts have yet
to acknowledge that the detainees hold any such rights, sometimes
53
\\'orld ]\fed. Ass'n, Regulations in Times of Armed Con AieL, I Oth World
Med. Assembly H;n-anna, Oct. 1956.
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even to the point of absurdity. lt makes little sense that the EIBanna judge required hunger strikers to prm·e that government
actions present an imminent threat to their healtb before a detainee
may exercise his or her established right to end their own life. The
hopelessness of the detainees' indefinite incarceration pnwides an
understandable environment where an indi,·idual may feel it necessary
to exercise such a right, especially if Islamic sociali7.ation strengthens
such a decision's viability. The detainees see no end, and possibly
little reason, to their incarceration. The court, in In re GIICmtanamo
Detainee Cases, referred to Hamdi u Rltmsjeld which applied a Matbe111s
t: Eldtidge analysis where the plurality opinion called detainee private
interests "the most elemental of liberty interests -- tbe interest in
being free from physical detention by one's own go,·ernment."54 The
Court then wisely explained, "There is no practical difference between
incarceration at the hands of one's own government and incarceration
at tbe hands of a foreign governmem; significant liberty is deprived
in both situations regarilless of the jailer's nationality."55 Universal
principles of liberty stretch their jurisdiction across aU boundaries,
hoping to bless all of humanity, but unfortunately, those principles
have yet to improve the lives of tbe detainees in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. Meanwhile, legal precedent, unjust incarceration, and medical
ethics all support the rationality of the detainees to hunger strike.
No one's preference should be able to arbitrarily suspend the rights
of another, regardless of the extent of their power in the country.
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Ct.:RRE1'\T DE\'ELOP~IDJTS

The final draft of this article was submitted to the production
team prior to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia that denied certain Constitutional rights to
detainees at the Guantanamo Bay prison.' The nature of the topic
being discussed effects the current legal validity of this argument.
Lawyers for the detainees are planning an appeal to the Supreme Court.2

1
Jee Boumecliene v. Bush, ~o. 05-5062, 2007 U.S. DisL LEXIS 3682
(D.D.C., 2005).
2
David G. Sa,·age, Court Denies Guantanamo Legal Rights, Tm. i'l ·mo:-:
Sot:RCL, February 22, 2007, at A I.
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SAME- SEX M ARRIAGE IN TilE UNITED STATES
B Y JoliN GocHNOL'R

1

I. L"TRODUCI'ION

T

he Roman orator Cicero once described marriage as "the first
bond of society".2 l\Iarrjageisacommitmentof many dimensions.
Jtis in its simplest terms an agreement between laYers to forge a
bond of love and commitment. Beyond that simple dimension the act
of marriage carries great significance. President Bush calls "the union
of man and woman the most enduring human institution .. . honored
and encouraged in all cultures and by every religious faith." 3 Marriage
is an important and enduring social tradition, representing to many
the passing of the young into adulthood and even tually parenthood.
It is also a decision of spiritual sigruficance. Religious leaders often
perform marriages, ceremonies are often consecrated in churches,
and in many faiths the marriage itself is considered a sacrament.4
Marriage is significant not only as a relationship between
individuals, but also as a relationship between indi,·iduals and
government. Marriage is used by the federal government as the '<legal
gateway to a vast array of protections, responsibilities, and benefitsmost of which cannot be replicated in any other way ... " 5 How and to
whom government should extend the responsibilities and benefits of
marriage has never been more controversial than today, in the wake of the
legalization of same-sex marriage in orthern Europe, a l\lassachusetts
Supreme Court decision that fo und a right to same-sex marriage
l
John Gochnour is a senior at Brigham Young University majoring in
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from Burley, Idaho.
2
H ANNIS TAYLOR, CiCFRO: A SKETCH OF HIS LIFE AND W ORKS 503 (19 16).
3
George W~ Bush, President, U.S., President Calls for Constinnional
Amendment Protecting Marriage (Feb. 24, 2004) (transcript an1ilable at http://
w'W\v.whitehousc.gov/news/ rcleases/2004 /02/20040224-2. ht ml).
E\'AN \'\'ou·SON, \'\hi\ ~L\RR1 \{.F. 1\L\ncRS: A.\tERIC ,, EQmun· \I'D Gw
4
PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO l\L\RRY 5 (2004).
5
ld. at 4.
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in the ~lassachusetcs Consotution, and the proposal of a Federal
Marriage Protection Amendment tO the l!ruted Stares Consotution.
Same-sex marriage proponents, asserting that a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage exists in the U.S. Constitution and that
legalizing same-sex marriage is good public policy, argue that rhe United
States should foUow the lead of Canada and many Europ~n countries
and lcgal1ze same-sex marriage. In response, same-sex marriage
opponents have proposed a Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA)
that woukl define marriage in the United States as a union between a
man and a woman. This paper argues that both of these positions go
too far. Same-sex marriage proponents are incorrect to call legalized
san1e-sex marriage a fundamental constitutional right and good public
policy, yet same-sex marriage opponents abo eclipse necessity in their
present efforts to amend the Constitution. The U.S. government
should continue to support traditional marriage through legislation
such as the 1996 D efense of Marriage Act (DOMA), but should also,
for the time, respeCL the boundaries of fedt!ralism and leave decisions
about whether or not to legalize gay marriage in the hands of the states.

Il. S \.\11:.-SEx ~L\RRL\GE AS A Fn,D\MEI\TAL RtGI!T
The first Amendments to the United States Constitution
protected important, eyen "fundamental" human rights d1at the
Founders felt each citizen was entitled to. ln 1997 Chief Justice
\~'illiam Rehnquist defined fundamental righrs as those "which are
objectively, deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition ... and
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificcc.l."1' The U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently recognized marriage as a fundamental
right.- In a 1967 case that limited states' ability to prohibit
interracial unions, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote: "The freedom
6
\'\'ashington -.·. G luchbcrg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 ( 1997) (quoting Moore \.
E. CleYeland, 43 1 U.S. 494,503 (1977)).
7
Srr Turoel'\: Safley, 482 l '.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki\. Rcdhail, 434 U.S. 374
( L978); Lo' ing \ , Virginia, 388 U.S. 2 (196-, .
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to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 8
Same-sex marriage supporters argue that all marriages are
equal and should equally protected because the right to marriage is
a fundamental right. Carlos Ball, a respected gay marriage advocate,
notes that needs of ''companionship and affiliation with other
humans" cannot be separated from needs of intimacy and sexuality.9
Since humans cannot separate these basic needs, proponents assert
that legislation placing limits on an individual's right to marry another
person of the same sex depri,•es him o r her of the equal protection
of the laws and limits basic Constitutional rights. Same-sex marriage
proponents seek to define marriage as the Massachusetts's Supreme
Court did, as a ''deeply personal commitment to another human
being and a highly public celebrntion of the ideals of mutuality,
companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family." 'VIn this view the primary
concern of marriage is to promote personal satisfaction and happiness,
and allowing same-sex couples ro marry is a constitutional requirement.
Same-sex marriage proponents argue that any legislation that
limits a fundamental right on the basis o f sexual preference must
be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, just like other Jaws that
discriminate based on race or sex.11 If same-sex unions are indeed
fundamentally similar to heterosexual unions, then prohibiting samesex unions is to base marriage law on the same moral grounds which
mid-twentieth century la\\'S denying interradal unions were based
on. This argument centers on the idea that sexual preference, like
skin color, is immutable or unchangeable. Since the Supreme Court
ruled in Loving'~ Virginia that marriage limitations based on race are
suspect classifications entitled to greater judicial scrutiny, limits on the
right of homosexuals to marry should likewise be deemed suspect.
8
1-0\'ing, 388 US. 2 at 12.
9
Carlos A. Ball, Marriage, Same-Gender Relationship~. and H uman Needs
and Capabilities in l\L".RRI \<;E AND S,\~n:.-SEx UN rONS: A D F.ft\TF. 137, 137 (Lynn D.
\'\'ardle, et al. eds., 2003).
10
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 '.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003).
11
!Jcrnandez \'. Robles, o. 86-89, slip op. at S ~.Y July 6, 2006), a\·ailable
at http:/ lwww.nycouns.govI reporterI 3dsericsl2006l2006_05239.btm.
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Though persuasi,·e, these arguments go too far in ascribing
legitimacy to same-sex unions while ignoring the historical and legal
reasoning behind marriages designation as a fundamental right. First,
a right to same-sex marriage is not rooted in Ollt nation's history: "Until
a few decades ago, it was an accepted truth for almost everyone who
ever lived, in any society in which marriage existed, that there could be
marriages only between participants of different sex. A court should
not lightly conclude d1at everyone who held this belief was irrational,
ignorant, or bigoted." 12 For more than 2,000 years marriage between
a man and a woman has served as a bedrock of western civilization.
Aristotle described marriage as the "natural union between husband
and wife.'' 13 While tradition by hself is not always convincing evidence
to continue a practice, as one sees with the earlier debate on interracial
marriage, when examining the nature and purposes of marriage, one sees
tl1e rationale of l)jswricaUy limiting marriage to couples of opposite sex.
Second, as Justice Williams of the ew York Supreme Court
noted in that court's Hernandez v. Robles decision; while government
has consistently recognized marriage as a fundamental right, it has
done so in decisions concerning individuals of the opposite sex, not
same-sex couples. 14 lndeed, the Supreme Court has given marriage a
privileged status for very specific reasons. In Skinner v: Oklahoma ex
rei. \~'illiamson, the Court stated that "Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to tl1e very existence and surviva.l of the race." 1" A nation
is out of necessity interested in promoting marriage as a means to
encourage reproduction and to ensure the state survives and prospers.
Nations that ignore this p riority can face devastating consequences.
For example, due to years of government policies that discouraged
reproduction and ignored the role of the traditional family to national
stability, most of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
bloc now face the possibility of losing between a third to half of their
12
Hernandez v. Robles, Ko. 86-89, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. July 6, 2006), a\·ailahle
at http:/ /w·ww.nycouns.gO\'/rcporter/ 3dseries/2006/2006_05239.hm1, at 5.
13
Quoted in \'\'nuso-.;; suprll nore 4, at 48.
14
liernandcz, 1 o. H6-89, slip op. at 5.
I5
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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populations by the year 2050. 111 The national goYernmcnts of several of
these nations toda) must provide heavy subsidies to encourage couples
to have children, further taxing the economic resources of newly
capitalistic economies. ln order to avoid a situation similar to these
countries the llnited States must continue to recognize the important
role that marriage and families play in society and continued national
stability. In a dissent to the Massachussetts Supreme Court's ruling
in Goodridge ,. Dept. of Public Health Justice Cordy outlines why
legislatures may rationally exclude homosexual couples from traditional
marriage. He asserts that the government regulates marriage because the
nation has a strong interest in fostering marriage as the social institution
that best forges a linkage berween sex, procreation and child rearing.
Marriage systematicaJJy regulates heterosexual behavior, brings order
to the resulting procreation and ensures a stable family structure for
the rearing, education and sodalization of childrcn. 17 In summary, state
and federal legislators are not irrational to conclude that procreation
and reproduction are the legitimate goals behind government regulatiun
of marriage. The Court has protected marriage as a fundamental right
based on these legitimate state concerns, therefore no fundamental
rights are violated by a states choice to disallow same-sex marriage.
Third, relating to the argument that legislation restricting
same-sex marriage should face heightened judiciaJ scrutiny just as laws
allowing discrimination based on race; unlike race, whose designation
as a suspect classification is supported by the Constirutions Fourteenth
Amendment, no similar mandate for classification exists for sexual
o rientation. Suspect classifications like race involve unchanging
immutable biological characteristics; claims that homosexuality
is immutable are nut substantiated by scientific evidence and are
weakened by the claims of many former gays and lesbians "'·ho claim

16
D on II ill, L:N: Population Di' i~ion Says Eastern Europe's Population
to FaU by Half in Some Areas, R l1SSL.\ \X'k.LY., Feb. 27, 2003, http:/ ;,,..ww.cdi.org/
russia/ 246-IS.cfm.
17
GoodriJge , •. Dep't of P ub. llcald1, 798 :-.J.E.2J 94 J, 995 ~ [ass. 2003).
K"'
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heterosexual attraction. I I! Perhaps more importantly, a couple's race is
not related to any legitimate purpose states have in regulating marriage;
a couple's sexual odentation, with its important consequences for
procreation, is profoundly related. During the debate in the early
1990s oyer gays in the United States Military, Colin Powell noted
this important clifference between race and sexual orientation: "Skin
color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic... Sexual orientation
is perhaps the most profound of human behaYioral characteristics.
Comparison of the two is a convenient but invalid argument." 1, Courts
rigid examination of all laws that allow any form of discrimination
based on immutable and unchanging characteristics is an important
component in protecting indi,ridual's rights and uberties; however, this
class of suspect classifications should be limited to those characteristics
that General Powell referred to as benign and non-behavioral.
The fundamental right to marriage between heterosexual
individuals exists and has been protected by the nation's courts.
This right has never been extended to same-sex couples. It is
neither unconstitutional nor irrational to legislate against allo\\r1ng
marriage between same-sex couples because the state's regulation
of marriage has very specific goals and purposes. Chief among
those is promoting procreation and strengthening the family which
has long been regarded as society's moral bedrock. Same-sex
couples truly afford each other the benefits of " mutual caring and
sharing, of coinsurance and cooperation, domestic efficiency and
proficiency, and sexual comfort and constraint."20 These are rights
of association ancl should not be limited; however, a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage does not exist in the Constitution.

18
LYN'< D. \X' .-\RDI.E, Beyond Equalicy in l\IARRIAGt: Al\ID SAMI·. -SEX UNto~s:
A DEB.\Th, supt'tl note 9, at 186, 186-187.
19
Cou:-; Po" ELL, l\fy AMERIC.Uv Jut "Rl'\IF-Y 545 (1995).
20
Jmtr-. \X'rrrn JR., Rep!) to Professor MMk Strasser in ~L\RRI \GE AND
S \.ME-SEx U~tOt\S: A DEs.m :, supm note 9, at 43, 43.
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Ill.

SAME-SEx ~L\RRL-\GE AS

Pusuc PuucY

In addition to arguing that marriage should be legalized
because it is a fundamental right many proponents of samesex marriage claim that legalizing it is good public policy. t-.Iany
proponents and opponents of same-se-x marriage agree that marriage
promotes emotional stability for adults and children and helps both
lead happier, more productive li\'es.21 The disagreement lies in whether
extending the benefits traditionally associated with marriage to samesex couples would have a negative effect on marriage as an institution.
Same-sex marriage advocates claim that legalizing same-sex
marriage would serve a variety of state interests. For instance, some
maintain that same-sex marriage would have positi,•e effects on
American families by strengthening the instimtion of marriage and
reaffirming the principles of commitment and fidelity. They argue
that the traditional institution of marriage has been so damaged
by infidelity, di\'orce, and abuse among heterosexual couples, that
allowing deeply-committed homosexual couples to marry might
reinforce a "healthy social trend."22 These activists argue that allowing
state-sanctioned marriage between committed couples, regardless
of gender, will promote and strengthen the institution of marriage.
Early data from Europe, however, shows that legal recognition
of same-sex marriage does not in fact strengthen the instimtion of
marriage and may accelerate its decline. 23 The Netherlands legali:ted
same-sex marriage in 1998. Fundamentally changing the definition
of marriage has furthered a continuous gradual erosion of the
traditional family in the country. According to social scientists, many
Dutch today "increasingly regard marriage as no longer relevant"
21

1\L\RJ... S·nnssER, The States interests in Recognizing Same Sex Marriage
S \.\1£-SE:-. Urxro"'s: A DEB.\TE, supra note 9, at 33, 33.
22
Andrew Sulli,-an, Here Comes The Groom: A ConserYative Case
For Gay Marriage, TilE NF.\~' RIWL'BUC, Aug. 1989, 20, available :u http:/ /v.'W\V.
andrewsulliYan.com.homosexuality.php?artnum =1989082R.
23
Patrick Fagan and Grace Smith, The Transatlantic Di' ide on Marriage:
Dutch Data and the U.S. Dehate on Same-sex Unions, THE Hr:RJnGE Fot 'l'.D.\110:-<,
Scp. 29, 2004, http:/ / www.heritagc.org/Research/ Family/ wm577.cfm.
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because they have been persuaded that "marriage is not connected
to pan.;nthood, anJ that marriage and cohabitation are egually valid
lifestyles ... " 24 Alternative forms of cohabitation and childrearing are
now widely accepted in the Netherlands, and young people place less
value on marriage. The effects of these changes are real; since 1998
there have been overwhelming increases in the divorced percentage of
the population, the percentage of out-of-wetUock births, the number
of induced abortions, and the number of couples who choose to
remain childless.25 While the evidence from the Netherlands and
other Western European countries does not show a definite causal
connection between legalizing same-sex marriage and the continued
decline of the traditional family unit, it does undermine the
argument that legalizing same-sex marriage will strengthen traditional
heterosexual marriage and the basic unit of a stable society, the family.
Other same-sex marriage proponents argue that legalizing
same-sex marriage '\Vill benefit the nation by increasing citizens
overall happiness and productivity. 26 Essentiall)~ this argument says,
marriage is a public good that increases individual satisfaction. When
individuals are in happy, secure, and open relationships they are more
satisfied and better able to focus on other producti,·e economic and
civic endeavors. By limiting same-sex couples ability to marry, some
would argue the United States stigmatized these couples and left them
unable to openly express their emotions in a socially acceptable way.
If same-sex marriage were legalized, proponents assert, than the
nation would benefit by removing this stigma and thereby increasing
same-sex couples' happiness, satisfaction, and productivityY
This line of reasoning goes too far, howe,•er, in identifying
individual happiness as the primary national interest in regulating
marriage. Theresa Stanton Collett of South Texas College of Law
more accurately describes the government's interest in marriage:
24
Quoted in id.
25
F.\G,\ N , supm note 23.
26
l\L\RK STR.\SSER, The States Interests in Recognizing Same Sex Marriage in
l\L\RRJ,\t;F. A."'D SAME-S!ix UNJUNS: A DuB:\TE, supra note 9, at 33, 33.
27
ld. at 34.
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"Historically the primary function of marriage has been legitimization
of children conceived within the mat1tal union, with subsequent
support, socialization, and property transmission to those children."28
While the happiness of citizens is certainly an important goal of
any legitimate regime, d1e primary goY<:rnment policy interest in
regulating marriage is prom< 1ting stability through the creation of
strong families. As early as 1885 the Supreme Court noted the relevant
national interest in marriage and the family in Murphey• t~ Ram.rry.
[N]o legislation can be supposed more wholesome
and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing
commonwealth, fit to take its rank as one of the coon.linate States of the Union, than that which seeks
to establish it on the basis of the family, as consisting
in and springing from the union for life of one man
and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony. 29
Personal ties between dose friends are likewise important,
loving, personal commitments between individuals that bring great
satisfaction. However, they do not affect the nation's future as does
the marital relationship between a man and a woman, and are therefore
not regulated by the law and deemed marriage. A fundamental purpose
of state regulated marriage is to foster strong families; families which
stabilize young men and women, and support, protect, and teach the
next generation of citizens.
Another focus in the debate over legalized same-sex marriage
concerns the effect that legalizing same-sex marriage will haYe on
religious groups, universities, and other tax exempt o rganizations
that oppose same-sex marriage on religious grounds. Same28
THERES.\ ST.\l'.'TO"l Cou.J:-rr. Should Marriage be Pch·ileged? The State's
Interest in Childbearing Unions in .\L\RRL\GE A.'ID S-\.ME-SF..:-.: U~TONS: A DF.B,-\TE,
supm note 9, at 152, 159.
29 Murphy v. Ramsey 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
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sex marriage opponents worry that many groups who oppose same-sex
marriage on religious gmunds may be forced to accept and recognize
same-sex unions or lose their tax exempt status. Pepperdine Law
Professor Douglas Kmiec notes, "an insidious, but less recognized,
consequence [of gay marriage] will be a push to demonize-and
then punish-faith communities that refuse to bless homosexual
unions." 30 This push has already begun in Massachusetts. Catholic
Charities in Boston was one of the nation's oldest adoption agencies,
specializing in finding homes for difficult to place children. However,
after the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered gay marriage
legalized, the agency faced a difficul t decision, either allow same-sex
couples ro adopt in conrradiction to the doctrines of the church, or
close irs doors and allow the children it could ha\·e otherwise helped
to suffer. It chose the latter. 3 1 \Xt'hether it be a specific faith or an
organization such as the Boy Scouts, any organization that refuses to
abide by laws that same-sex marriages may face grave consequences,
including the possibility of having their tax-exempt status revoked.

IV

SEx-~lARRIAGE AND FEDERALISM

In 2002 Representative Marylin MusgraYe of Colorado
proposed a l<ederal Marriage Amendment (l=-1v1A) to the United
States Constitution.
The Amendment contained two primary
ideas. First, marriage in the United States should consist only of a
union berw·een one man and one woman. Second, that neither the
U.S. Constitution nor the constitution of any state, or any state or
federal law, could require that marital status or the legal benefits that
accompany marriage could be conferred upon unmarried couples.32
The second clause faced cri ticism from both proponents and
30

Douglas\\~

Kmiec, If Gays Marrr, Churches Could Suffer, CHIC\(;o

TRIBl'i\.E, ~fay 26, 2006, at A 14.

31
l\faggic Gallager. 13anncd in Boston: The Coming Conflict Between
Same-Sex .\[arriage and Re~gious rjbcrty, THE \'( 'r:f.KLY S'T.\~0:\RD, .\tar 2006, at 20.
32
Alison Smith, Same-Sex 1\farriage: Legal Issues, CoKGRESSJnr-..\L
Rt SE.\RCI I Sr R\' lll:., 2004, http:// digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/crs/13.
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opponents of same-sex marriage because of its implications for a
traditionally state-controUed area of law. Since 2002 versions of the
~lA have been proposed twice, but as of this writing no proposal has
achieved the three-fifths majority ' 'ote necessary to end congressional
debate, and so the Amendment has neYer received a full Yote.
There are three reasons that the Fi\IA is not the best solution to
d1e same-sex marriage debate. First, the federal nature of the American
system gives states primary control over domestic issues, and at this
time a Federal Marriage Amendment is an unnecessary abridgement
of that sovereignty. Second, the Founders made amendments to d1e
Constitution extremely difficult to pass in order to protect the documents
original intent-to balance power and protect civil rights. Some regard
a constitutional amendment as the only way to stop the legalization
of same-sex marriage. This theory is based on the possibility that
the Supreme Court will overturn DO~tA and states' constitutional
amendments. This argument does notgh-eenough credence to legislative
mechanisms mat are capable of protecting traditional marriage
without addressing the issue in the Constitution. An amendment
should not be regarded as me only solution and, for the time being, an
unnecessary one. Third, the D efense of Marriage Act, coupled with
state constitutional amendments and statutes prohjbiting same-sex
marriage, offers a legitimate Line of defense for protecting marriage.

A.

R EGUL\TION OF lvL\RRL\GE lS PROPERLY LEFT TO TilE STATES

The U.S. Constitution states: "in order ... to secure me blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity [we] do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America." 33 The Constitution
enumerates and defines the powers of the federal government and
also checks and balances iliese powers against each other in order to
prevent one branch from usurping power. James Madison famously
explained the balance of power between the states and d1e nation:

33

U.S. CoNST.

Pt-mL.
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The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
are few and defined. Those which are to remain
to the State governments are numerous and
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally
on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation and
foreign commerce. . . . The powers resen·ed to the
se\•eral States will extend to alJ objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties,
and propertit:s of d1e people, anti the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.34
The States have historically been free to determine the
conditions of a ''alid marriage.35 In Pennoyer v. Neff, the Supreme
Court stated that "the State ... has the absolute right to prescribe the
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved." 36 The
Federal Marriage Amendment would take this power away from the
states by establishing a constitutionalJy enshrined definition of marriage
and limiting states' ability to prescribe for themselves what constitutes
a marriage. Regardless of one's position on the issue of same-sex
marriage it is difficult to see the necessity of changing the traditional
federal power structure on an issue that, while important, is currently
effectively being regulated at a state level. Both the legislatiYe and the
judicial branches of the Federal Government have at times regulated
the states' ability ro prescribe the conditions of civil marriage. For
example, in 1862 Congress made bigamy a punishable federal offense in
order to eliminate the proliferation of polygamous relationships in the
Western United States.37 And as discussed earlier the Supreme Court has
also limited states ability to set the conditions for marriage in decisions
such as I ..oting. These limitations were based on both Congress' and
34
1961).
35
36
37

THE FEDt::R:\UST No.

45, at 292 Qames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.

Sherrer"· Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 354 (1948).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-5 (1877).
Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, 12 Stat. SOl, ch 126 (1862).
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the Court's determination that marriage between heterosexual couples
was in the nation's best interest and a fundamentally guaranteed right.
These congressional and judicial actions secured the national interests
without the far reaching step of Amending the Constitution and
effectively limiting states ability to prescribe the conditions of marriage.
B. S.\.\IE-SF.x MARRL\GE .\NO A \IE:-.101 rc; THL Co:-.~STITPTION

While the Constitution preserves and protects our rights
as citizens, one must remem ber that upon ratification citi7-ens gave
the go,·ernment the right, through statutory law to regulate and eYen
limit freedoms. 38 This delegation of authority requires legislators to
take stances on moral issues and to regulate those issues through the
legislative process. Prostitution, incest, and drug use are each issues
deemed immoral and regulated by the government in order to protect
national interests. Society even allows the go,·ernment to discriminate
when it is necessary for the common good. For example, no legislation
has been passed to protect those who engage in domestic violence
or pedophilia from employment, housing, or public accommodation
discrimination. Society has determined that because such actions are
morally problematic employers, landlords, and government officials
can use dtem as grounds for discrimination.39 As noted above, the
1862 Morrill Anti-Bigamy Law is an example of Congress limiting the
states' control over marriage policy through statutory law in order to
address a public policy concern. When Congress passed the DOMA,
which defines marriage for national purposes as a union between a
man and a woman, it addressed a similar concern about protecting the
family, and was justified in doing so. However, one should note that

38
Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressi\·e Expansion of
State Power and the Rise of Modern CiYil Liberties Jurisprudence, Pot. RES. Q.,

623 (IY94).
39
Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict: (Some) Religions and Marriage
Equaljty THF. BECKET FliN D FOR R.kUGTOUS LIBERTY, May 4,2006, htrp:/ /www.
becket fund .org/ files/92708. pdf.
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no constitutional amendment prohibiting polygamous relationships
was passed; instead the concern was addressed through statutory Jaw.
The Founders believed that amending the Constitution
should be an extremely difficult process reserved "for certain great
and extraordinary occasions."40 The legislative process the founders
designed allows Congress to address concerns and protect the nation's
interest through statutory law while reserving the Constitution
for defining government power and guaranteeing fundamental
rights. This process has been successful in protecting traditional
marriage, the legislature has acted by instituting the DONIA, the
Court has and this legislation has so far been upheld by the Courts.

c. TilL D EJ·ENSE OF MAHRJAGE
In 1996, Congress, with the support of President Bill Chnton,
enacted theDOJ\JA tO define marriage as "between a man and a woman".
D011A declares that whenever the terms "marriage" and "spouse,"
appear in federal laws or ref,rulations they do not include homosexual
marriage. In other words when determining the meaning of any act of
Congress, or any federal rule or regulation, the word "marriage" means
only the legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word spouse refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife. DOMA also gives states the authority
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages that have been carried out
in other srates. DONIA makes it clear d1at in the United States the
fundamental right to ciYil marriage in the United States applies only
to opposite-sex unions. 4 1 For the last ten years DOM.A has served as
a guidepost for states in their attempts to protect traditional marriage
through statutory and constitutional measures and has allowed states
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages carried out in Massachusetts
following the court ordered legalization of same-sex marriage there.
The fact that DOMA allows states to refuse recognition
of same-sex marriages in other stares indicates its intent to protect
40
41

No. 49 Qamc~ Madison) .mpm note 34, at 311.
Defense of :Marriage Act of t 996, 28 U. S. C. § 1783C (1996).
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states historic power to prescribe the conditions of marriage. As
mentioned above, marriage has historically been a subject principally
of state concern. Moreover, DONlA adds nothing to the Constitution
allowing states the freedom to pursue their desired marriage policies.
The Defense of Marriage Act is thus a valid effort by Congress
to afford states continuetl discretion in setting marriage polic)~ 42
The DO:MA constitutes a bipartisan effort to protect the
traditional American family. Since it was established twenty-six states
have passed state constitutional amendments limiting gay marriage
and twenty three states have passed statutes defining marriage as a
union between a man and a woman. 43 These amendments and
statutes have been rigorously reviewed by judges in several states.
In July of 2006 the New York and the Washington Supreme Court
overruled lower court decisions supporting same-sex marriage. 44
Another case in Georgia reinstated a ban on gay marriage that
had been overturned by a lower Court.45 In each case the majority
echoed the importance of procreation and protecting the traditional
family as the states primary concern in regulating marriage.
In the years since the Massachusetts Supreme Court ordered
the legalization of same-sex marriage in that sate, same-sex marriage
proponents haYe been soundly defeated in most state trial courts and in
all state appellate courts in which they have argtted. This is unsurprising
when one considers that 87% of all state court judges are subject
to election.46 As long as a majority of the American people remains
against same-sex marriage a majority of these judges will remain so
42
Ken l. Kersch, Full Faith and CrediL for Same Sex Marriages?, 112 Por..
So. Q. 117,135 (1997).
Human Rights Campaign, State Prohibitions on J\'larriage for Same-Sex
43
Couples, http:/ / hrc.org/ Template.cfm?Sc:ction=Center&CO, TENTID=28225
&TEl\lPLATE=/Contenttvlanagcment/Contentdisplay.cfm Qast visited Mar. 3,
2006).
44
See Hernandez,.. Robles, i'-!o. 86-89, slip op. at 5 (.'l.Y. July 6, 2006);
.Andersen'~ King County, 138 P.3d. 963 (\X'ash. 2006).
45
Perdue'" O'KeUer, 632 SE.2d. 110 (Ga. 2006).
46
Dale Carpenter, The Federal ~larriage Amendment: Unnecessary, AntiFederalist, and Anti-Democratic, PoLICY AN1\LYSIS,june 1, 2006, at 1, 5 aYailablc at
http:/ I \\"\vw.cato.org/ pubs/ pas/ pa570.pd f.
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as well. Even federal judges with life-terms wiU be war) of passing a
groundbreak.ing ruling legalizing same-sex marriage. Research on the
relationship between the Supreme Court and public opinion shows
that that Court rarely strays far from the national consensus on a given
issue.'17 The Justices realize that the Court, while not subject to direct
election, relies on the approval and faith of the public for credibility
and institutional standing. Since the public feels so strongly about
the issue of gay marriage, it is unlikely that in the absence of a grave
violation of fundamental rights, the court would act so contrary to
popular opinion. Tbe threat of "activist judges" who might legalize
same-sex marriage continues to be, for now, hypothetical. \Xfhile the
possibility remains that these bans might be overturned and even that
the federal DOMA might be ruled unconstitutional, it appears more
likely that marriage will continue legally as a relationship between
a man and a woman. Jn effect, tl1e Federal Marriage Amendment
appears to be a pre-emptive strike against this hypothetical adverse
decision by the Supreme Court. For now it is best to allow the
DOJ\1A and similar state legislation to regulate same-sex marriage,
if the Supreme Court rules adversely in a same-sex marriage case it
would show the Amendments necessity, until then it is necessary to
remember that a preemptiYe constitutional an1endmem is rightfully
not something that has happened to this point in our nation's history. 48

V

CoNCLUSIONS

Proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage both
hold extremely entrenched positions about what should constitute a
marriage. While both sides present persuasive evidence in support of
their positions, legalizing gay marriage and passing a Federal Marriage
Amendment represent unnecessary and improper solutions to the
issue of san1e-sex marriage. Marriage has historically been a union
47
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48
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between a man and a woman. This traclicional definicion of marriage
should continue to govern the federal government's determinacion of
what constitutes marriage. For one, granting a fundamental right to
gay marriage is to exceed the scope of rights that are fundamental
to a person's life, liberty, and happiness. Also, because one of the
st.<tte's most important concerns in reguJacing marriage is concern for
children, the state should continue to determine the constitution of
marriage in a manner that provides the best em'ironn1ent for future
generations. finally, because sexual preference is not an immutable
characteristic such as race or sex legislation limiting same-sex
marriage should not be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.
Legalizing gay marriage would also not make good public
policy in America. The arguments which advocates use in favor
of same-sex marriage ignore the primary importance of the family
in marriage relationships. Heterosexual marriage is not only a
fundamental right it carries with it fundamental responsibilities
deeply rooted in our society. To argue against gay marriage does not
mean that homosexual couples are incapable of loving, personal,
and deeply committed relationships. They are every bit as capable
as any heterosexual; however, it is not in the government's best
interest to relegate marriage to an emotional and sexual commitment
between two people who choose to be married. As go,·ernment
struggles to control the excesses that have weakened traditional
heterosexual marriage, it should continue to promote and strengthen
an ideal that \\ill be best for irs current citizens and their posterity.
While it is important to limit same-sex marriage in America, an
amendment to the Constitution is neither the best nor the only answer
to this question. The Constitution clearly gives the states power over
domestic issues including the regulation of marriage. It is important
to our system of government that the balance of state and national
power be maintained. The process of amending the Constitution is
difficult for many reasons, among them that the document should not
address policy concerns that can be more adequately addressed through
statutory Jaw. Recently, the courts have upheld the Yast majority of
state constitutional amendments limiting same-sex marriage, following
99
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the general public's opinion that legalized gay marriage is not in the
nation's interest. lJotil this situation changes, the best way to limit samesex marriage is to allow states to continue ro prescribe the conditions
fo r marriage under the guidance and direction of the federal DOJ.\IA.
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THE

GRE1\TER

or Two Evrr.s:

THE CASE BEHJND
BY LINDSAY PETERSEN

DISCOVERY ABUSE IN

NoRm CouNTRY

1

) . l '\TR( )J)l 1CTl< >:"\
ith d1e release of the film North ountry, there has been
a renewed interest in the case behintl d1e movie. The
movie tells ilie story of a woman who endures intense
sexual harassment while working in Minnesota iron mines and decides
to speak out, despite strong opposition. This eventually leads to
the nation's first class action sexual harassment lawsuit.2 Jenson v;
Eveleth Taconite Co. is famous for its depiction of egregious sexual
harassment and the women who fought against it, but the story of
the abuse the women suffered at the hands of the court is lesserknown. Despite arguments that this case revolutionized sexual
harassment law, a careful examination of the history of the case, the
abusive discovery practices employed, and d1e negative results of
these practices reveals that the case did not improve the condition
of the women involved, but instead destroyed them emotionally.

W

II. HISTORY
The history of this case illuminates its negative impact.
Although the case was settled in 1998, the events that led up to the
settlement began in 1974, when several large steel companies reached
an agreement with the government to make up for past discrimination.
Many women were then lured to work in the mines because of high
wages. One of those women was Lois Jenson, who began working
for Eveleth Taconite in 1975. lt soon became eYident that the female
1
Lindsay Petersen is a jullior at Brigham Young University majoring in
Marriage, Family, and Human Development. She is planning to attend law school
after graduating from BYU. Lindsay is from Carmel, Indiana.
2
North Country: Synopsis, http:// northcountrymc)Yie. warnerbros.com/
srnopsis.html Qast visited Mar. 5 2007).
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workers were unwelcome. They faced intense sexual harassment
from some male workers, including insults, groping, threats, physical
intimidation, graffiti in the mines, and other forms of harassment.3
Sexual discrimina cion in promotion practices and general attitude was
also a problem. 4 Jenson notified company supervisors and union
rcpresentati,·es, but no one would help her. Her tires were slashed
after she sent a letter to the 1\Iinnesota Human Rights Department. 5
The state finally stepped in and ordered one of the mine's
part-owners to pay S11 ,000 in damages to Jenson, but rhe company
refused to do so. Jenson's attorney filed stdt in the U.S. District
Court of Minneapolis and asked that the case be gh·en class action
status, which the judge granted. This made history because it
was rhe first-ever sexual harassment case to be designated a class
action. ln the liability phase of the trial, the judge decided that the
mining company was liable because it did not prevent the sexual
harassment. The company was ordered to educate its workers about
sexual harassment and create new company policies regarding it.
The injustice the women faced from the court began when
Patrick ~kNulty, a former federal magistrate, was assigned to be
Special Master for the trial and therefore appointed to determine what
to award the ·women in damages. By way of background, ~fcNulty
was a 71-year-old former federal mat,~strate who Jenson's lawyer
believed was given the case to make up for having to step down from
his previous position before he would have liked to. Also, Jenson's
attorney was told by a female la\vyer that once, while sbe was trying a
case in his presence, McNulty "made a pass at her." HoweYer,Jenson's
lawyer had no proof of this claim and therefore, could take no action.6
It soon became evident that McNulty did not have a clear
concept of burden of proof for this case. Did rhe women have to
3
The Real Case Behind " 1orth Country," Imp:/ / w\\'\v.atlaner.org/
pressroom/ facts / dassacrions/north counrry.aspx Qast visited Mar. 5, 2006).
4
Jenson v. E'·eletb Taconite Co., 130 f.3d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir. 1997).
5
The Real Case Behind ":-.:orth Country," sup ra note 3.
6
Clara Bingham & Laura Leedy Cansler, Class Action: The Landmark Case
thar Changed Sexual Harassment Law 277-78 (2002).
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prove that the work em•ironment at the mines caused the damage
of mental anguish, or did the company have to prove that it did
not? Jenson's lav,ryer felt that the women's only responsibility at this
point was to show that the sexual harassment had affected them in
the way it would have affected a reasonable woman. The defense
lawyers argued d1at the plaintiffs had to prove that their emotional
anguish was caused by the work environment and not something else.McNulty seemed confused on the issue of burden of proof.
When asked for a ruling on the issue, he "rolled his eyes toward the
ceiling, slowing rocking his head back and forth." Jenson's lawyer
later said of this strange mannerism, which McNulty repeated often
at court, "It was extraordinary. As though he did nor know how to
rule, and perhaps God would tell him ... And, in fact, he did not know
how to rule. He was in over his head."8 Ultimately, ~Ic ulry decided
in favor of the mines. The subsequent appellate opinion (which
will be discussed later in greater detail) states, "Confusion about the
correct burden of proof set in at the early stages of discovery . ..
Somehow, and wid1out explanation . .. the Special Master foLmd it was
plaintiffs who had the burden to show aggravation of a pre-existing
condition, and that under Minnesota law 'the damages recoverable
are limited to additional injury direcdy caused by the aggravation."'9
P roblems of unsound legal thinking continued to cause
problems in this case. The appellate opinion also states, "ln conclusion,
we lind that by whatever synergistic reasoning utilized, the Special
Master did not apply proper principles of caLISation to plaintiffs'
claims of emotional harm. \'Xe belie,-e the Special Master's erroneous
approach p layed a significant and unfortunate role in limiting plaintiffs'
damages."w
McNulty collected 7,4o9 pages of testimony, culminating
m an extensive Report and Recommendation of 416 pages.11
7

8
9
10
II

Jd. aL 311.
Jd. at 311-1 2.
Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1293.
ld. at 1295.
!d. at 1290.
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In the report, l\ lcNulty insuJtingly said that the women were
"histnonic," and he made public personal matters. 12 He did award
the women funds, but only about $10,000 per person. 13 ln the
opinion, it stares, •<p ]aimiffs assert d1e damages awards do not
make the " ·omen whole and are totally inadequate and 'shocking."''~
As pre\ iously stated, the ''omen decided co appeal. The
National Organization for Women became invol\'ed in the situation by
filing an amicus b rief stating that McNulC)' held biased \'it!WS against
women. The decision by McNulty was overturned by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals. '" The court called for a trial de novo regarding
damages and, understandably, requested that there not be "further
reference to any Special 'Master" and added, "I n view of the record, we
hesirare to imroduce any new fact finder inro the case." 11' finally, right
before the start of the jury trial, Eveleth Mines settled with 15 women
on December 30, 1998, awarding ilie group $3.5 million in damagcsY
After this settlement, the women were worse off than they
had been, and rhey left ilie case feeling empty and defeated. I n Class
Action, a book ahout the case by Clara Bingham and Laura Leedy
Ganster, it States, "They wanted an apology from the company. They
wanted credibility in a community that did nor trust them. They
wanted co be believed. Now they felr iliat iliey had sold cl1emsel\'es
our. They felt unsatisfied, and for many of mem, it had nothing to
do with the amount of money they receh•ed." The women attempted
ro move on with their uves, but the scars left by the debilitating court
experience and the disco\·ery in particular \VOuld ne\ er fully heal. 1-

12
The Real Cao;c Behtnd "Nonh Countr)," III/Jiil note 2.
13
Jcmon vs. Eveleth ~lines, hup:/ /www.scxualharassmcntsuppon.org/
Jenson \'sEn:lcth~lincs.hunl (last visited ~far. 5, 2007).
14 Jenson, 130 1:.3dut 1291.
IS
The Real Ca!>C Behind "North Country," supm note 2.
16 Jenson, 130 E3d at 1304.
17
Bmg,ham & Ganslcr, s11pra note 6, at 378.
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111. DISCOVERY PRACTICES
The abusive manner and system of discovery was particularly
degrading and emotionally harmful to the women involved. Much
of it was intrusive and simply did not pertain to the case. The
defendants turned to many sources to find information on the life
events of the women, including abuse, abortions, medical histories,
sexual relationships, and experiences that took place during
childhood. The appellate opinion states, "We would agree that
much of the discovery (e.g., domestic abuse, earlier illnesses, and
personal relationships, etc.) was not relevant or was so remote in time,
that it should not have been allowed. Plaintiffs sought protective
orders, but the Special 1\Iaster denied the requested orders." 18
Interrogatories sent to rbe claimants asked about all the names
the claimants had ever used, names and addresses of every doctor ever
seen, dates the women were examined, and treatments received. There
were also questions about childhood, marriage, children, and social
relations. The lawyers representing the women refused to provide this
extensive list and instead cut the lifelong medical history to only the
time that they worked for Eveleth Mines. They also only gave the health
care providers' names and the reason for seeing them. Even cut down,
all of the information amounted to 16 pages. To add to all of this,
McNulty decided on a very aggressive schedule for discovery, only six
months.•~ This short time frame made it difficult for the '.VOrnen to deal
with the stress and pressure associated with the demands of discovery.
The defense tried to obtain the medkal records in vat·ious ways
and then subpoenaed the health care providers, including some not
even listed, and gave them a one-week deadline. The plaintiffs la\.vyers
were angry with the defense's demands for the women's records.
They wanted to screen the records before handing them over to the
defense. Also, the medical providers squabbled over confidentiality.
The defense asked the judge who ruled during the liability phase,
and who still was supervisor over McNulty, to force the production
18
19

Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1292-1293.
Bingham & Gansler, supn1 note 6, at 283-84.
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of meclical records. The defense reportedly said, "\'<'hen a plaintiff
'places her mental or psychological conclition at issue, a defendant is
entitled to cliscm·er the plaintiff's entire medical records in order to
determine 'whether other stressful situations' ... were responsible for
any emotional distress, rather than what happened at Eveleth Mines." 20
The judge decided that the defense could request the lifelong
medical records. H e ordered the plaintiffs to produce releases. He
required that all records be produced except for the few chat were
specifically objected to. The judge threatened claim dismissal if these
conditions were not met. 21 \X'ith this ruling, the women could not be
protected from intrusive requests such as "Relate aU the experiences
of your marriage relating to your dh·orce." The women could refuse
to answer, but they would be forced to stop pursuing the claim.22
The depositions that they faced from the defense were up to
eight hours long and very invasive. Class Actio11 states: "The point of
the depositions ... was to find out everything traumatic or disturbing
that had ever happened to the women. That meant hours and hours
of mind-numbing detailed questions about each woman's life, starting
·with birth."23 These questions included: "Have you ever been tested
for HIV or AIDS? Does your husband have any problems with
alcohol or drugs?...Does he read Pk!)lbqy? ...I-Iave you ever bit your
husband? HaYe your children ever run away?...Have any of your
brothers or sisters had financial problems?24 ... Given the average life
lived on the Iron Range, many of the questions were answereu in the
affirmative."The depositions lasred 41 days.25 The questioning was
emotionally draining on the women. One claimant was dying of Lou
Gehrig's disease, and the questionnaires repeatedly sent her into tears.2 6

20
21

Bingham & Ganslt:r, mpra note 6, at 284-86.
ld. at 287.
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The defense also sought to depose the fathers of Jenson's
children.1- Jenson's first child was conceiYed through date rape, and
the second was born out of ·wedlock after the father had ended the
relationship. Jenson had kept the first child, but gave the second for
adoption when she realized she could not care for both.28 The father
of her first child had not been in contact with Jenson for OYer 25 years.
Her lawyers felt there could be no other reason to depose him except
to embarrass Jenson and to attempt to get her to drop the lawsuit so
that her first child would not find out about his father and how he
was conceived. One of the lawyers said that the defense's "insistence
on deposing these men showed the absolute abusi\·eness of the
discovery ... The burden should have been on them to establish the
relevance of their testimony, but it wasn't. It was on Lois to show the
irrelevance, which she could not do." The claimant's attorneys fought
this, but the depositions were allowecli. 2Y When the man that raped
Jenson was deposed, he stated d1at he did not remember her and that
he had been told that the defense was attempting to discreditJenson.30
The defense chose Barbara Long, a mental health expert,
to evaluate the claimants. Long was known for finding that victims
of abuse and sexual harassment had emotional disorders before the
harassment took placeY After investigating Jenson, Long reported
that Jenson was pursuing the lawsuit mostly for money and blamed
Jenson's harassment on her «engaging, charming and manipulative"
behavior. Long also said that much of the harassment at work was
due to the culture of Iron Range. 32 Jenson was deposed again and
again. 33 The defense's plan was dearly to discredit the women in order
to either cast doubt on their claims or force them to drop the case.
Certainly, the injustice of these abusi,•e and invash·e
discovery practices is evident. An examination of the medical
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Bingham & Gansler, supm note 6, at 296.
ld. at 9- 1I.
ld. at 296-97.
/d. at 302-03.
ld. at 297.
Id. at 299-300.
Id. at 302.
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and personal histories of the plaintiffs was warranted to an
extent. However, the draining depositions, the personal nature of
the questions, and the obvious attempt to discredit the women
involved was unnecessary, as was later determined in the appeal. 34

IV.

NEGATlVE RESULTS

After the invasive discovery was completed, the women
were left emotionally debilitated. They had little to show for their
embarrassment because almost nothing was done to change the work
environment. In the first ruling in No' ember 1995, the Special Master
issued an insulting Report and Recommendation that subjected the
women to even more poor treatment: ''The 416-page report was worse
than anything they could have imagined, and they had imagined that it
would be bad. McNulty came as dose as he could to awarding them
nothing." The women were awarded $182,500 in total, with individual
awards ranging from $3,000 to $25,000. In other sexual harassment
cases at the time, plaintiffs were commonly awarded $200,000 and
higher. 15 Me ulty decided to rule out aU expert witnesses, saying
chat "experrs know no more than judges about what causes menta]
change-which is to say they know almost nothing." He decided to
base his decision about whether they had suffered from the harassment
completely on the women's testimony. Because he felt that they did not
prove that they were sexually harassed or that the work environment
damaged them, he ruled against the women in burden of proof.36
The women were discouraged by the ruling and the small
awards, but the bitter tone of the report sharpened the sting:
" ... Hostility toward the women ... oozed from nearly every paragraph
of the report." 37 McNulty also stated that d10se who claim sexual
harassment generally exaggerate and misconstrue "reasonably
expectable interpersonal conAicts in sexual terms." I le was not
34
35
36
37
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Jd. at 346-47.
ltl. at 347.
108

-

The Greater of Two Evils

convinced of any more mental harm than temporary anger and
embarrassment. In the report, he was very bitter toward the women,
particularly Jenson. He said that she tended to be dramatic and to
"slcirt around the whole trutb.".>S \X'orst of all for Jenson, her rape was
spoken of openly in the report, even though she was told it woultl be
kept under seal. He said that Jenson had mischaracterized the rape, and
that in reality, it was consensual. Other intimate things that the women
had testified about were included in the report. Tbcse personal details
were now released to the public and readily available on the 1nternet.3'1
After the discovery was completed, Jenson's "spi rit
was broken." The draining process had impacted e\·ery part
of her life, and she felt isolated from her friends and family. 40

V.

0PPOS~G VIEWPOINTS

Some argue that this case can be praised for malcing
improvements in worlcing conditions. However, the suffering
the women endured was the greater of the two evils.
I t can be said that because the 1-.IcNulty ruling was so unjust,
it was easier to get it overturned. One of Jenson's lawyers said, "The
level of venom in the report was both extremely disheartening and
heartening at the same time, because in it lay the possibility for
redemption." 41 However, after so many personal details about the
\Vomen had been revealed, not onJy in court, but to the general public,
it would be impossible to ever be made whole. A look at the case, overall,
reveals many meaningful precedents, the most prominent of which
was the establishment of the first sexual harassment class action suit.
According to some sources, the outcome of the liability
portion of the trial, which held companies accountable for sexual
harassment, fundamentally impacted sexual harassment law by
38
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inspiring more class action cases:~2 The case inspired more women to
fight for their r.ighrs, such as those inYoh·ed in d1e 1996 class action
case brought aga.inst ~fiLsubishi on charges of sexual harassment,
d1c Merrill Lynch sexual discrimination class action case, and a new
case in which female Wal-J\fart employees arc suing by means of class
~1ction on the bas.is of sexual discrinUnation.~ 3 This kind of case is
used by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as it deals
with the accountability of companies. Also, this case influenced the
passage of federal and state laws for the protection of workers..."
Despite these arguments, research has shown that Jenson did not
change sexual harassment law by inspiring the cerci fication of more class
action cases.45 After me case recei,·ed class action scatus, it \vas prerucred
that the case would inspire a flood of class action sexual harassment
cases.46 I Iowevcr, a study of sexual harassment cases filed between
l986 and 1995 showed that "in contrast to well -publicized accounts
of class action lawsuits in the media, only three of the approximately
£ive hundred cases .involved a class action." 4" Also, a search of sexual
harassment cases from 1995 to 2002 reYeals only ten class action cases.41j
Despite predictions that ir would inspire many more class action cases
and Class Action's claim that the case "set many important precedems,"4 '1
some evidence shows mat it did nor revolutionize sexual harassment la\v.
Even the few positive results did not justify or lessen the
abuse and embarrassment endured by the plaintiffs during the suit.
Despite the praise that this case receives from media such as Class
42
Bmgham & Gamier, mpra note 6, at 346-4- at 3K2.
43
One Lawsuit ~lade a Difference for Countless \'\"omen, http://www.
:ulanet.org/rocus/0511 07.aspx (last \'isited ~far. 5, 2007).
44
The Real C..ase Behmd "~onh Country" slljJra note 3.
~lclissa 11art, Liugauun NarratiYes: \'\'h) Jenson ,.. E,·clcth Didn't Change
45
Se\Ual Harassment Law, But Still Has a Story W'orth Tcllin~, 18 Bt!rkcley \'\omen's
I..J. 282, 282 (2003).
46
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47
Ann Juliann & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of SexuaiiJarassmcnt
Cases, 86 Cornell L. Re\·. 548, 562-63 (200 1).
48
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Actio11 and the mm•ie f\To1th CoullhJ', it practically destroyed the women
who fought for their rights. Trying to change societal problems comes
with a price, but the injustice and abuse that the women suffered \Vas
beyond any necessary payment. At one point during her questioning
by a psychiatrist, Jenson was asked about the personal impact of the
litigation. She replied that she had learned much of the legal system and
the potential cruelty of courts and attorneys. She also felt that calling
her rapist should be illegal.50 At an anniversary dinner for the law firm
that had worked with Jenson, many people praised her for what she
had done, but she had a difficult time feeHng any pride. According to
Class Action, "One lawyer from Duluth shook Lois's hand and said,
'D o you know how many women you've helped?' The truth was, she
didn't. D espair was "\Vhat she knew, and she had held steadfastly to
it." 51 In spite of the advances the case brought about, the injustice
suffered by the women because of the cliscovery abuse was greater.

VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it can be said that ]mson v. Et'e/eth Taconite Co. did
not deliver justice, but instead, the abusive cliscovery practices used
therein actually made it worse for the women involved. The ways in
which both the case and the women were affected by the abuse \viii
continue to stand as a witness to the abuse that was endured. The case
history, the discovery practices themselves, the results of the discovery,
and a look at opposing vie\vpoints show that the women suffered a
great injustice by our legal system through discovery abuse in this case.
\V'hatever success came from this case, d1e women were affected in
a way that can neYer be repaired. The appellate opinion states quite
pointedly, " lf our goal is to persuade the American people to utilize
our courts as little as possible, we have furthered that objective in dus
case. Jf justice be our quest, citi7.ens must receive better treatment."52
50

51
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Although thJs case did not deu\'er justice, it can now act as
a call for reform and unprm emem. A ttenoon must be paid to
the follies of the lawyers and the Special Master when tbey forgot
that the law exists to scn·e people and not itself. Although this
case did more harm than good co the women involved, it can serve
some p urpose if it is seen as both a revelation and a war ning. The
bittersweet resolution of this ilifficult case is aptly described in the
words of Jenson's lawyer: ''lt was an important case. l f it were not
for the roU it rook on the women ... ir would ha\e been a great case."51

53

BI-;GH..-\.\1 &

G

\\N 1 R,

supm note 6, at 377.
112

Reverse Age

Di~criminntion

REVERSE AGE D tSCRI~IINJ\'fiON :

GE

A

SHORT REVIEW OF

ERAL D YNAMIC L\."o SYSTt .Ms
w II \RRIS1

INc.

v.

CuNE

BY PHILIP

A

n irre,·ersible fact of life is that all people in this world, whether
male or female, black or white, conservatiye or liberal, "ill all
die. The human body continues to de\'elop throughout life and
in some cases age presents limitations that make it harder to function,
par ticularly in the workplace. So the American government has provided
protection for the older working class against discrimination in favor
of younger laborers. This statute is called the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (1\DEA). This short review will show
that rhe intentions behind the ADEA do not p rovide protection for
discrimination of the younger, citing the case Genera/lJjwa!nics La11d
Systems Inc. v. Cline as an example. By examining the reasons for and
characteristics of the AD EA, the decision in Gmeral D)'11a111ics Land
Jjste111s Inc. u Cline, prior cases addressing the issue, and the intent of
the ADEA to protect the older worker from unfair replacement by
the younger.

II. REAso:-.:s FoR A 10 Cl L\RACTERJSTICS Or THE ADEA
In 1964 the Ci\'il Rights Acr did not ha,-e specifications relating
to age discrimination but it did call for the Secretary of Labor to make
a fuU and complete study. This study was to address factors which may
tend to result in employment discrimination because of one's age and
of the consequences of such discrimination.l The ADEA was written
in response to the findings of the Secretary of Labor about the grmving
Philip \Xi. l larris is a sophomore at Brigham Young University majoring in
Mechanical Engineering. Upon graduation, he plans to pursue a law degree with an
emphasis in intellectual propcrry Ia\\: Philip is from Farmington, l'tah.
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Ci\'il Rights i\ct, 42 l 1.S.C. § 7 15 (1964).
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social problem of age discnminarion that hau led to the mistreaonent
of older workers. This can be clearly seen in the opening section of
the act. The ADEA states ItS purpose, "w promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems stemming from the impact of age on
employment."3
This well defined purpose shows that the portion of the working
class to be protected is the older class. This term "older" is defined later
as employees "at least 40 years of age."~ Thus, no one under 40 years of
age would be entitled to any ruling on their behalf due to reverse age
discrimination. If Congress intended to protect the younger employee
they would not hm:e simply failed ro include those under the age of 40
in the ADEA, but rather would have provided specific protection for
all employees including even the part-time worker still in adolescence.
The aim of the legislation as interpreted by the courts in
pondering this issue is to protect older American workers from
discrimination based on age. The Congress more specifically stated
the problem as follows: "In the face of rising producri,·ity and
affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts
to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when
displaced from jobs."' The intent of the Congress in this case was
particularly tO proYide protection to the "older" workers in relation
to the "younger" workers. Therefore, Congress' intent was not to
prevent reverse age discrimin~tion but only to prc,·ent bias in which
the older worker \\·as disath antaged arbitrarily for the younger worker.

lll. T ill

D LCISIO:\ h'YOL\'1,(, CU.\'E

ln the case of Cemnd D)'lla!llics Land .\)stems Inc. zt Cline the topic
at hand was again whether the ADEA made reverse age discrimination
allo\\'able. In the year 2001, a collective barg~1ining agreement by the
3
4
5
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company and the United Auto Workers Union, limited retirement
health insurance benefits to those 50 years of age or older. Current
and prior employees between ages 40-49 proposed that the ADEA's
prolUbition covered "discriminat[ion] ...because of [an] individual's
age."6 This suit, brought by nearly 200 employees--called Cline
collectively--alleged that there had been age discrimination in favor
of the older employees. TlUs case came before the lower courts and
was consequently appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The issues and decisions declared in the lower courts
will be cliscussed later in part to acknowledge opinions contrary to
those of the Supreme Court on the issue of re,·erse age discrimination.
The court returned to the investigation by the Secretary of
Labor in the late 1960s wlUch found that the cost of hiring older
employees was higher and there were legitimate reasons to question an
older employee's ability to perform their task. These reasons included
Jess physical capability and lack of up to date training in the field. So the
Court looked to the intent of the legislators at the time and issues at hand.
They concluded, " ... from the voluminous records of the hearings, we
have found (and Cline has cited) nothingsuggestingthatanyworkerswere
registering complaints about discrimination in favor of their seniors."Through examination of tbe original situation, tbe court found the root
of the problem to be discrimination of the older in favor of the younger.
The court heard three major arguments by Cline that supported
their declaration of palpable discrimination. 'fhe first contention of Cline
came from the multiple uses of the word "age" in the ADEA document.
Clim pointed to other cases as precedents, where the same word held a
constant meaning throughout a document. Here the court disagreed
for two reasons. First, in reading law we must discern the meaning of
the word from those that enclose it. Additionally, the court clisagreed
due to the many ways the sentences were connected to the word "age.''
Cline's second argument relied upon d1e words of an original
ADEA proponent. During the 1967 hearings, Senator Yarborough was
asked his opinion on the ability of the act to forbid discrimination of
6

Id. at§ 623(c)(2).
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parties both within the prorectcc.J age class anc.J not. Senator Yarborough
stated, "The law prohibits age being a factor in the decision tO hire, as
to one age 0\~er rhe other, whichever war his decision went."~ These
remarks did support Clinr }assertion in a small way, but this e\'idence was
insufficient in over ruling the precedent established by past case findings.
The third argument in Cline's case came as a claim that the courts
should defer to the U.S. HlJual Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC) understanding and reading of the statute. In 1981, the EEOC
adopted a regularion which giYes an example of employees with ages
42 and 52 applying for the same position. The regulation states that
"the employer may not Ia\\ fuJly tum down either one on the basis of
age, but must make such decision on the basis of some other factor."Y
Thus Cline wanted the Court to defer based on this ordinance of the
h J:oc which had already been written. Unfortunately the court's
reply was that deference would be given "only when the devices of
judicial construction haYc been tried and found to yidd no clear sense
of congressional iment." 111 The court decided here that the intent of
Congress had been established through prior decisi()ns reached by
numerous other cases ca es. A fe'.\ of these decisions will be addressed
later and it will be shown that upon correct interpretation of the act by the
courts, the intent of the acr and process bas been upheld. So, in relation
to this case, the Court denied deference due to Cline} lack of proof
and generally rejected Clint:} arguments for reverse age discrimination.

JV.

PRIOR CASES

In our examination, the precedents established by prior
cases deserve attention. These rulings ha\ e established precedents
in interpretacion nf the Ia\\' as written by Congress. One case that
pertains to the topic at hand is Dittman t: Gmeml Motors. T his case
H
Agt: Discrimination llt:arings, 113 Cong. Rcc. 31255 (I!)(> 7) (statement of
lhlph Yarborough of Texas, Senator of the United States).
9
U.S. Equall :mplonncm Opportunity Commis!>ion, 29 LF.R. 1625.2(a)
(2003).
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was brought before the District Court in Connecticut \vith allegations
chat the employer, GM, made generous retirement plan offers w
workers who were over 50 years of age, but left out part of the "older"
class contained from 49-50. The district court held chat the ''ADEA
specifically allows retirement plans such as the one in guestion, and
ADEA does not bar discrimination against the young in fa,·or of the
old."11 This court also applied che eccion of the ADEA that related
to retirement and pension plans. The ADEA is not 'iolared because
"an employee pension benefit plan... provides for the attainment
of a minimum age as a conclition of eligibility for normal or early
retirement benefits."'2 This section provides for employers to be
able to make judgments as to which portion of the "protected class"
may be eligible for specific benefits in relation to a retirement plan.
The case Parker t~ Wake/in also addresses this issue, in part, and
supports the intent of the ADEA. This case was again about the
protected class o f those betw·een the ages of 40-49, and one issue was
whether these reachers could claim discrimination based on disparate
impact due tO the writing of the retirement plan reguiremenrs. The
Court ga,·e their opinion and ruling based on d1e ADE.A, saying:
"The ADEA has never been construed to permit younger persons
to claim discrimination against them in favor of older persons." The
Court continued, "Indeed the existence of minimum age requirements
suggests that it was only discrimination i11 Jaror of younger indi,·iduals
that the law is designed to prohibit."" So the holding in this case again
bolsters the intent of the ADEA as being to prevent discrimination
against older workers based solely on their age, not younger
workers being discriminated against in favor of rhe older workers.
Another ruling in support of this topic came down from the
United State Court of Appeals, Seventh Orcu.it in I lumilton ~~ Catnpillar
Inc. In a similar situation to d1e prior cases mentioned, the court
again ruled that the ADEA does not prO\·ide for claims of re,·erse
discrimination. The Court ruled that the ADEA "does not protect
II
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the young as well as the old, or e\·en, we think, the younger against the
older."11 This statement is importantin relation to the Cline case because
though the younger are in the protected class of age 40 and abm·e, they
are not protected in relation to the older part of the protected class.

v. 11\TENT OF Til E ADEA
One of the main causes of contradictory decisions from

lower and higher courts was intent versus the literal wording of the
statute. It seems that the Supreme Court relied on the objective
of the legislatures in writing the statute, while the Sixth Circuit
Court and dissenting justices of the Supreme Coun seemed to
base parr of their ruling on the exact wording used in the statute.
The Sixth Circuit Court ruled in favor of Cline, and Jus rice Cole's
opinion included his view that "Congress's choice of language, whether
specifically intended or not, prohibits age discrimination rhar favors
older over younger protected employees."•s The major opinion against
the holding of the Supreme Court comes from the language used in
the act itself. This includes the protection of "any individual...bccause
of such individual's age."•• Justice Cole's opinion points ro Sections
623 and 631 of the ADEA which summarized says that discrimination
is against the law and any person 40 or older would be protected and
have the right to sue their employer. This opinion allows fo r reverse age
discrimination cases to be upheld, due ro the language of the ADEA.
Essential ro the discussion at hand is the value of inrcrpretation
and the '\;alue of the plain language. By analyzing the two different
opinions on sides of the issue we see how important iment and
language are. In this case a few short words ha\·e made all the
difference. One might question whether the courts should take the
language within the statutes to be exact anu, if not, how far should
they go co infer the purpose of congress many years ago. The Supreme
14
15
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Court reaffirmed pasr holdings regarding re>erse age discrimination.
By looking to t.he social climate, reason and proceedings of the
actual composidon of the act, tbcy have found the true intent of
Congress, which in 1967 included protection of the older worker from
discrimination in favor of the younger. If there is a social problem
of fayoring the older 'ersus the younger, then an im-estigation
similar to that of 1967 is required and legislation may be necessary.
The ruling in General DJ'IltiiJJirs Land .f)'slems Inc. l! Cline is
essential to understanding d1e intent of the ADEA. '1'bis act was
written for the protection of older workers' rights from abuse by
employers wanting cheaper, younger labor. By understanding the
language of the act, the intent is clear. The precedents and rulings
of prior cases for decades show that the judicial system has upheld
that intent, particularly in Land .S)sle111s Inc. v. Cline. Age discrimination
may continue to be a problem in the future, but with a clearer
understanding of the intent of the ADEA, employers and employees
will be able to know how they are limited and to what they are entitled.
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